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lfp/ss 03/01/82
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Dick

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 1, 1982

80-945 Harlow
I think the Chambers draft of Februar 27 generally
is excellent.

I have raised a question or two, and

suggested minor language changes.
As I reviewed the draft, I had in mind Byron's
view that we should take this opportunity to confine the
applicable standard to whether the official "knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took" was
unconstitutional.

In his view, the frustration of what the

Court intended in Butz results primarily from the "malice"
component of the wood v. Strickland standard.

Incidentally,

Byron says this was first announced in an earlier decision.
He agrees now that virtually every plaintiff can make a jury
case by alleging malice - a subjective issue of an
official's good faith.

Although he recognizes that the

"constitutional" standard - at least the "should have known"
portion of it - may be viewed in some cases as subjective,
this should be a question of law for a court to decide.
I am inclined to accept Byron's view for two
reasons.

First, I think he is basically right.

Second, as

he moved to this position last Term in his memorandum in

2

0

Nixon, and seems firmly of this opinion, we probably would
have a badly fractured Court if I retain the "malice"
component.

Byron thinks - and he may be right - that the

Chief and possibly even Rehnquist - would join this
reformulation of the standard.
The principal negative, as we have discussed, is
that it would be necessary partially to overrule prior
decisions.

This may be justified in light of experience.
I therefore suggest that you make the necessary

revisions.

The principal changes will be in Part IV.

When

we have a draft, I will submit it to John Stevens in view of
our prior collaboration.
It may be, Dick, that this change would provide
the protection against insubstantial suits going to trial
that our present IV is intended to provide.

If we make

clear that the application of the standard normally presents
a question of law, I may conclude that shifting the burden
of proof is unnecessary. What do you think?
But first, I would like to see how adoption of an
objective standard writes.

I would make sure that the print

shop retains the present draft, as possibly we may revert to
it.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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March 10, 1982
JOHN GINA-POW

To:

Dick Fallon

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-945 - Harlow v. Fitzgerald

In a talk with Justice Stevens this morning, he advised
that he will join Nixon as now written and thinks it is an
excellent opinion.
Justice Stevens also likes the Harlow draft, but has
some suggestions only one of which I view as substantive:
1.

He would add to fn 10 (p.S) a more explicit

reference to the subject of fn 36.

We might simply add a

sentence saying that the question whether a private cause of
action may be inferred is not presented, and then refer to
fn 36.
2.

Referring to fn 16, page 10, John thinks that

separation of powers considerations may be implicated to
some extent by suits against high officials.

I think he

would be satisfied if we simply change the last sentence in

2.

the note to read: " suits against other high officials including presidential aides - generally do not to the same
extent invoke the special separation of powers
considerations ..•. "
3.

On page 13 we have the sentence that identifies the

"societal costs".

John likes what we have said, but would

add, possibly in a separate sentence, the thought that
decision making should not be affected by personal concerns
of possible liability.

we said this in Nixon.

It would be

easy to repeat it here.
4.

As usual, John has some innovative ideas.

He

thinks that the Wood v. Strickland standard (referred to on
p. 14) is internally inconsistent, and that the malice
component is meaningless.

For example, if it were found

that the defendant neither knew nor reasonably should have
known of the asserted constitutional right, how could there
have been a malicious intention to violate it?

Thus, John

thinks that by abandoning the malice component we really
aren't making a substantive change.

He will give us some

language for a note.
5.

On page 18, John would like for us to add a note -

perhaps in an existing note - a statement that there also
often will be a recovery against the government itself, as
was true in this case.

John thinks we should repeat,

briefly, as we said in Nixon, that Butterfield already has
made a substantial recovery against the government.

3.

6.

Recognizing that he was "kicking me in the shins" a

bit, John asked if I wouldn't recognize stare decisis enough
to include in footnote 36 a reference to his opinion in
Merrill Lynch, noting that it infers an intent of Congress
to create a private cause of action where it deliberately
accepted an established line of federal court decisions.
Assuming that Merrill Lynch comes down before Harlow, I
suppose I can do this.

Incidentally, perhaps to make it

easier for me, John says that from now on unless there has
been a history similar to that in Merrill Lynch, he will be
as strict as I have been about implying unexpressed damage
suit rights.
7.

Finally, and not surprising, he has reservations

about our Part C (p. 19).

He makes the arguable valid

comment that there may be some question as to

the source of

our authority to change the burden of proof except where due
process is implicated.

John does say, and would be willing

to accept a change on page 18, that judges appropriately
should be able in most cases to decide whether an official
reasonably could have been expected to know about the law.
Although I do not entirely agree that we lack the power
to identify the burden of proof with respect to an immunity
we have created, I am nevertheless inclined to omit sub-part

c.

I would, however, make the change in the last sentence

in the first full paragraph on page 18 that he would accept.

4.

Also, I would like to give Judge Gesell a more
prominent billing than you have done.

At one point in

drafting Nixon, we had included both of the paragraphs from
Gesell's opinion, one that emphasized the burdens of
protracted litigation and the other that purposed a change
in the burden of proof.

I do not recall why we omitted

these from Nixon.

I certainly would like to include the

former in Harlow.

Gesell has tried a number of these cases,

others will certainly come before him, and he is a respected
district judge.

***
I suggest that you make the changes indicated above,
and I will show them to Justice Stevens before we go back to
the printer.

I would like to be able to say to Justice

White that the draft has been approved by Stevens.

LFP, JR.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 10, 1982

Re:

80-945 - Harlow & Butterfield v.
Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Perhaps the footnote that I suggested could be
added on to the end of footnote 24 on pages 14-15 and
might read something like this:
"The two-pronged standard as phrased in
Wood is, of course, somewhat redundant. For if
it is determined that the defendant neither knew
nor should have known that his conduct would
violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights,
it would necessarily follow that the defendant
could not have acted with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of a constitutional right
that defendant knew nothing about."
Respectfully,

!/~1..
Justice Powell

/

March 12, 1982
80-945 Barlow

Dear John:
Here is the draft (3/8/82) of my opinion in this
case that you previously reviewed. Almost all of the
changes i.ndicated are made i.n response to your suggestions.
Two explanations may be helpful. First, I have
made no reference in the final footnote (n. 37, p. ?.0) to
your decision in Merrill Lynch. At the same time that I am
trying to make your opinion look dreadfully wrong, it would
look a bit curious to include it in another opinion I am
circulati.ng. Nhen Merrill r,ynch comes down, however, twill
refer to it as our latest expression on implied actions.
Now, back to Harlm~. In view of your reservations
about Subpart c of Part IV (p. 19), I have substantially
revised the prior draft. I very much hope the substance of
the revision will have your approval and become a ~ourt
opinion, or at least command sufficient support to encourage
District Courts to assume greater responsibi.lity in cases of
this kind. For example, if .Judge Gesell had not felt
constrained by the views of c~oc, I think it is evident from
what he wrote in Halperin that he would have dismi.ssed a
case like this one on the basis of the plaintiff's marginal
summary judgment showing.
We emphasized in Butz that District Courts should
be able to identify early the insubstantial suits, and

prevent them from dragging on for years - as is now taking
place. The assumption that District Courts would be
sensitive to their duty to do this underlies the distinction
we have drawn between qualified and absolute immunity.
Again, I express my appreciation for your
willingness to helP me put the draft in a form that both of
us can sup~ort before I circulate. I will await further
wor~ from you.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss

March 15, 1982

PERSONAL

Dear John:
Again I thank you for reviewing my Harlow draft,
and the suggested revisions.
I consider your support essential.
Sandra favors
qualified immunity. But, unless the opinion persuades the
Chief and Bill Rehnquist, they will go for absolute
immunity. Whether Byron will be content with the way I have
written Harlow remains to be seen. If he joins us, we will
still need one of our Brothers who were with Byron last
Term.

In this uncf">rtain post.ure of the case, I would
like to have Harlow satisfactory to you so that you could
join promptly after circulati.on. I therefore am eliminating
Subpart c. I t7ould like, however, to keep a gentle
admoni-tion in the opinion somewhere, and suggest the
enclos~d footnote to be added as a paragraph on page 16 at
the place indicated. The note is faithful to the Court's
opinion in Butz.
I add, in response to your letter, that I do think
Subpart c is well within the authority of the Court.
Qualified immuni.ty is a judge-made doctrine, and I would
think we properly may define safeguards to its aopli.cation.
Because of the strong public interest in a case of this
kind, it differs from the relevant considerations on summary
judgment in the typical civil litigation. I make this point
only in response to your view - but in recognition that you
could be right.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 15, 1982

Re:

80-945 - Harlow & Butterfield v.
Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for sending me a copy of your revised
draft of the opinion. I think it is a fine job: it
satisfies my concerns in all except the two respects
you mentioned in your letter.
You are, of course, entirely correct in
postponing any reference to Merrill Lynch until that
case comes down.
Your rewrite of Subpart C of Part IV is a
substantial improvement and certainly makes good
sense but I am still troubled by our lack of power to
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for one
class of litigants. The problem is the same basic
issue that separated us in cases like Duke Power, New
York Telephone, Snepp, and most recently, Mite. I-n-all of those cases, your vote was consistent with
wise policy and mine may have reflected nothing but
an out-of-date notion about the scope of our power.
Nevertheless, I do not believe I will be able to join
IV-C. I suggest that you circulate it in its present
form anyway. It may well command a Court. I will
not respond to it immediately, and ultimately may
simply write a sentence or two noting my inability to
join that portion of your opinion.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

March 17, 1982
PERSO~tJ\L

80-945 Harlow
Dear Chief and Bill:
I am circulating this afternoon draft opinions in
Nixon and narlow.

taxon is written, I beli.eve, in full accord with
your respective views. In writing Harlow, I have followed as ! feel obligated to do - the Court's decision i.n Butz v.
Economou, a decislon that I know displeases both of you.
You wiii recall that last Term, in each of the eight
separate drafts of my memoran~um in the Kissinger case, I
also applied the Butz qualified immunity rationale with
respect to the claims against Kissinger, Mitchell and
Halderman. I did recognize, however, that even where an
official normally has qualified i:mmunity only, certain
functions are sufficiently sensitive to justify absolute
protection, e.g., national defense.
I invite your attention today particularly to one
major change that I have incorporated in the flarlow opinion.
I propose a modification of the Wood v. Strickland standard
to eliminate the •malice" component. Byr.on suggested this
laet Term, and I am happy to accede to the suggesti.on. My
guess is that most of the protracted trials have resulted as in this case - from allegations of subjective malice
which generally create jury questions. In sum, if there is
a Court for Harlow the way it is written, t think nietrlct
Courts will be encouraged to identify and dismiss
insubstantial claims.

I add that the apparent alternative to a Court
along the lines of my draft is a fractured Court, perhaps
splitting three ways that may leave the malice component in
the standard, and the CAOC opinion in ~issinqer as the law
at least of this Circuit.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 18, 1982

Re:

80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield
v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
If my presently circulating opinion in Merrill Lynch
becomes a Court opinion, I will ask you to make a modest
language change in footnote 35. On the assumption that
we will have no difficulty ~ing on an appropriate
change in that footnote, please join me in your opinion.

--

-

-------------,..

Respectfully,
I

I

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

rl

Clfottrl of tlrt ~nittb ~hdeil
~asltington. 19. <!f. 211~'-1~

~uprtntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR.

March 18, 1982

80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear John:
Thank you for your "join" in the above case.
This will confirm that I will add appropriate
language in footnote 35 to reflect a Court opinion in
Merrill Lynch. As I am dissenting in that case, and even
though my cause may be "lost", I will await the final
decision before making the change.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

March 18, 19B?

80-945 Harlow and

~utterfieJ~

v.

Fitzq~rald

Dear .lohn:
'T'hank. vou for vour "join" i.n the above case.
This will confirm that T will add appropriate
language in footnote 3Cl to reflect a Court opinion in
Men:i.ll t.ynch. As I am di~sentinq tn that case, and even
though my cause may be "lost", t wtl1 at..rait the fi.nal
decision

b~fore

making the change.

SincereJy,

Justice Stevens

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

The Chief Justice
Circulated: liAA 3 0 1982

From:

Recirculated: _ __ __ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-945

BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P.
BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]

Memorandum of Dissent, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER.
The Court today decides in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No.
79--1738, what has been taken for granted for 190 years but
not explicitly decided by this Court: it is implicit in the Constitution that a President of the United States has ·absolute
immunity from civil suits arising out of official acts. Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 17. I agree fully that absolute immunity for official acts of the President is, like Executive Privilege, "fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708
(1974). l
In this case the Court decides that senior aides of a President do not have the same immunity as the President. I am
at a loss, however, to reconcile this conclusion with our holding in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 616 (1972). In
' Presidential immunity for official acts while in office has never been seriously questioned until the last 10 years. N ixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
21, n. 36. I can find only one instance in which a citizen sued a former
president for acts committed while in office. A suit against Thomas Jefferson was dismissed for being improperly brought in Virginia, thus precluding the necessity of reaching any immunity issue. Livingston v. J eff erson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C .C. VA. 1811).
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80--945-MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT
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HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

Gravel we held that it is implicit in the Constitutiort that
aides of Members of Congress have absolute immunity for
acts performed for Members in relation to their legislative
function. We viewed this immunity as deriving from the
Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that "for any
Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." Art. I,
§ 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Read literally, the Clause would
limit absolute immunity to only the Member and to speech
and debate only within the Chamber. But we have read
much more into this plain language. The Clause says nothing about "legislative acts" outside the Chambers, but we
concluded that the Constitution grants absolute immunity for
legislative acts not only "in either House" but in committees
and conferences and in their reports on legislative activities.
Then, far beyond the words to be found in the Constitution
itself, we held that a Member's aides who implement policies
and decisions of the Member are entitled to the same absolute
immunity as a Member. It is hardly an overstatement to say
that we thus avoided a "literalist approach", Gravel, supra,
at 617, and instead looked to the structure of the document
and the function of the legislative branch. In short, we drew
this immunity for legislative aides from a functional analysis
of the legislative process in the context of the document
taken as a whole.
In Gravel we very properly recognized that the central
purpose of a Member's absolute immunity would be "diminished and frustrated" if the legislative aides were not also
protected by the same broad immunity. Speaking for the
Court, Justice White stated:
"[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of
the modern legislative process, with Congress almost
constantly in session and matters of legislative concern
constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to
perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides

80-94~MEMORANDUM

OF DISSENT

HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

3

and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is
so critical to the Members' performance that they must
be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are
not so recognized, the central role of the Speech and Debate Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary ... -will inevitably be diminished and
frustrated." 408 U. S., at 616-617 (emphasis added).
I joined in that analysis and continue to agree fully with it,
for without absolute immunity for the aides, who are indeed
"alter egos," a Member could not effectively discharge all of
the assigned constitutional functions of a modern legislator. 2
Since the Court has made this reality a matter of our constitutional jurisprudence, how can we conceivably hold that a
President of the United States, who represents a vastly
larger constituency than does any Member of Congress,
should not have aides with comparable immunity. To perform the Constitutional duties assigned to the Executive
would be "literally impossible, in view of the complexities of
the modern [Executive] process ... without the help of aides
and assistants"-"alter egos" as we described them in
Gravel. 3 408 U. S., at 616-617. These words reflect the
2

A Senator's allotment for staff varies significantly, but can range from
as few as 17 to over 70 persons. S. Doc. No. 19, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
27-106 (1981). House Members have roughly 18 to 26 assistants at any
one time. H.R. Doc. No. 97-113, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 2&-174 (1981).
3
In the early years of the Republic, Members of Congress and Presidents performed their duties without staffs of aides and assistants. Washington and Jefferson spent much of their time on their plantations. Congress did not even appropriate funds for a presidential clerk until 1857.
Lincoln opened his own mail, Cleveland answered the phone at the White
House and Wilson regularly typed his own speeches. S. Wayne, The Legislative Process 30 (1978). Whatever may have been the situation beginning under Washington, Adams and Jefferson, we know today that the
presidency functions with a staff that exercises a wide spectrum of authority and discretion and directly assists the President in carrying out Con-

80-94&-MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT
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HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

precise analysis of Gravel, and this analysis applies with even
greater force to a President. The primary layer of senior
aides of a President-like a Senator's "alter egos"-are literally at a President's elbow, with offices a few feet or at most a
few hundred feet from his own desk. The President, like a
Member, may see those aides many times in one day. They
maintain regular communication with Cabinet officers and
heads of the vast network of the federal bureaucracy to implement directives and policies of the President. They are
indeed the President's "arms" and "fingers" to perform his
Constitutional duty "to see that the laws are faithfully executed." Like a Member of Congress, but on a vastly greater
scale, the President cannot conceivably personally implement
a fraction of his own policies and decisions.
Consist-ent with history and reality, the Court today correctly holds that the Constitution affords a President of the
United States absolute immunity from civil liability for official acts. This places the President and Members of the two
Houses of Congress on essentially the same basis with respect to civil liability for their official acts, the former under
what we hold is implicit in the Constitution, the latter's immunity is express. 4 The Court in Gravel included legislative
aides within the constitutional immunity of Members of Congress, not because the Constitution said so explicitly but because it is implicit in the function of the legislative branch
under that document.
If, as we held in Gravel, "it is literally impossible, in view
of the complexities of the modern legislative process ... for
Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides," is this not at least equally true of a
President? 408 U. S., at 616-617. And if the "day-to-day
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance
stitutional duties.
' It is not insignificant, as a matter of history, that the immunity of a
chief of state long preceded recognition of legislative immunity.

•
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that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos," why is
this not true of a President's aides? Ibid. If we assume
each Member of Congress has only 10 aides-and many have
more-who are entitled to share in the Member's absolute
immunity, that means that more than 5,000 legislative aides
are entitled to absolute immunity under the Constitution, as
construed by this Court. Yet the Court today holds that the
Constitution does not provide equal immunity for two personal "alter ego" aides of a President!
For some inexplicable reason the Court declines to recognize the realities in the workings of the Presidential office,
despite the Court's cogent recognition a decade ago in Gravel
concerning the workings of the Congress. Absent equal protection for a President's aides, how will Presidents be free
from the risks of "intimidation . . . by [Congress] and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary?" 408
U. 8., at 617. Under today's holding the functioning of the
Presidency will inevitably be "diminished and frustrated."
Id., at 616-617.
Precisely the same public policy considerations on which
the Court now relies in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and that werelied on only 10 years ago in Gravel, are fully applicable to senior presidential aides. The proposed opinion points out that
if a President were subject to suit,
"the President and his advisers naturally would have an
incentive to devote scarce energy, not to performance of
their public duties, but to compilation of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability." Ante, at
19 (emphasis added).
This same negative "incentive" will permeate the inner workings of the office of the President if that officer's "alter egos,"
comparable to Congressional aides, are not protected derivatively from the immunity of the President. In addition, exposure to civil liability for official acts will result in constant
judicial questioning, through judicial proceedings and pre-

80-94~MEMORANDUM
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trial discovery, into the inner workings of the Presidential office beyond that necessary to maintain the traditional check
and balance of our constitutional structure. 5
By construing the Constitution to give only qualified immunity to senior presidential aides we give those key "alter
egos" nothing more than lawsuits, winnable lawsuits perhaps, but lawsuits nonetheless, with stress and effort that
will disperse and drain their energies and their purses. I
challenge the Court to say that their effectiveness as presidential aides will not "inevitably be diminished and frustrated," Gravel, supra, at 61f:H>17, if they must weigh every
act and decision-every discretionary Executive act in which
they participate-in relation to future lawsuits. The Court
now adds to the other burdens of senior presidential aides-a
burden we removed from congressional aides: the stress of
long hours, heavy responsibilities, constant exposure to harassment of the political arena, and now the risk of lawsuits
while in or on leaving office. 6
• The same remedies for checks on presidential abuse also will check
abuses by the comparatively small group of senior aides that act as "alter
egos" of the President. The aides serve at the pleasure of the President
and thus may be removed by the President. Congressional and public
scrutiny maintain a constant and pervasive check on abuses, and such aides
may be prosecuted criminally. See Nixon, ante, at 23-24. A criminal
prosecution cannot be commenced absent careful consideration by a grand
jury at the request of a prosecutor; the same check, however, is not
present with respect to the commencement of civil suits in which advocates
are subject to no realistic accountability.
' The Executive Branch may as a matter of grace supply some legal assistance. The Department of Justice has a long-standing policy of representing Federal officers in civil suits for conduct performed within the
scope of their employment. In addition, the Department provides for retention of private legal counsel when necessary. See Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Justice Department Retention of Private Legal Counsel to
Represent Federal Employees in Civil Lawsuits, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978). The Congress frequently pays the expenses of defending its members even as to acts wholly outside the legislative function.

80-945-MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT
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In this Court we witness the new filing of 100 cases a week,
many utterly frivolous and even bizarre claims. Thousands
of other cases are disposed of without reaching this Court.
When we see the myriad irresponsible and frivolous cases
regularly filed in American courts, the magnitude of the potential risks attending acceptance of public office emerges.
Can anyone rationally think such potential risks will not be a
factor in discouraging able men and women into public
service?
We-judges collectively-have provided absolute immunity for ourselves with respect to judicial acts, however erroneous or ill advised. See, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U. S. 349 (1978). Are the lowliest of 27,000 judges and
50,000 or more prosecutors in America entitled to greater
protection than the senior aides of a President whose absolute immunity derives directly from the Constitution?
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), does not dictate
that senior presidential aides be given only qualified immunity. Unlike the present case, Butz did not consider the
question of constitutionally required immunity for the President. Butz rejected a claim that all federal officials exercising discretion were entitled to absolute immunity; we need
not abandon that holding. In this case we are not dealing
simply with the exercise of discretion in the implementation
of congressional acts; rather, we are dealing with the "alter
egos" of a President-as Gravel dealt with "alter egos" of
Senators. Without these aides neither the President nor
Members of Congress could conceivably carry out their
sworn duties.
By ignoring Gravel the Court gravely undermines to a
large extent the Presidential immunity today recognized in
Nixon. This·is not an instance in which petitioners request
an "undifferentiated extension" of presidential immunity.
Harlow & Butterfield, ante, at 10. The sole question is
whether senior "alter ego" aides who work daily with the
President in implementing Executive policy directives from
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the President are entitled to the same immunity we construed the Constitution to provide for the 5,000 or more aides
of the 535 Members of Congress.
There is not the remotest indication in the Constitution
that any kind of derivative absolute immunity should be
given to Congressional aides yet we recognized that implicit
in the presence of express absolute immunity for Members of
Congress was a corresponding immunity for the aides who
carry out the Members' legislative duties.
I find it
inexplicable-and indeed it is unexplained-why the Chief
Executive of the Nation cannot be assured that his senior
staff aides will have the same protection as the aides of Members of the House and Senate and accordingly I dissent.

. ~u.prttttt (!fcttrl cf tlft ~tb ~tatts

.asfringto:n. ~. Of. 2llP:~6J
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 1, 1982

Re:

No. 80-945 Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
I basically agree with the approach you have taken in
this case. I too think that the inquiry of courts in suits
against high executive officials should, in those cases
where absolute immunity cannot be established, be limited to
"objective" good faith. You correctly state that "there
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative
of subjective intent," and that "[j]udicial inquiry into
subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging
discovery and deposition of numerous individuals." Draft
Opinion at 16.
As I understand your opinion, cases will proceed past
the summary judgment stage only if the trial court
determines {1} that the allegedly violated constitutional
rights were well established at the time of the official's
action, and {2} that the particular defendant reasonably
could be expected to have known about the existence of those
rights. I think this approach will facilitate resolution of
cases at the summary judgment stage: but I think such
resolution would be even easier if the second part of your
test required courts to determine whether a "reasonable
p~n" -- as opposed to this particular defendant _.; would
nave ~ known of the existence of the asserted constitutional
rights. Perhaps there is not much difference between what a
"reasonable person" should have known and what this
defendant "reasonably should have known." But by placing
the focus on this defendant, I fear that courts will permit
"broad-ranging discovery and deposition[s]" in an effort to
determine what past exposure this defendant has had to
constitutional law. With such a focus, courts may also be
slow to grant summary judgment if there is some question as
to the extent of the defendant's familiarity with legal
matters.

- 2 -

I think that such a possibility could be foreclosed by
two minor changes in your opinion. First, the third full
sentence on page 18 could be changed to read: "Consistently
with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore
hold that at least high executive officials are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate 'settled, indisputable' legal rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Second, the
third full sentence on page 19 could be amended to read: "On
summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what
the law was at the time the action occurred and what a
reasonable person could have been expected to know about
it."
Sincerel~

Justice Powell

Juvrtmt <!fcurt cf t4t ~ttittb 'Jhdt.s'
'~llht.&'lfittgtctt, ~. <!f. 2ll~Jt~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

April 1, 1982

No. 80-945

J

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
You have accomplished a difficult task in drafting
opinions in this and the Nixon case. They are both well
thought out and I am in general agreement with your
treatment of this case. I am prepared to support the
~dopt~on of an "objective" good faith standard for qualified.. \
1mmun1ty.
lEi

td /
,...

D

'~ {)

I would not go so far, however, as to immunize i-H gal JY b yt5~ ._,"'i
actions undertaken in ignorance of rbasic, unquestioned" or ~~
"settled, indisputable" constitutional rights. "High
executive officials" should be charged with knowledge of
such rights and should be encouraged to seek the advice of
the counsel available to senior officers whenever doubts
arise. An ordinary citizen running even a small business
must conform to myriad statutes and regulations and acts at
his own peril when he acts in ignorance, whether the law is
settled or not. We should, I think, expect no less from our
officials, at least as regards well-established rights.
Moreover, demanding something less invites much litigation
over how much law a given official should have been aware
of.
For these reasons, I am troubled by the following
language on page 19 of your draft: "Charged with
decisionmaking under pressures of time and limits of
information, not every official fairly could be held
responsible for areas of the law remote from his experience
or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect every such
official to be familiar with the most recent judicial
developments." Would you consider eliminating these
sentences from the draft?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

j;n.vumt ~llltd cf tqt 1!lttittb :itatt.e'

'Jl!t$ftittgton, ~. ~·

2llP:'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 5, 1982

No. 80-945

Harlow and Butterfield v.
v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
Your changes are excellent and I am well
satisfied with the draft as revised.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

cc:

Justice Rehnquist

.iuvumt Qlltltrt .o-f tqt ,uittb ~taft.&'
Jla,gfti:ngtcn. ~. QJ. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 5, 1982

No. 80-945

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in your proposed opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE

U~ITED

STATF!

No, 79...880

Henry Kissinger et al., Petitioners,

v.
Morton Halperin et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir·
cuit.

[February - , 1981]
Memorandum of JusTICE WHITE,
I approach this case a good deal differently than do Lewi!
and those who agree with most or all of his submission.
This memorandum first reviews the posture of this c~
as it comes to us. It then deals with the wiretap stattlte,
concluding that while Title III does not disturb the President's constitutional authority, wh~tever that may be, to
wiretap without a warrant in national security situations~ it
does declare illegal and provide a remedy for any warrantless interceptions for which the Constitution requires a magistrate's prior approval, as well as for any unre8$0nable wire•
taps whether or not the ConstitutiQn requites· a warra,nt.
Hence, Title III affords a remedy at least as broad as that
afforded by an implied Biv~ns cause of ·action fQr a Fourth
Amendment violation. Therefore, th~ latter cause of action
need not be pursued in this case,. This seems to me by. far
the most sensible reading of Title III and its legi$lative
history.
It is then submitted that because this is primarily a Title
III case, there is no necessity or occasion to address the President's immunity from damages in a Bivens c~. The immunity question, if there is one before us, is whether the
President and his aides are immune from Title III liability.
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The petitioners concede they did not bring that issue here,
although they do not by any means concede that the President would not be immune· from, congre~siOJ!ally created remedies such as those contained in Title III. We could properly postpone addressing this issue, as Lewis seems tO do, but
because absolute ·immunity is meant in part to 'relieve a defendant of the burden, of litjgat~on in cases such as this one,
it would not be improper to decide the question ·sua sponte.
At least, I take this COUl'Se in ~his memorandum, concluding
that Congress may not only establish the ground rules for
Presidential wiretapping in national security cases, a matter
which does not appear to be in dispute. but may also impose
remedies for the violation of those 'rules.
Finally, I offer a few comments o'n Lewis' treatment of the
immunity of the petitioners from damages liability. 1
][

The respondents claimed damages a.gainst petitioners under
both Title III of the Omnibus·Crime Cont'rol and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §. 2510 et seq., and the Fourth Amendment. The District Court dismiss'ed the statutory claim on
the ground that "defendants'· determination that· Title ·III
was inapplicable to the Halperin ·wiretap· was reasonable during the period of surveillance [ahd there was] no genuine
issue of fact in the record controverting· this good faith belief
' on defendants' part." '66A.
1 I would agree with petitioners that Keith should not be applied retroactively and would not oppose saying so, since that is one of the questiqns
presented in the petition and will be involved in the Title III proceedings
remanded to the District Court. · Also, although the -question is not here
and there is no need to addre55 it, I would agree with petitioners that on
this record the Halperin tap, though warrantless, was reasonable at· the
outset . and that even if the tap at some point became unreasonable and
hence violative of the Constitution and of Title III, the President might
be exonerated on the ground that he was not responsible for the unr~Oll. -able tontihuation of the tap.
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On the constitutional claim, the court held that the warrant
requirement was inapplicable during the period of the Halperin tap, which was prior to this Court's decision in United
States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U. S. 297
(1972), but observed that there could be "no serious contention" that the independent requirement, under the Fourth
Amendment, of reasonableness was suspended in the area of
national security : "Even if § 2511 (3) and prior presidential
practice could be invoked to authorize warrantless wiretaps,
national security surveillance still must be 'exercised in a
manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment,' " 67A,
quoting from Keith, supra, at 320. The court did not question that the Executive had been "justifiably" concerned with
unauthorized disclosure~ injurious to the public interest and
that wiretapping had been adopted to "investigate and curb
leaks." 68A. But without stopping to determine whether
there was probable cause to select Halperin as one of the
wiretap targets, 68A, the Court determined that in any event
the Halperin tap was unreasonable : "Even granting the ino
applicability of the general warrant requirement . . . [the
Halperin tap was] per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and unjustified by any possible exception
thereto." 70A. Specifically, the District Court found:
"The evidence here reflects a twenty-one month wiretap
continuance without fruits or evidence of wrongdoing,
a failure to renew or evaluate the material obtained, and
lack of records and procedural compliance, a seemingly
political motive for the later surveillance and dissemination of reports, and an apparent effort to conceal the
wiretap documents. . . . Regardless of intention, they
violated plaintiffs' basic, constitutional right to freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure. Like any other
citizen, these officials are charged with knowledge of
established law and must be held accountable for per·
sonal misconduct/' 74A.
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The District Court further held that none of the defendants
could claim absolute immunity 11 for their excessive improper
actions" ; nor was the defense of qualified immunity available
since petitioners' claim of 11subjective good faith" was controverted by 11 the undisputed record in this case," 73A. After
further proceedings, the court determined that only nominal
damages should be awarded.
The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the District
Court and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of
Appeals held that Title III was available to respondents aa a
basis for liability : If, as was alleged, the Halperin tap was
not instituted for one of the purposes exempted from Title
III by § 2511 (3), the statutory remedies would be available.
Title III would also apply to "any period during which the
wiretap did not involve the primary purpose of protecting
national security information against foreign intelligence activities." 28A. In the Court of Appeals' view, the holding
in Keith was retroactive and, therefore, the warrant require-ment of the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the Halperin tap. Petitioners could, however, escape liability for
failing to secure a warrant by proving their defense of qualified immunity. Furthermore, if for any period of time the
Halperin tap failed the Fourth Amendment test of reason,..
ableness, petitioners would be liable for the constitutional
violation. Finally, the court rejected all claims of absolute
immunity, concluding that qualified immunity was ampl~
protection for the conduct involved in tbis case.
The Court of Appeals remanded the <;ase to the District
Court for further proceedings ·to determine whether and to
what extent petitioners were liable under Title III, as wen
as to determine the exact period of time during which the
Halperin tap was unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. On remand, the District Court was also
to reconsider the issue of damages.
Petitioners raised three questions in their petition for cer:tiorari ~ whether the President .and his Closest advisors arre
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absolutely immune from personal damages liability for decisions made in the exercise of the President'-s official authority; whether these federal officers are entitled to qualified
immunity as a matter of law for authorizing electronic surveillance for national security purposes prior to this Court's
decision in Keith,· and whether the Keith case should be applied retroactively to create personal damages liability for
federal officers. Petitioners did not seek review of the Court
of Appeals' holding with respect to Title III nor of the remand for further proceedings on the statutory claim. Petitioners do not suggest that Congress is powerless to define the
circumstances and the procedures under which electronic surveillance may be employed by the Executive Branch, whether
for national security purposes or otherwise. Nor do they ask
us to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
at least for some period of its existence it was 11most likely"
that the Halperin wiretap violated Title III.

II
Section 2520 of Title III expressly provides that 11any per...
!50n whose wire or oral communication is intercepted ... in
violation of this chapter shall ( 1) have a civil cause of action
against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept . . . such communications. . . ." The section further specifies the damages an
aggrieved individual shall be entitled to recover against the
person or persons who violate the statute:
"(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of
violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
u (b) punitive damages; and
u (c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation
costs reasonably incurred."
Finally, the section provides violators a limited defense to
s.uch private damage claims ~ ''A good faith reliance on :a court
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order or on the provisions 6f section 2518 (7) of this chapter
shall constitute a complete defense."
Petitioners do not claim that they fall within the statutorily provided defense : No court order was ever obtained,
and although petitioners could perhaps have made use of the
emergency procedures specified in § '2518 (7), this section re·. quires that application for a court order be made within ·48
hours after the inception of a warrantless wiretap. No such
·application was made here.
The sparse 'legislative "history on the civil dama.ges provi.
sion of the statute indicates that Congress intended it ·to
·be the exclusive feaer9J remedy for wiretaps violating the
terms of the statute and that Congress intended the remedy
'to extend as far as the statute's prohibitions: "The scope of
' the remedy is intended to be ' both comprehensive and exclusive, but there is no intent to preempt parallel State law." 2
· The scope of this remedy is "limiteu only· by the definition of
the term "person" in the statute: " '[P] erson' means any
employee, or a.gent of the ·uniteu States... ;" § 2510 (6) .3 ·
This definition is surely so broad as to include petitioners,
unless they are otherwise exempteCl from the substantive ·re. quirements of the Act.
Section 2511 prohibits, except as otherwise specifically pro. vided in Title III, any person from intercepting or disclosing·
any wire communication. 'This broad prohibition on wiretaps that do not conform to the proceoures established ·by
the Act is subject to several exceptions. §§ 25U (2), (3) .
'The only execption relevant to this case ·is that contained ·in·
§ 2511 (3), which provides:'
81
Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit the·
S. Rep. No. '1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 107.
The Senate Report emphasized that the definition was intended to be
·«comprehensive" and that it "expliCitly includes any officer or employee
"Of the United States," excluding only the governmental units themselves.
ld., at 90-91.
" Thete waa some dispute in .United States w. United St.ates District.
2

8

'79-880-MEMO

KISSINGER v. HALPERIN

eonstitutional power of the President to take such meas ..
ures as he deems necessary . .. to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities....
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of
the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in
any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise
used or disclosed e"cept as is necesary to implement that
power."
JusTICE PowELL understands this subsection to exempt
from Title III any wiretap with a "Bational security purpose," at least when the wiretap is carried out pursuant to
presidential authorization. For JusTICE PowELL the scope
of Title III's application to petitioners depends upon an
analysis of their subjective intent: A wiretap that was objectively unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, may not fall
within the prohibitions of 'title Ill if it "retained a national
security purpose." Ante, at 11. Such a reading of § 2511
(3) is inconsistent with the plain language of Title III, with
this Court's previous interpretation of § 2511 (3), and with
the legislative history of Title III.
In United States v. Un£ted States District Court, 407 U. S.
297 (1972), (Keith) the Court addressed and rejected the
Government's claim that § 2511 (3) recognizes or affirms the
power of the President to conduct warrantless searches in
pursuit of the national security : "[T]he statute is not the
measure of the executive authority asserted in this area.'~
ld., at 308. ·T he Court found that Congress did not intend
Court, 407 U. S. 297 ( 1972), as to whether § 2511 (3) is more appropriately
characterized a.s an "exemption" or a ''disclaimer;'' The label used is
not important : "it is apparent from the face of the section and its legislative history that if this interception is one of those described in § 2511 (3),
it is not reached by the statutory ban •..•" !d., at 338 (WHJTE, ;r ••

•conourr."J.Il,g).
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"to take anything away from [the President]," 3 but only to
''[leave] presidential powers where it found them." ld., at
303. Keith found that Congress had no intent il). enacting
Title III to limit the President's constitutional powers in certain specific areas; Keith did not address, and no reasonable
inference can be drawn from that opinion concerning, the
reach of the sta.tutory prohibition with respect to actions by
the President that do not fall within ·his "constitutional
. powers." e
8 United States District Court, supra., at 307, quoting Senator McClellan. 114 Cong. Rec. 14751.
6 JusTICE PowELL would draw such an inference from Keith.
He cites
the following statement from Keith to support his argument that Title III
is inapplicable to wiretaps engaged in for a national security purpose, re. gardless of their constitutionillity: "We ·therefore thinK: the conclusion
inescapable that Congress only intended to n:1a'ke clear that the Act simply
did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances." (Emphasis added by JUSTICE PowELL.) Ante, at '12 .. In the aostract, this statement appears to support JusTICE PowELL's position; in · the context 'in
which it was written, it aoes not.
Title III was introduced into· the Keith case by the Government, not
the respondent. Tht:! Government's position in · that case was· that ·-the
President had the authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps for national
security purposes. In support of this position the Government relied on
§ 2511 (3), arguing' that in it "Congress recognized the · President's authority to conduct such surveillance wit1wut prior -judicial approvaL"
Thus, the discussion of the statute in· Keith was directed only at this one
issue: was § 251i (3) a "recognition or affirmance of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance" ? 407 U. S., at -303.
The Court's analysis of the statute emphasized. that contrary to the
Government's position the section " confers no power." Ibid. It was in
this context that the statement that JusTICE PowELL relies upon was
made : It meant only that Congress expressed no view as to any power
the President may or may not ha.ve in this regard . Having rejected the
Government's position ·that · Title III conferred such power upon the
President, the Court went on to examine the question of whether the
President had such power under the Constitution . The Court concluded
that 'he did not , .and that ended the inquiry in Keith : as the Court saw
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·The plain language of the exception indicates that the
President is exempted from the requirements of the Act only
to the extent that he pursues the specified substantive ends
according to the powers given to him by the Constitution. 7
it Keith presented no occasion to go on to the further question of whether
the "constitutional warrant requirement for domestic-security surveillances
was incorporated into the statutory requirements of Title IIL" Ante, at
13. I do not agree, therefore, that the failure to reach this issue in Keith
supports an inference that Title III did not incorporate constitutional
limits on presidential power.
The analysis of the structure of Title III presented in Keith, in fact,
supports the position taken in this memorandum. The Court there contrasted the language of § 2511 (3) with that of the four exceptions in
§ 2511 (2), which state : "It shall notbe unlawful under this chapter ..•
to intercept" some particular type of communication. This language exempts the type of communication involved from the otherwise blanket
prohibition on wiretaps not in conformity with the statute, regardless of
the legality of those wiretaps under ·tbe Constitution or other· laws. ·As
the Court noted in Keith, 't his language is not used inT2511 (3): "Rather
than stating that warrantless ·presidential uses of ·electrohic surveillance
'shall not be unlawful' arid thus employing 'the standard language of
exception, sUbsection 13) merely disclaims any' intention to · 'limit ·the constitutional power of 'the President.'" ld., at· 304. ·JusTICE PowELL's
present reading of s'ubsection (3) ignores this' difference.
Nor does JusTICE PowELL accurately read my concurring opinion in
Keith . Ante, at 13. · JusTICE- PowELL forgets ·that prior to Keith the
application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to national
security wiretaps was not Clear; Katz v. United States; 389 U. S. 347, 358,
n. 23 (1967) . It was my position In Keith that the Court need not resolve that. issue because the Government agreed that the wiretap was
illegal under Title III unless saved by § 2511 (3) and because, as I saw
it, even if the warrantless tap was one the· PreSident could impose without violating · the Constitution, it was nevertheless not within the categories of wiretaps saved by § 2511 (3) . · Of course, if, as the government
argued, § 2511 (3) exempted the tap from the statutory prohibition, then
'it would have been necessary, as the Court believed it was, to determine
whether the tap was constitutionally permissible. There is no incon·sistency: between my position now and my positioh in Keith .
· 1 " [T]he limitation on the applicability of § 2511 (1) was not open' \~tnd~c;l; ~. it -was confined tQ those situations that § 2511 (3) specially.~~
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!flhe language does not say that the President is exempt from
the Act's provisions whenever he takes "such measures as he
deems necessary ..."; rather, it specifies that he may ·t~ke
such measures independently of the requirem~nts of the Act.
only to the degree that he has the "constitutional power" to
do so. 8 As Senator Holland put it during the Senate's consideration of this exception:
"We are simply saying that hothing herein shall limit.
such power as the President has under the Constitution.
If he does not have the power to do any specific thing,
we need not be concerned.H
Because the Act specifica.lly addresses the scope of a presidential exemption from Title III, it c~n properiy be inferred
that Congress intended presidentiai acts failing outside of the·
iimits of the language of the exception to be covered by the
provisions of the Act.9 if "l(ei{h, for e'Xampie, had been described. Thus, even assuming the constitutionality of a warrantless surveillance authorized by the President to uncov~r private or official graft ...
the interception would be illegal under § 2511 {1) because it is not the
type of presidential action saved by . .. § 25li (3) .;. United States District Court, supra, at 338, n. 2 (WHITE, J., concurring) .
8 Petitioners conceded beiow and do not contend otherwise here that
the President is subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fcurth
Amendment.
9 There is one possible contrary indication · in the language of the.. Act ..
Section 2515 pro~ibits the use in any proceedi~g of any materials recei,·ed
in violation of the Act. The fact that § ~511 (3) further restricts the·
use of information gathered from wiretaps that fall within that exception
to instances in which "such interception was reasonable" might be read, .
therefore, as indicating that the scope of the exception was greater than
the President's constitUtional authority. That is, the exception might
cover all wiretaps authorized by the President, regardless of whether those·
taps fall within the Fourth Amendment1s reasonableness requirement. I
believe that the leglsl~tive history discussed below indicates that .the "reasonableness requirement" was included in § 2511 (3) only because Congress
was not certain how broad the President's power was. It. intended, therefore, to put clear limits on the use of evidehce derived from such taps,
-=re~a-fdles& of the llltlma.te decisiQll on the scope of the Preaid.ent1s a'u thorhy _
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cided before § 2511 (3) was enacted, there could be no doubt
that warrantless wiretapping for domestic security purposes
would violat-e Title III as well as the Fourth Amendment.
The Senate debate over the exception for national security
wiretaps sheds light on the scope of the exception for the
President in two ways.H) That debate demonstrated considerable uncertainty in the Senate itself over the reach of the
exception. Senator Yarborough objected to the provision on
the ground that it "declares that the President has the constitutional power, without any order of the court, to take any
measure he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or danger." 11 Senator Long urged
rejection of the bill because it gave "unlimited power to authorize tapping in national security cases" to the President.
Senator Fong argued that the President does have, as Commander in Chief, power to authorize certain warrantless wiretaps, but that the proposed exception went too far. 12 Responding to this expansive reading of the exception. Senators
Hart, McClellan, and Holland engaged in the colloquy reviewed in the Keith decision on the meaning of § 2511 (3).U
Senator Hart emphasized his fear that the provision would
be read as a grant to the President of unlimited authority
to tap and Senator McClellan, the sponsor of the bill, and
Senator Holland responded that there was no such intent.
Rather, the section used neutral language to indicate that
the scope of the exception was no broader than the scope of
the President's power. As Senator Hart concluded: "[I] f
the President has such a power, then its exercise is in no way
affected by title." 14
This provision was never discussed on the floor of the House.
114 Cong. Rec. 14730 (1968).
1 2 /d., at 14704.
1 8 See United States District Court, supra, at 306-307; 114 Cong. Rec.
14750-14751 (1968).
14 JusTICE PowELL properly reads this statement by Senator Hart to
mean that Congress did not jntend to "IaffectJ the assumed .Power of the
10
11
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The debate also indicates that there was some uncertainty
over the power of Congress to place limits on the President.
Senator McClellan was convinced that the Senate had no
power to restrict the. constitutional powers
of the President:
.
.
"I do not want to undertake to detract from any power
the President already has. ·I do not think we could do
so by legislation ~?-yway. In fact, I know we 'could ·not."
From his point of view the purpose of the section was more
formal than substantive: Whether it was there or not,. the
President's constitutional powers remained what they were.
There were, then, two grounds for including § 2511 (3):
a desire not to restrict whatever. constitutional authority the
President had in this area and a belief that any attempt
President ... to wiretap in the national security area." Ante, at 13. But
to create a statutory remedy for actions that t~e President· concededly has
no authority to perform under the Constitution is hardly to affe.ct the
power of the President-except in a most indirect manner. J;usTICE
PowELL assumes that such a Temedy would somehow have such an effect
and therefore infers that Congress had no intent to incorporate the constitutional reasonableness requirement into Title III. Senator Hart's
statement does not support such an inference: He· casts his statement as
a conditional statement; the condition he interposes iS the limit placed on
presidential authority by the Constitution. I do not see how one can
read this to imply that if tl1e President does not have such power, then in
that case too he is "in no way affected by Title III."
,
Although Senator Hart in his exchange with Senators McClellan and
Holland was particularly concerned with emphasizing that ·§ 2511 (3) was
not to be interpreted as implyipg congressional authorization for warrantless wiretaps by the President, he also made clear that-he rejected a
reading of §2511 (3) that turned on. the subjective intent of the.President:
"But if, in fact, we are here sayjng that so long as· the -President thinks
it is an activity that constitutes a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government, he can put a bug on without refltraint, then clearly I think we are going too far." · ll;l Gong. -Rec.-14751.
At least in his view, § 2511 (3) was not intended to serve as. a .shield
behind which the President could retreat simply by interposing a claimed
nationalJsecurity intent.
··
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to restrict this authority would be unconstitutional.

Under
either rationale, the scope of the exception for presidentially
~uthorized wiretaps is no broader than the scope of the con..
stitutional power of the President to engage in wiretaps to
pl'otect national security information. 'The reverse side of
this, however, is that Congress intended that the statute
cover the President insofar as it would be constitutional and
insofar as the President did not have constitutiona:l authority
ln this area. 'Thus, the civil damages remedy created by the
Act is applicable 'to the President insofar as his actions do
not fall within the scope of the exception.

III
No one in this case suggests that Congress is powerless to
forbid, impose restrictions on, or establish the procedures for
wiretapping in national security cases. 'Similarly, no one
suggests that Congress may not provide remedies for wiretaps that the Constitution forbids. ·Nor ·is ·it ·urged, as 'I
understand it, that ·congress may not forbid or regulate national security wiretaps that the Constitution · might otherwise permit to be carried out without a warrant. 15 ·Indeed,
petitioners note that § 2511 (3) ·has been repealed: "Congress
had recently demonstrated [in the 19'78 ·Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act] its capacity to oversee the actions of · the
Executive Branch, including "Executive action in the areas of
national security and foreign affairs." -Petitioner's Brief·-ao,
n. 27.
' Petitioners conceded below and do not indicate otherwiee
here that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement
applies to the ·President : The President has no constitutiona1
authority to en·gage in unreasonable wiretaps. It follows
15 Specifically, had Keith been decided the other ·way and held that
warrantless national security wiretaps in domestic cases are not subject to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, Congress could
uonethele6s require a warrant or other conditions for such interceptio~.
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from . t4e ab9ve analysis of Title .III that ~nsofar as the wire·
tap involved in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth
· Amendment, it was also illegal under Title III. The Crime
Control Statute is a complex law but it clearly makes illegal
a Pre$identially auth~rized wiretap that complies neither·with
the procedures of Title III nor· with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.' If that is -the case, respondents- are
entitled to the dama.ges remedy specifie.d in the Act-in fact,
that is their exclusive federal remedy-unless appli:cation of
the damages provision of the statute to the President and ~is
aides is unconstitutionaL
· When Title III is understood in this way, unconstitutional
wiretaps are proscribed by the Act and fully adequate reme<lies are provided by that law. Congress has occupied the
field in this regard and there is no occasion in cases such as
this to pursue a cause of action directly under the Constitution. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that there could
not be double punishment for an unconstitutional wiretap
· that also violated Title III. 31A, n. 5: Lewis Powell has
similarly observed that where Title III and the ·Bivens cause
of action overlap, the latter need not be given further consideration. Ante, at n. 50. On remand, it is to be determined whether for any period of time the Halperin wiretap
required a warrant or was otherwise unreasonable under· the
Constitution : In either event, the statute would ha.ve been
violated. The Bivens cause of action will, therefore, be beside the point on remand. If a statutory violation is found,
the question of whether Congress may constitutionally subJect the President and his aides to damages liability for violating an otherwise valid statute will have to be faced .
This raises the question of whether we should now address
the question of the President's immunity from Title -III damages liability. 'Petitioners have not . brought the Title -III
issue here. · They say they are quite confident they ·will)2revail in the· courts below:· Perhaps they iWill, at least · wi.th.
•

•

0
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respect to the President. On this record, it could be held
that the Halperin tap was a valid national security interception at the outset; if it became unreasonable at a later time,
the President and perhaps others may not be responsible for
that development. In that event, the immunity issue, however it might be decided, would not be relevant.
I am nevertheless persuaded that we should deal with the
Title III immunity question at this time. A major reason
for extending absolute immunity to the performance of certain official functions is to protect the official from the unavoidable distraction that defending serious litigation inevitably entails. In the present posture of this case, the Title
III litigation contemplated by the Court of Appeals' remand
will go forward in the District Court, and petitioners must
defend that litigation. It is true that immunities are usually
defenses to be pleaded and proved by the defendants, but
considering and passing on a dispositive defense at an early
stage of the litigation is within the anticipation of the gov..
erning rules, and in an immunity case, there is every reason
to do so.
Furthermore, although petitioners have brought here only
the question of immunity from damages for having violated
the Constitution, they have not abandoned their position that
the President is absolutely immune from damages under Title
III as well. The immunity argument they present is based
on constitutional text and history as well as upon a functional
analysis of the Presidency in the light of the sepa.ration of
powers doctrine. These arguments would also have to be
faced in dealing with the question whether Congress may constitutionally create a cause of action for damages against the
President. The upshot is that although the question of Title
III immunity is not among the questions raised in the petition for certiorari, we ·have the authority to reach that ques..
tion, and 1 would do so.
'The immuni~y question to be de.alt ·with, ho-wever, is .119~
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whether these petitioners should have ~ juqic_ially createq
i~munity to a judicially created cause of action. Rather, it
is whether Congress may not only establish rules for national
security wiretaps but may also provide a damages remedy
against those federal officials, includii)g the President, who
breach those rules. This is a considerably different question'
than the one that Lewis Poweii answers. Indeed, he expressly withhoids judgment on "whether the statutory dam_.
J~,ge remedy fot illegai wiretapping estabiished by 1\tle III,
18 U. S. C. § 2S20 ... appiies to the President, and whether,
if so, this remedy is within the power of Congress." Ante;
at n. 35.

IV
As I see it,· only two of the. argu;ments that the Governmen ~
makes in support of an absolut.e immunity for the Pres:dent'
from civil liability need be adc,iressed: absolute immunity is
an "incidental power" Qf th~ P~esidency, historically recog.:.
nized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute immunity
is required by the separation of powers doctrine.
A

..

The Constitution, in the Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I,
§ 6, guarantees absolute immunity to Members of Congress;'
nowhere, however, doe~ Jhe Constitution .~irectly address the
issue of presidenti~l _it;nmuni~y. • Nevertheless, petitioners.
argue that the debates at ,the Copstitutiqnal Convention and
the early history of constitutional interpretation demonstrate
an implicit assumption of absolute presidential immunity.
In support of this position, petitioners rely primarily on three
separate items : first, remarks made during the discussion of'
16

16 In fact , insofar as the Constitution does addre..."S the issue of Presi~ .
dential liability,it takes a very different approach from that taken in the
Speech or Debate Clause. The possibility of impeachment assures: .that.
the President can be held accountable to the other branches qf Go¥ernmentlI for his a,ctions and the1 .Constitution
further states that impeacbhient
I ~
c:l.oes not bar criminal l?rosecutton,
t•

'19-880-MEMO

KISSINGER v. HALPERIN

11

f>l'esidential impeachment at the Convention; second, re·
marks made during the first Senate; and third, the views of
Justice Story.
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the President should be impeachable did touch on the potential dangers of subjecting the President to the control of another
branch, the Legislature. 11 Governor Morris, for example,
complained of the potential for dependency and argued that
11
[the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors
who may be punished. In case he shc-uld be re elected, that
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 18 Col. Mason responded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Justice" and argued that this was ieast appropriate for the mall
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 19 Madison
agreed· that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should
be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity,
negligence or perfidy of th~ chief Magistra.t e." 20 fi!J.kney
responded on the other side, believing that if gran~
power, the Legislature would. hold impeachment "as a rod
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his
independence." 21
Petitioners conclude from this that the delegates meant
impeachment to be the exclvsive means of holding the President personally responsible for his misdeeds, outs:de of electoral' politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported
by the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed
concern over limiting presidi:mtial'independence, the delegates
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently shared,
17 The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787; 64-69 (1934) .
18 /d., at 64.
19 !d., at 65.
20 Ibid.
21 /d; at 66.~.
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to insulate the President from political liability iri the impeachment process.
Moreover, the Convention debate· did not focus on wrongs
the Presi'dent might commit against individuals, but rather
on whether there should l:,e a method ef holding him account, able for · w.hat might be termed wrongs against the state.
'Thus, examples of the abuses with which the de egates were
concerne<! ·were betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that the · alternative to an impeachment mechanism woqld be "tumults and insurrect1ons" byt he people
in response to such abuses. "The only conclusions that can
be drawn from this debate are that the independence of the
Executive was not understood to require a total 'lack of accountability to the otper branches and there -was·no general
desire to insulate the· President from the -consequences of-.his
improper acts.
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petiti9ners
is an el!:change at the "first meeting of the Senate involving
Vice-President Adams aud Senators Ellsworth and Maclay.
The debate started over whether or not the words "the President" should be included at the--beginning of Federal writs,
similar to the manner ip which English writs ran in the
King's name. Senator Maclay thought that this would improperly combine the executive and judicial branches. ·This,
in turn, led to a discussion of the proper relation between the
two. Senator Ellsworth ·and Vice-President Adams defended
the proposition that
uthe President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever ; could have no action , whatever, brought
against him; was above the power of judges, justices, &c.
For [that] would put it 'in the power of a common_justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the
whole machine of government." 22
'2

2

W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of · the United
'

~ St~tes in -1789- 1791, 152 (1969).
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In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive
form of process available against the President. Senator
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a
President committing "~er.. in the stre~t." In his view, in
such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the
, exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather,
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 28 In his
view, Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully
comprehended the difference in the political position of the
American President and that of the British monarch. Again,
nothing more can be concluded from this than that it was no
clearer then than now what was the proper scope of presidential accountability and whether the President should be subject to judicial process.
The final item cited by petitioners clearly supports their
position, but is of such late date that it contributes little to
understanding the original intent. In his Commentaries on
the Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described
the~wers" of the President:
"Among these must necessarily be included the power
to perform [his functions] without any obstruction or
impediment whatsoever. 'The President cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office;
{Jand for this purpose his person must be deeme~, in civil
fj cases at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the
exercise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion, and he is accountable only to his country and to his
own conscience. His decision in relation to these power-s
23/birJ.
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is subject to no control, and his discretion, when exercised, is conclusive." 24
While Justice Story may have been firmly committed t<J
this view in 1833, Sena,!?r Pinckng, a delegate to the Convention, was as firmly committed to the QID?Osite view in
1800.23 Senator Pinckney, arguing on the · floor of the Senate, contrasted the pri~:iles.es ex~nded to members of Congress by the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges
extended to the· Pre~ident. 20 ' He argued that this was a · deliberate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well
lcnew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had·
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no such
authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore, "[n]o
privilege of this kind was intended for your ·Executive, ~or·
any except that ... for your· Legislature." 27
:c 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution ·372 (1873).
~ 3 It is not possible to detennine whether this is the same Pinckney that
Madison recorded as Pinkney, 'who· objected at the Convention to granting
a _power of impeachment to· the Legislature. Two·· charles Pinckneys.attended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina.· See 3 ·M. Fartand, 8'!lpra, at 559.
26 Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress
69'-83. Petitioners argue that these remarks are not relevant because
they concerned only the aut~,!!!it.z of Con~.§J:.o inquire into the ori in of
an...!JJ.l~~Ji.belous news~aper article. ·Although this was the occasion for
the remarks, Pinckney dld discuss the ·immunity of members of Congress
as a privilege embodied in the Speech and Debate Clause: "our Constitu~ion slij)j)OS~ no man ... to be infallible, l:iut consiifers them all as mere·
~en. to be 81.1bject to. all the passions and frailties, an~es, that men
generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of such as ought
to be tried, and Jeave8 the members of the Legis~, for their proceed~ngs, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opinion...." Jd.,
at 7J. This, then, was one of the privileges of Congress that he was cont~asting with those extended (or not· extended) to the President.
27 Nor are Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to ·
the judicial process quite so clear as JusTICE PowELL suggests. It wopld'
be surprising if President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such im-
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In previous immunity CMes the Court has emphasized the
importance of the immunity afforded the particular government official at common law.. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U. S. 409, 421 (1976) . Clearly this sort of analysis is not
possible when dealing with an office, the presidency, that did
not exist at common law. To the extent that historical inquiry is appropriate in this context, it is constitutional history, not common law, that is relevant. From the history
discussed above, however, all that can be concluded is that
absolute immunity from civil liability for the President finds
no firm support in constitutional text or history, or in the
explanations of the early commentators. This is took weak a
ground to support a declaration by this Court that Title III
is unconstitutional as applied to the President.
munity from judicial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief
Justice Marshall. Jefferson's views on this issue before he became President would be a good deal more significant. Unfortunately he does
not appear to have commented on the issue; perhaps because he was out
of the country during the Constitutional Convention. It a.ppears, however, that in Jefferson's second and third drafts of the Virginia Con~ti
tution, which also proposed a sepa ration of the powers of government
into three separate branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive
be .subject to judicial process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to
personal restraint for private duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas
Jefferson 350, 360. Also Significant is the fact that when Jefferson's
followers tried to impeach Justice Chase !n 1804-1805, one of the grounds
of their attack on him was that ·he had refu~ed to subpoena President
Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper for sedition. See Corwin, "The
President: Office and Powers" 113. Finally, it is worth noting that
even in the middle of the debate over Chief Justice Marshall's power to
subpoena the President during the Burr trial, Jefferson looked to a legislative solution of the confrontation: "I hope however that . . . at the
ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice] may have means provided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testimony of the [Executive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of Thomas Jefferson, 407
n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to Geo~e
Hay, United States District Attorney for Virginia).
·
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B
'l'here is no bright line that can be drawn between consti..
tutionally based separation of powers arguments in favor of
·a,bsolute immunity and public policy arguments in favor of
such immunity. This lack of a bright line necessarily follows from the Court's functional interpretation of the ~e:p ..
aration of powers doctrine :
"[l]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the ·proper in·
quiry focuses on the extent to 'which it ·prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of General
.
Services, 433 U. S. 425', 433 (1977).
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (1974);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v: Sawyer, ·-579; •635 (19q2)
(Jackson, J ., concurring) . Similarly, petitioners argue ·that
public policy favors ab'solute immunity 'because · absent such
immunity the President's ability to execute his constitutionQ
ally mandated obligations will be impaired. The difference,
then, is only one of degree. While abso1ute immunity might
maximize executive efficiency and therefore be a worthwhile
policy, lack of such immunity may not so disrupt the functioning of the presidency as to vio1ate the separation of
powers doctrine. Since liability in this case is of congressional
t>rigin , petitioners must demonstrate that subjecting the .President to private damages actions fpr constitutional violations
will prevent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally
assigned functions." I do not 'believe that petitioners have
met this burden.
First, there can be no serious claim that the separation of
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial
review or insulates the President from judicial process; · No
claim is made here that the President; whatever his liability
for-ll\on:ey damages, is not &ubject to the cQutts' ·inj:uncttve
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powers. 28 See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co, supra;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioners, in
fact, argue that the possibility of judicial review of presidential actions supports their claim of absolute immunity: Judicial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized
exercise of the President's power," making private damages
actions unnecessary in order to achieve the same end. Petitioners' Brief, at 31. Regardless of the possibility of money
damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of
the President's actions can and will be reviewed by the courts.
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the
ground that such claims would involve the President personally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presidential actions. The President has been ·held to be subject
to · judicial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25
Ped. Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice Marshall sitting as circuit justice) . Burr usquarely ruled that a subpoena may be
U. S. App.
directed to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, D. C. - , 487 F. 2d ·700, 709 (1973) .29 Chief Justice Mar2 8 Nor have petitioners contended that the President is absolutely im·mune from criminal prosecution. Obviously the Constitution contemplates criminal liability in providing that impeachment does not exclude
the possibility of criminal prosecution.
29 Contrary to the sugg&>tion of JusTICE PowELL, ante, at n. 26, Missis~ippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of
whether a court may compel the President himself to perform ministerial
executive functions:
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection,
without expressing any opinion on the broader issues ... whether, in any
case, the President ... may be required, by the process of this court, to
perform a pu;ely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held
amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime."
"Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by
Xu51'ICE PowELL, did not indicate that the President could never be sub-
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shall flatly rejected any suggestion that all judicial process, in
and of itself, constitutes an unwarranted interference in . th.e
Presidency:
1

The guard, furnished to this high officer to protect him
from being harassed by vexatious arid unnecessary sub· poenas, is to be' looked for in the conduct of a court after
those subpoenas have issue·d; · not in any circumstance
which is to precede their being issued." · 25 Fed. Cas., at
'

34.
This position was recently rearticulated by the · Court ~n
United States v. Nixon, 418' U. S. 683,· 706 (1974):
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
need for confidentfality . . . without more, {)an sustain
an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances:"
These two lines of cases establish then that neither subjecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of
their constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial process violates the separation of powers doctrine. · With
respect to the intrusion oi the judicial process itself on ·Ex,
ecutive functions, subjecting the President to private claims
for money damages; however, involves no more than this.
If, therefore, there is a ·separation of powers problem here, · it
must be found in · the nature of the remedy and not in · the
process involved.
The functional analysis of the separation of powers· docject to judicial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional
judicial infringement upon the Executive Branch :
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general'
in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any respect of ·an•
of executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere minis'terial act, which neither he nor the president had any r authority; .:tOJ
deny or' cQntr.oJ." ld, .. .a.t .filO~
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trine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions so converge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is
determined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that
the President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his
actions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that
all presidential communications are entitled to an absolute
privilege, which was rejected in favor of a functional analysis by a unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra.
Therefore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a
broad immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility,S1
the only question that must be answered here is whether the
use of wiretaps falls within a constitutionally assigned execu~
tive function, the performance of which would be significantly
impaired by the possibility of a private action for damages
resulting from constitutional violations. I believe it does
not.
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), we said that
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should
know he is acting outside the law, and ... insisting on an
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not
unduly interfere ~ith the exercise of official judgment." ld.,
at 506-507. The obvious fairness of this principle has been
found by the Court to be outweighed orily in instances in
which potential liability may have the effect of making one
set of alternatives personally more attractive to the decisionmaker, without producing a similar social advantage. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 438 (1976) (WHITE, J.,
concurring) . ·Thus, prosecutors and judges are absolutely
immune because claims would only be filed against them for
decisions to prosecute and decisions adverse to a party able
to bring a civil damages action; society's interest, however,
See Virginia Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the United States,
No. 79-198, June 2, 1980 ; Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 511 (1978).
81 I will not speculate on the presidential functions which may require
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which tbe
:President participates in prosecutorial decieion.a.
30
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may be in just those alternatives which would open these
officials to a damage claim. No such social/personal tension
is present in this situation.
Potential liability_would certainly not encourage the use of
wiretaps. The use or nonuse of wiretaps, however, is not an
area in which society's interest is equally strong in both alternatives. Rather, this is an area that Congress has thought
proper to place within strict procedural and substantive
limits 32 and that some recent Administrations have v;ewed
as posing a substantial ·danger to the public interest. 83 · The
Court has also recognized the dangers posed by the nonpublic-i. e., secret--character of executive actions in this area:
"The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and
overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech."
United States District Court, supra, at 317. · In an area so
susceptible to uncorrected constitutional abuse, id., at 314,
absolute immunity is inappropriate.84
32

See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of'
1968, supra, Foreign Intelligence Sun•eillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783.
83 The Johnson Administration was oppcsed to Title- III of· the · 1-968
Act on the ground that wiretapping was an unne~ees:try and an unnecess::trily dangerous form of intrusion. See'114 Con g. Rec. 11598 ( 1968), quoting Attorne~· Gcnrral Rarrsc~· Clark. The Carter Ad'T'inistration supported·
the substantive and procedural limits enacted in the Foreign Intelligence
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. See Statement of Attorney
General Bell before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Ccmmittee on the Judiciary, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance·
Act of 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13 (1977) .
84 The lack of a public check on executive wiretapping distinguishes ¢is'
function frcm all those in which the Court has preY-iously upheld absolute
immunity-judicial, quasi-judicial, and legislative functions. The common
feature of all of these, which the Court has heavily relied upon in justifying absolute immunity, is their public character. This public character·
reduces the need for "private damages actions as a means of controlling;
upcon&titutional conduct." Butz, su'l?ra, at 5.La..
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The argument that there will not be any int:-rference of
constitutional dimensions with executive responsibilit:es here
is particularly strong given that an executive official, including the President, may insulate himself from potential liability by obtaining a judicial warrant. It is difficult to argue
that obtaining a warrant is itself an intrusion of constitutional
dimensions on executive functions given the manner in which
the Fourth Amendment separates and allocates powers in
the area of government searches, including wiretaps: 35
"The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial
judgment, not the riek that executive discretion may be
reasonably exercised. This jt· dicial role accords with our
basic constitutional doctrine that indiv:dual freedoms
will best be preserved through a separation of powers and
division of functions among the different branches . ..."
United States District Court, supra, at 317.
Neither history nor doctrine support petitioners' argument.
I conclude, therefore, that neither the judicial procees nor the
damages liability to which Congress has subjected the President in this Act is unconstitutionaL

v
Although I think the Title III immunity issue shodd be·
decided, if it is to be put aside and only the immunity of the·
President and his aides from damages liability for the implied
cause of action brought under the Constitution is to be adjudicated, then, as might be inferred from what has gone·
before, I am in disagreement with JusTICE PowELL's d;sposition. In the first place, he deals with the immunity issue in
constitutional terms. The strong preference of this Court
has been to avoid constitutional questions rnnecessary to thedisposition of a case. The cause of action that Bivens recognized is not expressly provided for in the Constitution;
uSee Berger v Neu York , 388 U. S 41 (1967) ; Katz v. Uvited States •

.3.89, U. S, 347 (196.7 l.
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rather, it was irnplied by this Court, Because it is a judiCially ·created cause of action, any immunity from StlCh a
claim need only be expressed as a judicially recognized immunity, not necessarily required by the Constitution. ·we
did not suggest in Butz v. Economou, supra, that the immunities recognized for federal officials were required by ·the
\
'
'
'
1
- Constitution.
We simply determined that the cause of action the Court had fashionea in Bit:ens would not reach
certain kinds of official conduct. Similarly, it was history,
n.o t the Constitution, that dictateCI the immunities accorded
state officials in § f983 actions. Pierson v. Ray, "386 U.S. 547
(1967); Scheuer v. Rhoaes, 416 U. B. 232 (1974); Stump v.
'Sparkman, 435 U. S. ·349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, supra.
Although we were formally engaging in statutory construction
in those cases, we have long since recognized that the scope
of immunity from § 1983 actions 'has been 1arge1y of "judicial
making." See Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959),
quoted in Butz, supra, at 502. 1 am, therefore, quite sure
that the President could be held absolutely immune in the
Bivens aspect of this case without rooting the judgment in
the Constitution.
We should eschew making constitutional judgments broader
than necessary in any particular case. Despite JusTICE
PowELL's disClaimer that 'he is not deciding the -question of
whether Congress 'has the power to apply to the President
the statutory damage remedy for illegal wiretapping established by ·Title ·nr, 1 do not believe that the argument he
presents leaves the question open. As I understand it, Jus-TICE PowELL's argument for absolute presidentia1 immunity
is basically a separation of powers argument: damages suits
would impermissibly interfere with the performance of the
President's constitutional functions and would impermissibly
interject the judiciary into the sphere reserved for the Executive Branch. These reasons would apply equally to a stat;utory damage suit against the President. ·c ertainly it is the

I'
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Government's view that acceptance of the constitutionally
grounded arguments put forth by JusTICE PowELL would
settle the Title III issue as well:
11
[I]f, as we submit, the President (and his closest advisers) are entitled to immunity from damages liability
for decisions made in the exercise of the President's official responsibilities under Article II of the Constitution,
that immunity could serve as a defense to statutory a~
well as constitutional causes of action." Petitioners' Reply Memorandum, at 1-2.
It is unwise and unsound to make the broad pronouncement that a President is to have absolute immunity for all
of his official acts and thus the same protection from damage
suits as is accorded to Members of Congress under the Speech
·or Debate Clause. If we are to reach the question of immunity from an implied cause of action brought under the
Constitution, I would limit the holding to the narrow question of whether the President is absolutely immune from
damages for violating the Fourth Amendment rights of a
·citizen through the imposition of a warrantless wiretap.
This would be much more consistent with the functional approach the Court took in Butz and with the pre-Butz absolute immunity decisions. Even under Barr v. Mateo, 360
U. S. 564 (1959) , and Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896),
the Court would have to determine whether the warrantless
wiretap of the Halperin family phone fell within the "outer
perimeter of [the President's] line of duty," 360 U. S., at
575, before it could decide that the President was absolutely
immune for his actions in this case.
My problems with JusTICE PowELL's approach, however, are
not limited to the scope of the holding he suggests. I believe that his argument is not consistent with the reasoning
of our previous immunity cases. With respect to presidential immunity, his argument makes three errors. First, it
improperly extrapolates from Scheuer v, Rhodes, supra. Sec.-
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ond, it misapplies the rationale . the Court adopted in Butz.
Third, it draws an unfounded analogy between the immunity
appropriate to the President a~d the immunities afforded
officials in the two other branches of the federal government.
·with respect to the immunity extended to the other petition' ers, JusTICE PowELL develops a subjective standard that h~s
no basis in any of our previous cases.
Evaluation of the appropriate scope of a judicially created
\ presidential immunity should begin, as· I believe · JusTICE
PowELL begins, with the holding in Scheuer that
"[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available
to officers of the executive branch ·of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of the office and all of the · circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based."· ·416·
U. S., at 247.
JusTICE PowELL concludes from this that because the discretion and responsibilities of the President· are so much broaderthan any other offiCial's, so ·must his immunity be broaderso broad, in fact, as to be absolute.
Scheuer does indeed create a sliding scale in the scope of'
official immunity.' But that scale is implicit in the application of the single standard for executive -immunity stated
there : "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light oi all t.he· circumstances. coupled with good-faith 'belief, that affords· a basis -for qualified
immunity of executive officers...." I d., at 248.
Scheuer contrasted the narrow range of options open to the
police officer with the vastly greater range of options open
to a governor acting in a civil crisis : The governor must be
free to choose from within that broad range on the basis of
the information he -currently has. Under the standard articulated in Scheuer, he is free to choose without incurring
liability any of the many options he has, · so long · as he goes
:'&O in ~ood faith -.and has .reasonable .grounds· for his choice...

.'1
. ..u
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As the responsibilities of an official become greater so does
the range of choices within which he may exercise reasonable
discretion. That is, the standard articulated in Scheuer it·
self provides a "greater protection" to higher officials.
At no point did we imply in that decision, or any other,
that the fact of a greater range of duties and choices is in
itself a reason to protect an official for choices made in bad
faith or made without "reasonable grounds." This, however,
is precisely the effect of granting the President an "absolute
immunity," because he has the broadest responsibilities and
therefore the broadest range of options within which to exercise his discretion. JusTICE PowELL, in short, confuses the increased quantitative protection implicit in the application of
the qualified immunity standard to the President, with a
qualitatively different kind of protection.
While Scheuer articulated the general rule for the scope
of executive immunity from damages liability for constitutional violations, Butz articulated the basic approach to be
taken in deciding whether a particular official's "special functions" require absolute immunity. I agree with JusTICE PowELL that Butz took what can best be described as a "functional" approach. It rejected the Court of Appeals' "undue
emphasis" on the location of the official within the executive
branch and looked instead to the functions performed by the
particular official. In each instance in which absolute immurtity was extended to an official, it was extended only to the
degree that the officer participated in a function that had
previously been found to require absolute immunity for its
proper execution. Butz stands for the proposition that no
official deserves absolute immunity simply by virtue of his
rank or position ; rather, some officials may perform functions
that require absolute immunity and such officials are immune
from damages liability for the acts they take in executing
those functions.
Thus, under Butz there may very well be functions within
.the President's responsibilities for the performance of which
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he is absolutely immune. JUSTlCE POWELL acknowledges tha~
j3ut~ suggests such a function by function approach, ante, at
n . 24, but rejects the suggestion. Instead, he argues t~at
the possibility of damages suits for constitutional violations
would hinder the President iri the performance of all of his
functions:
"The likelihood that Presidents
face large numbers
of constitutional damage suits creates a risk that Presidential decisionmaking will be interfered with unduly ..•
a sitting President. may be diverted from the pressing
duties of his office ~y the requirements ·of defending
numerous lawsuits...." Ante, at n. 22.

'vill

I have two problems with this reasoning. · First, in no instance have we J:lreviously held legal accountability in itself
to be an unjustifiabie cost. "'the avaiiabiiity of the courts to.
vindicate constitutional wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the v!rtues of our system of delegated and
limited powers. As argued in §IV, our concern in fashioning absolute immunity has been that liability may pervert
the decisionmaking process in a particular function by undercutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. - ·The
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas
that may intrud~ on individua1s1 constitutionally protected
rights has never before been counted as a cost. Second, JusTICE PowELL's practical concerns are, at this point, speculative. He admits that "there is no historical record of numerous suits against the President''; nor is there any reason to·
think that. the protection afforded by summary judgment ·procedures w()uld not be adequate to protect the President, as
they curr~ntly protect other executive officers from unfounded
litigation. Finally, even if judicial procedures are not sufficient, Congress remains free to .address this problem if and
when it develops.~ti
a6 Juf:!nce PoWJ<!LL also suggest::; that thi::; case illu:;trates "a dang«:>r of
unfaitneSll when otficial::l face per~onal liabihty for decisions made in areas·

I
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I understand JusTICE PowELL to have one final argument
for absolute immunity: It would somehow be inconsistent
with "our constitutional structure" to accord absolute immunity to Members of Congress and Members of this Court,
but not to the President. That is, it would not be consistent
with the "importance of the role of the chief executive office
of the Nation" to afford him a lower level of immunity than
that accorded to his counterparts in the other two branches
of the Federal Government: "[T]he Founders gave the President, as an individual official, a separate and equal footing
with Congress and this Court as corporate bodies." Ante,
at 19. Analogizing the President to the members of the
other branches, however, is wholly out of place. The ap~
propriate analogy under our cases would be between the
President and other executive officers, both state and federal, and not between the President and officials who perform
functions that have nothing in common with those of the
President.
Our decisions with respect to judicial immunity have been
founded on an analysis of history and policy. Insofar as
particular executive functions share a similar history and/or
policy we have not hesitated to recognize absolute immunity
for them as well. See Imbler, supra; Butz, supra. To draw
this simple analogy between judges and the President is to
avoid the complexity that our previous cases in this area
have held to be unavoidable. Similarly, it is to depart from
what I took to be well-founded law.
Our decisions did not create the immunity afforded Members of Congress: the Constitution did. Precisely because
the Constitution explicitly affords Congressmen-and not the
President-immunity from judicial process, analogizing the
President to Congressmen is inappropriate. What is more,
of legal uncertainty." Ante, at 21. But the qualified immunity stand- I
ard takes into account "legal uncertamty," so this is not an argument
in favor of absolute immunity.
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the constitutional history reviewed above, § IV (A), shows
it to be unfounded as well! JusTICE PowELL realizes that
there is nothing in the Constitution similar to the Speech
or Debate Clause to support his argument. He tries, how~
ever, to draw support from this explicit difference in treat~
ment of Members of Congress and the President:
"The omission [frotn the Constitution] of an explicit
exemption of the President from personaJ damages suits
may be explained by a general understanding at the
time that no explicit exemption was necessary." Ante,
at 19.
It may, of course, equally be explained by a quite different
intention of the drafters: The most obvious explanation for
the different treatment in the written text of the Constitution is that the drafters intended different treatment in fact.
It adds a new twist to constitutional interpretation, to say
the least, to conclude that the President has absolute immunity under the Constitution because the Framers did not
provide for it. In any case, it is· difficult · to believe there
was any "general understanding at the time," when there
had never before been an office quite like that of President.
Without substantial historical support JusTICE PowELL's assertion is mere speculation; but the only historical support
that JusTICE PowELL offers is a one-sided account of the
lively debate described iu §IV (A) above.
JusTICE PowELL's treatment of the immunity to be afforded petitioners Mitchell, Kissinger, and Haldeman again
fails to carry out an analysis of the effect of damages liability on the proper performance of their official functions; The
argument of the memorandum is based on one proposition:
"if the purpose of immunity is in part to avoid excessive caut~on on the part of officials who fear personal liability, that
purpose must be served where the Nation's security is at
stake." Ante, at 27. Not only is this far too simple an
approach to the complex problem of the appropriate scope
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of the immunity to be afforded petitioners, but even if it
were adequate, JusTICE PowELL fails to apply it consistentiy.
As I argued in §IV (B), absolute, as opposed to qualified,
immunity, cannot be justified simply • pointing to a need
for forthright governmental action: that rationale is far too
broad. Rather, whether absoiute immunity is appropriate
depends 'on a careful analysis of the potentially conflicting
values implicated in the part1cuiar function at issue. Supra,
a.t 25-27. But JusTICE PowELL writes as if society's interests were aligned wholly on the side of encouraging wiretaps
here and not equally, if not more, aligned with that of dis.:
couraging unreasonable, warrantless searches.
Thus, he notes that Attorney General Mitchell was the
11
key person" in determining when wiretaps were required to
protect national security, and from this observation alone
concludes that these "functions were sufficiently unique and
important to justify a rule of absolute immunity." Ante, at
21. Similarly, the memorandum moves from the observation
that Kissinger "had special responsibility and discharged special functions with respect to national security," ibid., to the
conclusion that he too shouid be absolutely immune. Despite the fact that Haldeman was involved with what might
have been a national security wiretap, jUSTICE PowELL denies
him the absolute immunity afforded the others. JusTICE
PowELL, however, does not distinguish Haldeman from the
others on the basis of the principle he purports to be applying-avoiding excessive ca.ution in the national security area.
Rather, Haldeman is denied absolute immunity because he
functioned only on the basis of an "ad hoc assignment from
the President." Ib-id. Why the perhaps temporary nature
of the assignment, rather than the duties performed, is relevant remains a mystery. This kind of argument is clearly
the antithesis of the functional analysis that we adopted in
Butz, and which JusTICE PowELL purports to be applying.
ll also suggest that the absolute immunitY. that Jus'riCS·

by
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PowELL grants Mitchell and Kissinger is, in fact, absolute in
name only: It bears a much closer resemblance to qualified
immunity, for petitioners must prove that they acted with a
particular subjective inte t. A defendant who possesses abso ute Immunity need only prove that the challenged action
fell within th~ "outer perimeter of [his]hne of duty," Barr
v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959), not that ·the action was
performed with a certain intent or under certain conditions.
On the other hand, a qualified immunity defense is not available "if [the defendant] knew or reasonab1y should h~e
known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate ·the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff], or if he too'k the action with the malicious int~ntion to cause ~~rivation o ~stltu wna ng s or ot er
inFiry...." ~· Strickla!!:!1J'420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
JusTICE PowELLs proposeastandard of "absolute immunity"
for Kissinger and Mitchell t~ature of
the defendant's "subjective intent":
---"The effect of th1s absolute immunity is to limit the possible liability of Mitchell and Kissinger to any period in
which they remained responsible for the wiretap and its
purpose no longer related to national security concerns."
Ante, at 32.

.
We have resisted previous attem ts to make ualificd imA ,jJ, /,j. ~
munity turn solei on the subjective in~ent of the defen ant. ~.:::;;_;-::::~
Woo , supra, at 321.
ather, we ave insisted that an officer· · ·
1
be charged with knowledge of well-established constitutional L........)£~--f '-"
law and be liable for damages when his conduct violates a
?
standard of objective reasonableness. The subjective element of the qualified immunity standard was not designed
I
\
to shield those who act with "good intentions"; rather, it was
designed to bar· an immunity defense to those who acted with
"malice": We have held that even if an action is obj'ectively
reasonable, a malicious intent to injure or deprive will bar
t~. defense of qualified immunity. See Wood, supra; at 322:
~

r -..

7
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(quoted above). I have suggested before, to no avail, that
the qualified immunity defense require only objective reasonableness and should not be defeated by a defendant's ill
will. As I see it, that would be the better rule. However
that may be, there is no basis in any of our immunity cases
for a 'tholly subjective standard/and Lewis' memorandum
does no~
The subjective test is particularly puzzling in the circumstance of this case. Petitioners have not proposed such a
test; in fact, they have argued in favor of just the opposite.
In their view, 'the subjective element of 'the qualified immunity test imposes too great a ·burden on "high federal officials
because it limits the · availability of summary judgment.
·Thus, petitioners ar ued for a wholly objective test to determine qua 1 e immunity for a1 ege const1 u 10na:I violations
by high executive officers:
11
The same reasons that support the conclusion that these
officials are absolutely immune for their official acts ...
also indicate that, if their immunity is orily qualified,
they should not be required to disprove alleg_atiO_!!,.S of
'mali e' in er nal aama es actions . . . charges of
malice can be easily maae. . . . [T]he conventional doctrine of qualinea immunity is entirely inadequate to
safeguard the e'Xecution or presiaential duties . . . . "
Petitioner's Brief, at 61. Judge Gesell, in his concurring
opinion below, expressed a similar belief that the subjective
.e~tht_.~fied_ i~st required rethinking
in this context:
'iit is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to
·create a material issue of fact on some element of the
. immmiity defense where subtle questions of constitutional law and a decision maker's mental process are involved." 52A.
Conditioning immunity on subjective intent will exascer. bate the burden of"'J.itigation for executive officials. ·.Because

•

J •
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motive is one of the issues least amenable to summary ad-.
judication, this standard will require the trier of fact to examine the defendant's motives in virtually every case. This
result is not consistent with a major goal of official immunity
in cases like this, which is substantially to remove the threat
'of litigation from the decisionmaking process of high execu~
tive officials in the field of national security. 87

37

JusTICE PowELL appears to present two arguments in support of
this subjective test. First, he suggests that a qualified immunity standard would present "a daJJger in this area that defendants will be unable
to mount a successful defense without breaching the secrecy they are
sworn to protect.'" Ante, at n. 41. This problem, however, has not
arisen in this case and respondents conceded at oral argument that
"if a damage claimant runs into a properly claimed state secret privilege
assertion, ... [t]he suit will be dismissed. . . . So those interest will
be protected." Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
Second, he indicates that his proJJOsed standard would ease the litigation burden on the defendant:
"[S]uch a rule would still require [government officials] to litigate the
!;;sue of the real purpose of an act. . . . But this rule would still be
more protective of petitioners than a rule of qualified immunity, because
'it would 'be much ea;;ier to establish a defense based on the national
security purpose of an action than it would be to establish that one
acted in 'good faith' with respert to plaintiff;;' con::;titutional rights."
Ante, at n. 43.
I doubt the empirical basis for this claim . The aspect of the "good
faith" defense that ha.Q been most difficult to deal with through summary
procedures has been that of subjective purpose-up until now, allegations of malice. But JusTICE PowELL's proposed staJJdard will require•
~xtensive litigatioJl •on juJ:;t such a subjective i;;sue in every case..
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Dick

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 19, 1982

80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald
Byron called me about WJB's letter.

I told him

that I had not read it and was in the middle of reading tax
cases.

He nevertheless, in substance, said the following:

He referred to the "last paragraph" (I believe) of WJB's
letter where - according to BRW - the suggestion is made
that we should explicitly leave open some right to discovery
on the question of whether the official "knew or should have
known" that he was violating the Constitution.
BRW said that he had tried to make clear in
Navarette his present view that

th~

law must be "clearly

established" (and BRW used this phrase several times) before
an official is held liable, and we should say nothing to
encourage protracted discovery.
I believe I argued in my Wood v. Strickland
dissent that particularly in constitutional law, there are
wide areas in which officials of various kinds operate daily
where "the law" is not clearly established.

As you observed

recently, it is one thing to know that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated by an ordinance requiring blacks to sit
in the rear of a bus.

It is something else for a school

board member in California or washington to know today what
the law is with respect to busing.

2.

I told BRW that after I had had an opportunity to
consider WJB's letter,
I

I

would call him back.

am now right in the middle of John's Asarco

case.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAMI!IE R S OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR.

May 19, 1982 .

/
No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald .

Dear Lewis,
I am still unsettled in this case . Your draft of
course effects a substantial change from the standard
adhered to in Scheuer v . Rhodes, Wood v. Strickland,
and Butz v . Economou, in which we recognized a "good
faith" defense that incorporates both objective and
subjective elements . But I am inclined to agree with
you that "substantial costs attend the litigation of
the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive Branch." Draft at 15-16 . At the same time,
however, I am troubled by several points in your draft .
(1) You limit the benefit of the new, objective
standard to "high executive officials , " at least for
the time being . Draft at 18 . I do not think that I
could join in such a limitation, because it appears to
be favoring high officials over their subordinates -an approach of doubtful symbolic value at best . Indeed, I would have thought it arguable that high government officials, since they have greater resources
and legal advice available to them, should be held to a
higher standard of behavior . All in all, the whole issue of differential treatment according to hierarchical
status would be better avoided , in my view. And it
seems to me that this is easy to do, since we have already recognized (as you observe in footnote 29) that
qualified immunity is of "varying scope . .. dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability
is sought to be based ." Scheuer v . Rhodes , 416 u.s . ,
at 24 7. In sum, if we are to reformulate the good
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faith immunity doctrine, should we not announce a rule
applicable across the board, subject to the Scheuer
limitation noted above?
(2) You have defined the new substantive standard
of liability to be objective in the sense that an official's "qualified immunity would be defeated if [hel
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]." Draft at 14 (emphasis yours). You persuade me
that, at least with respect to constitutional actions
having no ready common-law analogue (~~' false arrest, imprisonment), a "malicious intention to cause
••. injury," ibid. (emphasis yours), is an anomalous
basis upon which to rest personal liability: To my
mind, the relevant intent inquiry should focus on the
official's attentiveness to ascertainable law, on what
the official "knew or should have known." Therefore I
am willing to accept your view that personal liability
should not be imposed upon an official who reasonably
believes his conduct to be lawful. And sometimes the
law is simply too obscure for us to expect it to be
known even to an official who is attentive to the
responsibilities of his office. Where the law is thus
unsettled, the official ought not to be culpable if he
exercises his best judgment.
But while I can travel that far with you, I am
troubled by your use of the term, "indisputable legal
rights." True, that wording appears in Wood v.
Strickland and other opinions. But am I not right that
every action may be the subject of some legal dispute?
And of course every case may be distinguishable, if
only on its facts. Thus even when the law on a point
is apparently settled, the question of good faith turns
on whether the official has attempted to ascertain that
law, and whether his actions were taken in accordance
with a colorable view of it. I do not think that we
are far apart on this point, but I do fear that "indisputable law" sends out quite the wrong signal. I would
feel more comfortable if the references, in outlining
the substantive standard, were to refer to "ascertainable law," or simply "the law." Of course, under this
standard summary judgment would still be readily available to public-official defendants in two very common
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situations: (a) where the state of the law was ambiguous at the time of the alleged violation -- so that the
law could not have been "known" then, and thus liability could not ensue -- and (b) where the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter, that a violation of
his constitutional rights actually occurred.
(3) Given the substantive standard that you announce -- imposing liability when the public-official
defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions -- it seems
inescapable to me that some discovery may sometimes be
required to determine exactly what the defendant did
"know" at the time of his actions. In this respect the
issue before us is very similar to that in Herbert v.
Lando, 441 u.s. 153 (1979), in which the Court observed
that "To erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is
a matter of some substance, particularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their good-faith
. . . . " Id., at 170. I think that the possibility of
such discovery needs to be acknowledged, if only in a
footnote sentence with a comparing reference to Lando.
Of course, it could also be noted at that juncture that
summary judgment procedures could be arranged so as to
allow public-official defendants an opportunity to gain
summary judgment in their favor on grounds such as
those outlined in the previous paragraph, before discovery of the defendants' "knowledge" would be permitted. Cf. id., at 180, n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring).

!J:Oly,
,;;W• J • B • , J r •

Justice Powell.
Copies to the Conference.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

May 21, 1982

Re:

80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,

\

Under Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, and
like cases, a defendant with qualified immunity is not
liable for violating a statutory or constitutional
right of the plaintiff unless that right was clearly
established under the law in existence at the time of
the '1ti!egea conduct and the defendant knew or should
have known of that established right.
I would not
think this part of the test would be more of a legal
than a factual problem: whether the law is clearly
established is of that nature, and if the law is clear,
it is doubtful that the defendant can absolve himself
by claiming that he neither knew nor should have known
the established rule applicable to his conduct.
You will also recall that in early circulations in
Navarette, I unsucessfully proposed eliminating the
good faith-malicious intention prong of the ScheuerStrickland formulation of the qualified immunity test.
That requirement has never made a great deal of sense
to me. At the end of my memorandum last term in the
Nixon case I also suggested that the rule be modified
and have renewed that suggestion to you earlier this
term. Hence, it will come as no surprise to you that I
agree with Bill Brennan that the modification, if it is
to be made, should not be confined to the President but
should be a general rule.

l

the~tate t

As indicated, if the immunity turns on
of the law, I would not think the immunity de~ ion
would be burdened with factual determinations~or
would it be if the the law is clearly established -there must be probable cause to arrest, for example -and the facts are also not in dispute.
The question
then would be a legal one: was the officer's mistake a
reasonable one, as it surely would be in cases where
judges divide on whether probable cause exists.
Of
course, there will be recurring hassles on what the
facts are and what the officer knew, but at least the
qualified immunity rule, if modified as I hope you will
propose, will narrow the possible factual issues a
great deal.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

May 22, 1982

80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Byron:
Thank you for your helpful letter of May 21.
As you know from our several conversations, I am
in entire agreement as to the desirability of eliminating
the good faith-malicious intention component of the ScheuerStrickland formulation of the qualified immuni.ty test. In
the draft I circulated on April 6 in this case, I limited
the opinion to senior aides of the President only because
the petitioners in this case were in that category.
Since our conversations, I have been in touch with
the Justices who joined my draft, and they also are
agreeable to the view that our opinion should not be so
limited.
I am presently making revisions to accomplish this
change, and hope to be recirculating early next week.
I also agree with your identification, in the last
paragraph of your letter, of the issues that normally would
be decided by a court rather than a jury.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

rhf

May 25, 1982

Draft letter to WJB concerning Harlow

Dear Bill:

0-1~.., ~ ~

.&.r ~

Pl-ease _par a on m¥-- eelay in responding to your letter of
-1

May 19.

I

~ eeil

i~ri'A-jtOJJ....h Glel

not

busy these ga¥-S._h~

~-

~
In working on the enclosed draft, I have ReTd your
.A

~

suggest ions in mind.

The opin: :1 now

......

~e"ilow.s you £

~~~~vu-v~
~~)~~
1\ s.Y.'J g~~R tha t ...th4 ropo!!!e ~ good faith immunity standard
should extend "across the board."
responsiy e te

~

J
'Pfle~t ~

seeoftd-concer u abou t W¥

term "settled, indisputable rights."

relianc ~

Although that

the

""

formulation did appear in Wood v. Strickland, the current
draft defines the substantive standard in terms of "clearly
established" statutory and constitutional rights.
17-19. ,{

See pages

r:i;:~~~~-

~ Yoll?

th1rd sug es 10n h s p
and I have not attempted explicitly to

/

2.

t f r apart, especially in light of the changes I have
ndertaken in the
If

r

cu~;~traft opinjon.-----~

.;'

have further

onsider them.

....----.
g-est1ons,

I would be happy to

lfp/ss 05/25/82
80-945 Harlow
I

delivered today to JPS a copy of a third draft

of this case.

For identification purposes this is dated

5/24/82 in pen, and has not been circulated.
The draft contains changes designed to meet
Byron's views.

I

wanted to make sure that John Stevens

approved before submitting the draft to Byron.

John advised

me this afternoon that the changes are entirely agreeable to
him.

Th next step is to ascertain Byron's views.

L.F.P., Jr.

.:§u.prtutt ~O'Url d

tlrt ~ta ~titUs

._as!ringtcn. ~. ~· 2!lp'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 26, 1982
Re:

No. 80-945

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
I think it is very important to maintain the language
about abuse of discovery to which you refer in the third
paragraph of your letter to Bill Brennan dated May 26th.
After all, you have a Court for that language, and I would
see no advantage in weakening it in order to get a couple
more votes for the opinion.
Sincerely~

Justice Powell

<!Jou:rt of tlrt 'J!Uri.ttb~tafts
jifas~tittgtcn. ~. <!J. 2!IgtJ!~

.:§u:p:rtmt

C HAM BERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

May 26
Re:

No. 80-945

Dear Lewis:

1
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~t

. \-

I think it is very important ~q maintain the language
about abuse of discovery to which yo·u refer in the third
paragraph o
~r-Te~~~~~trr-~efl~~~~~d May 26th.
After all you
age 1 and I would
see no adva
to get a couple
more votes for the opinion.
Sincerely~

Justice Powell

~nvrtmt

Qfonrt ltf tftt ';!Jlnit~b .§taft.s'
'~Jhurlyittgt on, ~. Qf . 2:11.? Jl. .;l

CHAMBERS Of

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

'
May 26, 1982

No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It
states that knowledge by an official that his conduct will
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17,
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective
element is being discarded and that liability will be
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly
established rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Does the sentence on page 18 reintroduce a
subjective test?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

May 26, 1982

80-945 Harlow v.

~itzgeral~

Dear Sandra:
Although the last sentence on page 18 was not
intended to reintroduce a subjective test, there may be - as
you suggest - some ambiquity.
Accordingly, in my next circulation J will make
the changes indicated on the enclosed copy of paqe 18.
I commend your care in weighing every word, a
deqree of care that we rarely find here during the last few
weeks .

Sincerely,

..Just ice 0 'f'onnor
lfp/ss

Dick:

I would not recirculate until we give other Chambers

a. chance to comment on our changes - comments I hope will

not be made.
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sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of
subjective intent.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
1aw, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of goverrunent and
pennit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what the law was at the time the ac- .
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allowed.
.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely .in "objective" terms, we provide 'no license to lawless conduct.
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that foc~~es on the objective legal reasonabl~:...Vffi_c1~a_'_s-.----t
act:s.-wD~~ that ~ conduct-~-vio ate .
.
----statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to pesk __..9---tate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such ~o · .
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's

I

tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
"This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
37
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumsta.nces under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to .the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
"'Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not r easonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-

I

\

..... -

~ay
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80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Bill:
Again I am a bit tardv in responding to your
letter of May 19.
In workinq on the draft I am circulating this
morning, I have had your suggestions in mi.no. The opinion
is now in accord with your view and Byron's that the good
faith immunity stan~ard should extend "across the board." I
also removed the term "settled, indisputable rights."
Although that formulation did appear in Wood v. Strickland,
th~ current draft defines the substantive standard in terms
of "clearly established" statutory and constitutional
rights. See paqes 17-19. This change is in accord with the
more recent language in Navar~tte.
I hesitate to add language that may weakPn our
renewed a~monition against abuse of discovery in these suits
against officials. We know from experience that, despite
what we said in Butz, Oistrict Courts have tended in these
cases to allow litigation to go on for years through
discovery.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

SOC's letter in Harlow

It would be very easy to accommodate SOC's suggestion for
clarification, in the way indicated on the attached coryy of page
18 of Harlow.

I suggest that we make the change and recirculate.

You then could send a

S"•rt
..

note, along the lines of:

"In response to your question I have redrafted the last sentence on
page 18 to omit any ambiguity.
re - introduce a subjective test.
suggestion for clarification . "

The sentence was not intended to
I appreciate your well-taken

tqt ~ittb ,jtab.ll'
JlzuYltington, ~. <If. 2ll~~~

,ju.vum:t <!fourt ttf
CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 26, 1982

No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It
states that ~nowledge by an official that his conduct will
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17,
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective
element is being discarded and that liability will be
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly
established rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Does the sentence on page 18 reintroduce a
subjective test?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

C).··
<!Jllltrt cf tq t ~nib~ ~ hdt%'
Jlrurfrington, ~. <q. 2"ll~Jt~

~ttVrttttt

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 26, 1982

Dear Lewis,
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It
states that ~nowled~e by an official that his conduct will
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17,
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective
element is being discarded and that liability will be
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly
established rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Does the sentence on page 18 reintroduce a
subjective test?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

- f-nt.b~ ~ ~~
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sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of
subjective intent.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what the law was at the time the action occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allowed.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct.
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness .~o~f~a~n~£Of~fi~c~ia~l~'
acts.
ere an o eta~ that~uct,. violate
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to esitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such knowing
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's

i-J...-----=

tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 l : S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
31
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
33
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act ' ·
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 27, 1982

No. 80-945

Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
I continue to join you in this opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

J usuce
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t/.1 ustice
Justice
Justice
Justice

From:

1Vlarsnall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

Justice Brennan

Circulated:

.21~ ~ ~2..

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-945

BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
I agree with the substantive standard announced by the
Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. Ante, at 15, 18. I also agree
that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government officials performing discretionary functions." I d., at
17. I write separately only to note that given this standard,
it seems inescapable to me that some measure of discovery
may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a public-official defendant did "know" at the time of his actions.
In this respect the issue before us is very similar to that addressed in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153 (1979), in which
the Court observed that "To erect an impenetrable barrier to
the plaintiffs use of such evidence on his side of the case is a
matter of some substance, particularly when defendants
themselves are prone to assert their good-faith .... " Id.,
at 170. Of course, as the Court has already noted, ante, at
18, summary judgment will be readily available to public-official defendants whenever the state of the law was so ambiguous at the time of the alleged violation that it could not have
been "known" then, and thus liability could not ensue. In
my view, summary judgment will also be readily available
whenever the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter,

l

80-945-CONCUR
2

HARLOW v. FITZGERALD

that a violation of his constitutional rights actually occurred.
I see no reason why discovery of defendants' "knowledge"
should not be deferred by the trial judge pending decision of
any motion of defendants for summary judgment on grounds
such as these. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S., at 180, n. 4
(POWELL, J., concurring).

MAY 27 , 1.982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Justice Brennan's concurrence in "Harlow"

I don't know what to make of this.

WJB .._ deliberately

misreads the opinion as requiring an inquiry--at least in some
cases--into what a particular official actually knew .

This is
C\.

"subjective" in the sense of requiring discovery

into ~

!)articular

official's knowledge of the law--9ossibly a different inquiry from
what an official could reasonably have been expected to know.
In so reading the opinion, WJB cites page 15--aryoarently the quotation
from Wood concerning the present law, rather than the new standard
created by the opinion.

The quoted words do not aoryear on page 18,

the other oage that he cites.

After Justice O'Connor's requested

change is made, there will be no ambiguity on ryage 18.
What to do?

WJB has not joined the opinion.

According to his

clerks, he and several others are awaiting the lead of BRW.
it probably is best for now to wait for White.

I think

Without strong

pressure from BRW, I think it may ultimately be im,ortant even to
point out that WJB is wrong--that the opinion does not contemolate
the kind of inquiry to which he refers.
One other point : In the carryover sentence from page 1 to oage 2 ,
WJB suggests his support for a stiffening of the burden of l)roof
needed to survive a motion for summary judgment.

This was the

approach taken in our early drafts, before JPS suggested that the

Court lacked power to create an exception of this kind
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

~

to the

It probably is too late to try,

but it now apoears that there might be a Court for this aporoach-similar to that of Judge Gesell in Kissinger;-even without JPS.
If there . . . were more time, one oossibility might be to put this
idea informally to WJB, possibly as a compromise for letting him
have his way on the "knew or should have known" question.
Again, in view of the time , the best course is orobably to await
BRW's response to Harlow and simply take as much as he is willing to
give.

But WJB obviously is

"up to something," and I thought

I should sketch some of the oossibilities that occur to me.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

28, 1982.

J . BRENNAN , JR.

No. 80-945

Harlow and Butterfield
v. Fitzgerald.

Dear Lewis,
In case it was not clear from
my circulation of yesterday, I join in your
draft of May 26 in this case.

Justice Powell.
Copies to the Conference.

To : The Chief Just i ce
Justice Brennan
Justice Whit e
Justice Marshal l
Justice Puv.:Pll
J ust" ce R"J,T'<..,u1 st
Justii}E: Stevens
Justi :·e 0 Connor
From: Jnstica Blackmun

l·'AY 3 1 1S82

Circulate d : ~~n~~~------

Recirculated :

No. 80-945 - Har l o w v. F i t z g er ald
JUSTICE BLAC KMUN, concurring.
Having join e d the dis s ent in Ni xon v.

Fit z g e rald,

ante,

I,

like Justice White, di sassoci a te myself from any i mplication in
the Court's opinion in the pre s ent case that Nixon v. Fitzgerald
was co r rectly d e cid e d.
opinion.

With th a t r es ervation, I join the Court's

.
<!JO"ttrl ttf titt ~mu~ '~f:a.Ug
~ttgfrington. IB. <!J. 20gt>t.~

~u:pttttt.c

CHAMBERS OF"

May 31, 1982

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/
Re: No. 80-945 - Harlow v. Fitzgerald
Dear Bill:
If you will permit me to do so, I would like to have my
name added to your separate concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

~~
'

~I Jf/t-~ ~
'

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

~~~·

4YL-r ~~ --0.

~

~A-~~~

~upumt

Qj'ou.rt of tltt ~tb ~taftg
11lasqinston. tJ. <!J. 2llc?'l-;l

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 2, 1982

Re:

No. 80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

Dear Bill:
Pleas~

join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 06/03/82

BRENH SALLY-POW

v :~~ ~ ~ ~)
~J( ~~~

80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

r -/)_,.

Dear Bill:

I must say that your concern over the

~Gbage

ov·

change on page 18 surprises me.

a~ sh~

The common ground that I thought we

a:

~do: o::o:~:w:b:::t::esu:; :::: vet~aannd s~

:::ndt:rd

I would agree, however, that ordinarily an offici
know

what

certainly

he

"could

be

in

cases

true

constitutional

rights

political purposes).
what

an

official

discovery.

expected
of

(e.g.'

f"'

to

know".

egregious
a

wiretap

. ve

wil~ 1\

This

is

violation

of

purely

for

There will be cases, however, where

actually

knew

could

invite

extensive

It is for this reason that I viewed the change

on page 18 as consistent with our purpose

in redefining

the standard.
Perhaps

the

difference

in

our

views

could

be

accommodated by returning to the word "knows" on page 18
as you suggest, and dropping a footnote to the effect that
a plaintiff must make some objective showing of knowledge
-

ie.g., that a bare averment of it would be insufficient

to shift the burden.

~
, '

2.

We have been debating these
for

two

Terms.

In

view

of

the

immunity quest ions

multiplicity

of

suits

brought against officials, and the way in which discovery
has

been

exploited

to

prolong

the

litigation

even

of

frivolous claims, I consider it particularly important to
have

a

Court

unambiguously.
would

be

opinion
Though

beneficial

if

that

not

announces

necessary,

there

could

I
be

rather than a bare margin of five votes.
will await the views of the other Justices.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan

a
think

a

standard
also

strong

it

Court

Accordingly, I

C HAMBE R S OF

JU S T I CE W M. J. B R ENNAN, JR.

. : )__q£.,

,June 3, 1982 •
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Dear Lewis,

<ill-~

-4 L()~. .

Most of the changes that you have made in your
latest circulation in this case give me no difficulty.
The one exception appears on page 18, near the bottom
of the page, where one sentence now reads, "Where an
official could be expected to know that certain conduct
would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he
should be made to hesitate •••• " In your previous
draft, this sentence began, "Where an official knows
that
" This change, to my mind, is crucial.
The change manifestly alters the substantive standard to which I agreed in my concurrence. Relying upon
the sentence that you have now changed, I understood
your previous draft to contain a standard "imposing liability when a public-official defendant 'knew or
should have known' of the constitutionally violative
effect of his actions." See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, at 1
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). My understanding is, I believe, shared by others in the Harlow majority. See
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, at 19 (WHITE, J., dissenting):
"Today's decision in Harlow •.• makes clear that the
President, were he subject to civil liability, could be
held liable only for an action that he knew, or as an
objective matter should have known, was illegal anda
clear abuse of his authority and power." (Emphasis
added.)
Moreover, this change in the substantive standard
contained in Harlow is important in the resolution of
future cases. As you have changed it, the standard
would allow the official who actually knew he was violating the law to escape liability for h1s actions, so
long as he could not "reasonably have been expected" to

LJ

~

~

-t'/7

No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald.

2.

know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and
unusually well-informed violator of constitutional
rights would evade just punishment for his crimes.
Such a result would be very wrong, to my mind. This is
particularly so given that the substantive standard announced in Harlow applies "across the board" to all
public-offical defendants.
Accordingly, I suggest that you revise the sentence on page 18 to read, "Where an official knows or
could be expected to know ...• " Could you see yourway
clear to make this revision?

Sincerely,

~~
Justice Powell.
Copies to the Conference.

Jr.

June 5, 1982

DRAFT

On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine
what the law was at the time an action occurred.

If the law at

that time was not clearly established, summary judgment should be
entered for the official, since he could not know nor should he
have

about ~n-existen'§J legai

known

threshold
should

immunity

not

however,

be

the

reasonably
governing

question

allowed.

If

-~..

J

1

standar <;.!

~~#

' Until

resolved, [extensiv~discovery

is
the

law

was

clearly

established,

•'

immunity

competent
his conduct.

defense (
public

t

this

shoul ~ ordinar ily~

official

Nevertheless,

should

fail

know

since
the

a

law

if the official pleading

the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that
he

neither

knew nor

should

have

known

standard, the defense should be sutained.

of

the

relevant

legal

But again, the defense

would turn primarily on objective factors.

The above, I suggest, should take the place of the last two
sentences of the first full paragraph on p. 18.
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On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred.
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously
identified as unlawful.

Until this threshold immunity

question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.

If

the law was clearly established, however, the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct.
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard,
the defense should be sustained.

But again, the defense

would turn primarily on objective factors.
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On summary judgment the judge appropriately may detel mine,
not only the currently applicable legal standard, but
whether that standard was "clearly established" at the time
an action occurred.

If the standard at that time was not

clearly established, an official could not reasonably be
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade
conduct not previously identified as unlawful.
judgment accordingly should be entered.

~

Summary

Until this

threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should
not be allowed.

'

[

Where the applicable law is clearly

established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail:

A

reasonable official generally should know the law governing
his official conduct.

We do not foreclose the possibility

that an official pleading qualified immunity might prove the
existence of extraordinary circumstances, under which he
neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard.

If so, the immunity defense should be sustained.

But again, the immunity defense would depend primarily on
objective factors.

June 6, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Harlow

Generally I have no difficulty with BRW's suggested
"compromise" language. I have attached a slightly redrafted
version.

Most of the changes are stylistic.

nearly substantive.

Two are more

First, in accord with your marked copy

of BRW's draft, I have emphasized that it is a decision for
the judge whether the law is "clearly established."

Second,

I have added language asserting that unless the law is
"clearly established," an official could not "fairly be said
to 'know' that the law forbade [his] conduct."

This

actually tracks some language in WJB's concurring opinion,
but is intended more to defuse it.

WJB wants to make sure

that officials can be held liable whenever they personally
know that their conduct is unlawful, even if they could not
be "expected" to know this. By defining "know" in terms of
"clearly established" law, the added language would protect
officials against a claim that they should have anticipated
the declaration of new constitutional rights.

This I think

is the aspect of the opinion that does most to move the law

I

2.

in your preferred direction.

At the same time, this draft--

like BRW's--leaves open the possibility that an official's
actual personal knowledge would "count" at least in some few
cases where the law was clearly established.
As you will see, both of my suggested "substantive"
changes occur in the first two sentences of BRW's draft.

If

you agree with my suggestions, but think it might be better
not to depart too far from BRW's draft, you might consider
changing the first two sentences only.

You then could tell

him that except for changes in the first two sentences, you
have accepted his language entirely as drafted.

I
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80-945 'larlow

Dear Byron:
over the t.Yeekend ! took a c1 oser look at your
suggested substitute for the last two sentences of the first
full paraqraoh on o. 18.
Its substance is aqreeable to me. I believe it
would be somewhat clearer, however, if the first two
sentences were revised as I have indicated on my draft of
this morning.
I also ommitted the word "extensive" prior to
discovery in your third sentence. I have made no further
changes.

I agree that it would he a qood idea to talk to
Bill Brennan, and will join you whenever this is convenient
for you and him - preferably some ti.me prior to lunch.
I am grateful to you for your help. At. this
season of the year, one's own problems more than !=tuffice to
overwhelm. At least mine do!
Sincerely,

Justice W"hite
lfp/ss

j;n.prtmt (!Jltltd llf t4t 'Jnib~ j;tldt%
'Jllht%4ittgtcn, !9. <1J. 211.?'-t ~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 7, 1982

No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v.
Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
I have no objection to the proposed change
in Nixon.
It is still primarily an objective test.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

J ()/r~J~:. ..~ - .1~~
U vr ~

~~~~ ....

Th 1s
· 1s
· a compan1on
·
casep/.t o

+-~--3
h ~
• .UEh.""

annoYRE:e d •

It involves the same facts, except • that petiti0ners were
high White Hou,s e aides.

~~s'tion/is

what immunity may be

claimed by these officials.
The District Court held that they are entitled
only to qualified immunity - sometimes referred to as "good
faith immunity".

The Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia dismissed petitioner's appeal, and we granted
certiorari.

u..

In Butz v. Economou, involving a damages suit
1 ~ lf/7ff'-,
against the Secretary of Agriculture, we held that Cabinet
A
officers normally do not possess absolute immunity. We
think that decision/ is controll iQg : on this issue.

While we

recognize that presidential aides often perform duties of
great importance and sensitivity,j we can draw no distinction
between the, ;and officials of Cabinet rank.

~~

We hold, therefore, that petitioners a.eAentitled
ncr=n~ y

j as we did

-

to qualified immunity only.
in Butz v.

Economo~ , /that

We recognize, however,
a presidential aide may

claim absolute immunity on a functional basis:

~~k~
j 5v

~ t~ at

when the challenged act is of such a natureJ'that the public
interest requires full protection from the threat of suit .

z.
An example might be; ' discretionary act related to
national security or foreign affairs.
~~

J' on

the ~record

oefore

us,~has

'

Neithe~~oner ~
-1 1

A.

satisfied this functional

standard.
We do hold, however, that petitioners at least are
entitled to qualified immunity.

Prior decisions of this

Court have indicated;{hat the qualified immunity defens; lhas
both

"objective" and "subjective" aspects.

--.......

We take this

occasion to reformulate the applicable standard,J'a s
experience has demonstrated the inappropriateness of the
subjective component.
We hold, therefore, that a government officiay/entitled to qualified immunity~- can be held liable in
damages)'only for the violation of clearly est ~hed

: igh~ s ;Jof which a reasonable person would have known.
We remand this case to the District Court for
application of this standard.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
~~-'s

have filed a joint statement~concurring in the Aopinion.
Justice Brennan has filed a concurring opinion;4n which
.
Just1ces
Mars h all an d Blackmun~
JOlne d .
1\

has written a dissent.

.
The Ch1ef
Justice

,June 23, 1982

Memorandum to the Conference
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald
No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas
In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program.
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay
from the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime,
however, he had instituted this damages action against
respondent, his a~ministrative superior. The suit alleged a
conspiracy to deprive petitioner of First Amendment rights.
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an
alternative remedy unoer the Civil Service Act. This Court
then vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service
employees is a special consideration which counsels
hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of
affirmative congressional action." The panel also noted
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to
bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in
favor of judicial relief.
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government
employee represented a "special factor" defeating his claim
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member
majority in that case relies on a cumulation of factors not
all present here.

2.

The question raised is an important one. Moreover, the
CAS deicision in this case is in conflict with the decision
of CA7 in Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (1981).
I will vote to GRANT.
No. 81-872, Turner v. Jordan
The question here is whether the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency is absolutely immune from
damages liability for dismissing a CIA employee. The
employee was dismissed following his public criticism of the
Agency's personnel practices. His suit in the District
Court alleged a violation of costitutional rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments. Ruling on petitioner's claim of
absolute immunity, the District Court stated that absolute
immunity might be proper where "defense of a constitutional
tort action requires the disclosure of classified
information." Here, however, the District Court found that
"the defendants have acknowledged that this case involves no
such issue of secrecy or security." App. 2la. The District
Court certified the case for interlocutory appeal under the
collateral order ooctrine. CADC (Tamm, Robb, Edwards)
affirmed without opinion.
Harlow, No. 80-945, holds open the possibility that
federal officials might be entitled to absolute immunity in
connection with performance of functions "so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability." Slip op., at 12.
Under Harlow, petitioner thus could establish entitlement to
absolute immunity in this case if he could "demonstrate that
he was discharging a protected function when performing the
act for which liability is asserted." Ibid. Rere, as
noted, the District Court has found that the case involves
no issue of "secrecy or security." Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that the special functions of the
CIA director require an absolute immunity applicable to all
personnel actions. Nothing in Harlow suggests that the
special status of the CIA director might not raise a unique
and unsettled question. But this question--which does seem
to me to be unique--of course could be mooted by a decision
of the question presented in Bush v. Lucas, supra. If
government employment generally constitutes a special factor
precluding inference of a Bivens action for adverse
personnel actions, that rattonale would apply a fortiori to
suits against the Director of the CIA. Assuming that the
Court will vote to grant in Bush v. Lucas, supra, I will
vote to Hold this case for No. 81-469.

3.

No. 81-1010, Purt i 11 v. 'schweiker
Petitioner is a 53-year-old employee of HHS. When his
superiors failed to promote him, he filed suit in federal
court, alleging age discrimination. His complaint based one
count on a federal statute, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and one directly on the Constitution.
The District Court dismissed the Bivens count--which alone
is here--on grounds that it was preempted by the ADEA. See
Carlson v. Green, supra. CA3 agreed.
ln this Court there are two possible questions
presented for decision. The first is the same as that
presented in No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas. That is whether the
government's employment relationship with an employee is a
"special factor counseling hesitation" in the inference of a
Bivens action. The other is whether the ADEA preempts a
Bivens action that might otherwise exist. See Carlson v.
Green, 446 u.s. 14, 18-19 (1980). There appears to be a
split on the second question. S~e Sonntat v. Dooley, 650
F.2d 904 (CA7 1.981) (upholding Bivens c1a m by a former
federal employee asserting age discrimination by her
superiors).
The preemption argument in this case, based on the
ADEA, appears to be stronger than that made under the
general civil service law~ in Bush v. Lucas, supra. Yet the
Bush issue--whether federal employment is a special factor
precluding Bivens actions for employment decisions--is the
broader and more important issue. Viewing the "special
factor" question as the one the court should reach first, I
would be inclined to Hold this case if Bush is granted.
Alternatively, I could vote to Grant this case and
consolidate it for argument with Bush, supra, No. 81-469.
No. 81-1134, Ashcroft v. National Org. for Women, Inc.
The petitioner in this case is the Attorney General of
Missouri. In that capacity he joined other state Attorneys
General in bringing an antitrust action against respondent
for its convention boycott of States that had not ratified
the ERA. Following dismissal of that action, respondent
sued petitioner under § 1983. Petitioner claimed absolute
immunity from suit, asserting that prosecutorial immunity
extended to his initiation of a civil action on behalf of
the State. Resondent claimed that petitioner's actions in
arranging for the filing of the civil action all occurred in
an executive capacity. The District Court denied
petitioner's immunity claim without opinion, and CAB, in a
brief per curiam order, concluded that the order appealed

4.

from was not final within the meaning of 28
and thus not appealable.

u.s.a.

§

1291

In No. 79-173S, United States v. Nixon, the Court
reaffirms that orders denying absolute immunity are
appealable collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949). Respondent
argues that there can be no conflict with this or other
cases, because the collateral order doctrine is inherently
flexible and not mandatory. But CAS did not put its
decision on this basis. It appears to have held as a matter
of law that there was no appealable, because not "final,"
order. Because our Nixon decision is incompatible with that
of CAS in this respect, I am inclined to vote to GV & R in
light of No. 79-173S.
No. 81-15SO, Sanborn v. Wolfe!
The petitioners in this S 1983 suit are parole
officers. As a parolee under their supervision, respondent
was arrested for intoxication. He subsequently forfeited
bond when he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Upon
receipt of this and other information, petitioners took
respondent into custody for parole violations. There was no
on-site hearing to determine whether there was probable
cause to revoke his parole, as apparently should have been
held under our aecision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471
(1972). After he was released from incarceration 27 days
after his arrest, respondent brought suit against
petitioners under § 1983, alleging a violation of due
process under Morrisse • A jury awarded damages of $1,000.
On appeal, CA6 re ected petitioners' argument that the trial
court had erred in imposing on them the buroen of proving
that they had acted in good faith. And, after reviewing the
record, the CA found that the jury reasonably could have
found that petitioners did not act in subjective good faith.
As evidence of bad faith, the CA appears to have relied on
evidence that petitioners arrested respondent not in
response to parole violations, but to secure his detention
while more serious charges were investigageo. Judge Weick
dissented. He argued that the petitioners indisputably had
acted in accordance with the policies of the Audit Parole
Authority of Ohio and approved as lawful by the Attorney
General of Ohio. That policy was not to hold on-site
hearings where the parolee had jumped bail for an offense
committed while on parole. As laymen, petitioners were
entitled to rely on the policy adopted by their employer.
The Court opinion in No. 80-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
holds that an official is entitled to good faith immunity
insofar as his conduct does not violate wclearly established

5.

constitutional or statutory rights of, which a reasonable
person would have known." Slip op., at 17. Harlow further
provides that an official may establish entitlement to good
faith immunity where he can prove that he neither knew nor
should have known of the relevant legal standard. In light
of petitioner's claimed reliance on established Ohio
procedures, the immunity inquiry in this case may be in
tension with Harlow's reformulated standard.
Unlike Harlow, however, this case arises under ~ 1983,
and thus presents a technically unsettled question: whether
the Harlow standard should be applied to cases under that
statute.
But see Slip. Op., at 17, and n. 30 (suggesting
any distinction would be untenable).
I believe that the Harlow standard should be applicable
here. I therefore will vote to Grant, Vacate, and Remand in
light of No. 80-945, Harlow v. Butterfield. A iudgment
order in this case might read as follows:
"The petition is Granted. The judgment is
vacated and the case remanded for
r~consideration in light of No. 80-945,
Harlow v. Butterfield. See Butz v. ~conomou,
438 u.s. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it
"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under the § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials").

L.F.P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-945
BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the
1
Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see i d., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See i d., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
'App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statutory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
• See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante . Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact

remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for Cert.
1a-3a.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
10
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protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have extended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508--512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513--517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." !d., at 506. Without discounting the
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an absolute immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional
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violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S.
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute
immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations
omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
III
A
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket extension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v.
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
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ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not question the power or the importance of the Secretary's office.
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12
Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 61(H}17.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. Id., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
u. s. 306 (1973).
3
' See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").
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for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 16

c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
"See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
" In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 43(}-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer. " Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
511Hi17.
16
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-ofpowers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President
himself. See ante, at--.
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such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responCf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
18
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 61tH317, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
17
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sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demonstrate that he was in fact discharging the protected function
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 20
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.
IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently re•• Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, a t - .
20
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.
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quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally,
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments
21
See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324-327.
Zl The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis.
This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Bmndhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
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that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the
"good faith" standard established by our decisions.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " !d., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 24
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508.
23
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J .,
concurring).
24
In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring
resolution by a jury. 26
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but intending to inflict "other [actionable] injury."
25
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
:.; E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CAS 1978) (good faith
"is dependent on motivation and conduct ... as established at trial") (emphasis added); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 833 (CA2 1977)
(question of good faith is "peculiarly within the jury's province"); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the
existence of"actual malice," as an issue offact, may properly be decided on
summary judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
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the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideology, and emotion. This environment in part explains why
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary
judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind
not only can distract officials from the performance of their
duties. 2:1 At least in the case of such high officials as the
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] . . .. The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect
the public interest in "encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority", 438 U. S. at 506, because we believed that qualified immunity would
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith mistakes. We assumed that such immunity would prove "workable". There are indica27
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President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking
should not be undertaken lightly. 28
tions, however, that some District Courts may not have understood our admonition in Butz that "insubstantial" suits against high public officials
should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See Schuck,
supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition.
In so doing, we continue to recognize that "In situations of abuse, an action against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. This concern applies with special force in the case of officials whose "greater power
... affords a greater potential for lawless conduct." Ibid. We only repeat that insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and that "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such
cases. !d., at 508. Under those rules a plaintiff retains, of course, access
to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden of raising a material
issue of fact. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for
summary judgment.
28
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United
States v. Nixon 418 U. S., at 705-706, 708:
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution."
Many of the policy considerations implicated by Presidential communications would apply with nearly equal force to communications among Presidential aides and other high Executive officials. The separation-of-powers
concerns are different in the two cases, being less weighty where the President personally is not involved. As commentators have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical
rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior'' Federal Courts--A Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes no absolute
barrier to judicial functions intruding on the functioning of the Executive
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist.
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "settled, indisputable" legal rights of which they reasonably
should have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S.,
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administration, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, 418
U. S., at 711-712 (1974).
29
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes,
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by different officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based."
30
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
3
' As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978) , we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
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permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. Charged with decisionmaking under pressures of time and limits of information, not every official
fairly could be held responsible for areas of the law remote
from his experience or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect
every such official to be familiar with the most recent judicial
developments. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what the law was at the time the action
occurred and in most cases may be able to decide what a particular high official reasonably could be expected to have
known about it. 32
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless
conduct. The public interest in deterrence of constitutional
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of
an official's acts. 33 Where an official knows that his conduct
peals, or of the local District Court."
32
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U.S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")
33
A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official frequently may be
able to obtain compensation by means other than a private suit for damages
against the individual wrongdoer in a federal court. In this case, for example, Fitzgerald invoked civil service remedies that resulted in a judgment entitling him to reinstatement and backpay. See Civil Service Commission, Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973).
Where relief is available from the Government, as under the Civil Service
Act, no immunity defense generally will be recognized. Even under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, which provides certain exemptions from Government liability, including one for "discretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953),
this Court has held that "the very purpose of [Congress] was to waive the
Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity" and that there is "no
justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those
provided by Congress," Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315,

8{}-94&---0PINION
20

HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which
established rights are not implicated-even if the. action potentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless
and unhesitating action. 34

c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
319, 320 (1957).
34
We emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451
U. 8.630, 63&-639 (1981) (controlling question in implication of statutory
causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a
damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming
on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy").
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of the case
only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order doctrine.
We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of Appeals.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.

80-945-0PINION
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

3

volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?" , White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statutory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 9S-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in N ixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact

remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for Cert.
1a-3a.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). u
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
The first of these statutes, 5 U.S. C. §7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
11
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
10

I

I
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protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have extended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513--517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an absolute immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional

I
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violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S.
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute
immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations
omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." ld., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at - - .

III
A

Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket extension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v.
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-

I
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ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not question the power or the importance of the Secretary's office.
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12
Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United

/
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. Id., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself'3-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
u. s. 306 (1973).
3
' See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments , upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").
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for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 16

c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
14
See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
15
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515--517.
16
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule . As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-ofpowers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President
himself. See ante, at - - .
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such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responCf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711}-.711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
18
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 61&-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
17
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sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demonstrate that he was in fact discharging the protected function
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 2Q
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.
IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A

As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently re9
' Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
20
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou , supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.
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quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. 8., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally,
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. 8.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. 8., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance pers~asive arguments
2
' See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324-327.
22
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
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that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the
"good faith" standard established by our decisions.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the .
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " I d., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 24
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508.
23
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
" In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring
resolution by a jury. 26
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but intending to inflict "other [actionable] injury."
25
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
26
E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978) (good faith
"is dependent on motivation and conduct ... as established at trial") (emphasis added); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 833 (CA2 1977)
(question of good faith is "peculiarly within the jury's province"); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the
existence of "actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on
summary judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
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the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideology, and emotion. This environment in part explains why
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary
judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind
not only can distract officials from the performance of their
duties. 27 At least in the case of such high officials as the
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] .... The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect
the public interest in "encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority", 438 U. S. at 506, because we believed that qualified immunity would
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith mistakes. We assumed that such immunity would prove "workable". There are indica27
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President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking
should not be undertaken lightly. 28
tions, however, that some District Courts may not have understood our admonition in Butz that "insubstantial" suits against high public officials
should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See Schuck,
supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324--327. We reiterate this admonition.
In so doing, we continue to recognize that "In situations of abuse, an action against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. This concern applies with special force in the case of officials whose "greater power
... affords a greater potential for lawless conduct." Ibid. We only repeat that insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and that "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such
cases. !d., at 508. Under those rules a plaintiff retains, of course, access
to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden of raising a material
issue of fact. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for
summary judgment.
28
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United
States v. Nixon 418 U. S., at 705-706, 708:
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution."
Many of the policy considerations implicated by Presidential communications would apply with nearly equal force to communications among Presidential aides and other high Executive officials. The separation-of-powers
concerns are different in the two cases, being less weighty where the President personally is not involved. As commentators have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical
rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior'' Federal Courts-A Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes no absolute
barrier to judicial functions intruding on the functioning of the Executive
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist.
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "set- ~
tled, indisputable" legal rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S.,
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administration, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, 418
U. S., at 711-712 (1974).
29
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes,
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by different officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based."
30
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
31
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
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permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro- /Y)'Yl t
priately may determine what the law was at the time the action occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allowed.
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless
conduct. The public interest in deterrence of constitutional
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of
an official's acts. 33 Where an official knows that his conduct
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which
established rights are not implicated-even if the action popeals, or of the local District Court."
32
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")
33
A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official frequently may be
able to obtain compensation by means other than a private suit for damages
against the individual wrongdoer in a federal court. In this case, for example, Fitzgerald invoked civil service remedies that resulted in a judgment entitling him to reinstatement and backpay. See Civil Service Commission, Decision on the Appeal of A . Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973).
Where relief is available from the Government, as under the Civil Service
Act, no immunity defense generally will be recognized. Even under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, which provides certain exemptions from Government liability, including one for "discretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953),
this Court has held that "the very purpose of [Congress] was to waive the
Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity" and that there is "no
justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those
provided by Congress," Rayonier, Inc . v. United States, 352 U. S. 315,
319, 320 (1957).

~5 I ~
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tentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless
and unhesitating action. 34

c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

We emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451
U. 8.630, 638-639 (1981) (controlling question in implication of statutory
causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a
damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming
on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy").
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of the case
only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order doctrine.
We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of Appeals.
34
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BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS, v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the,.
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-

80--945-0PINION

2

HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164--165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
' See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.

- -- --- -- -
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi'See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency'' of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic'·

·.
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. AB evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statuCoalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1--3.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that ''The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
11
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
10
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247- 248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." !d., at 506. Without discounting the' · .
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion,
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
III
A

Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket extension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. . In deciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v.
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet'··
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official directly accountable to the President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not question the power or the importance of the Secretary's office.
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12

Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to , _

---
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos . . . . " Id., at 616--617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. I d., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet--Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative imm'lnity
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have follovJed a
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412

u. s.

306 (1973).

See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .
13

. . .").

1
' THE CHIEF JusTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent'

I
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 12~133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
u~~u

.

years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize
about the role of "offices" in a particular President's administration without
reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by the
President.
15
See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
~
•• In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213--1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515--517.
17
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso- ' ·
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
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c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-ofpowers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President
himself. See ante, at - - .
18
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("(C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
Pre~· dent's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 J. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
19
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some · aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 616--{)17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in'· .

•.
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demonstrate that he was in fact discharging the protected function
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 21
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, however, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
"'Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
21
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, ' ··
supra.
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IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail. able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 22 These social
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally,
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties."
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at

22
See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, , _
324--327.
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In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the
"good faith" standard established by our decisions.
B

Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508.
24
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore ' ·
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
23
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420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... " !d., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 25
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 26 Yet an official's subjective good faith
In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, it follows that the
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but intending to inflict "other [actiqJlable] injury."
26
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
25

....
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has been considered to be a question of fact, which some
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring
resolution by a jury. '1:1
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of
the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only
are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks
of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able
people from public service. There are special costs to "subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions. In
contrast with the thought processes accompaning "ministerial" tasks, the judgements leading up to discretionary action
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which there often is no clear end to the relevant
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive
of effective government. 29
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., Paller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
-n E . g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
28
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-...
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec- ·
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974):

I
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz,
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not viola
"clearly established" cons 1 u wna ng s o which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S.,
at 321. 30 Absent a clear congressional decision to the con"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica- ·
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."
29
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
30
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.

Dt"
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trary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost
\
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intenHt
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
c.l (0\f 1
ol
conduct, as measured by reference to settled,-indisputab
e.s
-\-~ \) \t' s"('
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
-------permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum·
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what the law was at the time the action occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allowed.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct.
· ·
·
·
The public interest in deterrence of
and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test
that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an offi,-----oi-.ia•l;.;;'s:..:a=:cts. Where an official knows that his conduct will vioL----~
late
rights, he should be made to hesitate; a
person who suffers injury caused by such knowing conduct
may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's duties
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
31
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
33
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a

80-945-0PINION
HARLOW & BUTTERFiELD v. FITZGERALD

19

legitimately require action in whic established rights are not (
implicated-even if the action potentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the public interest frequently
may be served better by fearless and unhesitating action. 34

c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")
a. We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases.
Id., at 508.
36
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
_,__§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not vi~nel:"'the statutory question as insubstantial. -ef:"
Te'fciS1'ri11ustries;-Inc...v.-Radcliff M aterials;-45l...U.-S.Q30;-638-639 (.,1.9~)
(eontrolling-!luestionitrimplication.of.8tatutory-causes-of-actiorris-whether
Gongres~atively-intended .to..create.a..damages.r.emedy); Cf. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Curran,-- U.S.--,-(1982) (controlling question in implication of statutory cause s of action is
whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a damages remedy);
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-Q39 (1981)
(same). Nor is the Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573,
576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding
that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civi}· .

----.
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we
took jurisdiction of the case only to resolve the immunity question under
the collateral order doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave
these questions for fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of Appeals.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
I
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, '~we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's ·position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
• The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally. . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statuCoalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
10
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. ld., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion,
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted);

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
III
A
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket recognition of absolute immunity for Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz
v. Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabi-
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net official directly accountable to the President-asserted a
defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not question the power or the importance of the Secretary's office.
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under
the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enj.oy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal for e to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12
Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. Id., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
u. s. 306 (1973).
13
See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").

14
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 17
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration without reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by
the President.
15
See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
16
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F . 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515--517.
17
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
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c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-ofpowers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President
himself.
18
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
9
' Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion.
We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity· would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, however, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.

such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
20
Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
21
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.
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IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A

As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, supra, 438
U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens'
shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that
has required the denial of absolute immunity to most public
officers. At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed
seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as
well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able
citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, there
is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties."
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950).
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac22
See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,

324-327.
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. 8.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. 8., at 245--248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. 8., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. 8. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the
"good faith" standard established by our decisions.
B

Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. 8. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. 8. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumThe importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378.
24
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d ., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
23
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within "!¢; sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitu'tional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... " Id., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 20
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
· has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith
In Wood ~he Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, it follows that the
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but intending to inflict "other [actionable] injury."
26
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcast26
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has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 27
In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of
able people from public service. There are special costs to
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is
available only to officials performing discretionary functions.
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "ministerial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in ·which there often is no clear end to the relevant
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive
of effective government. 29
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
27
E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
28
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974):
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz,
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland,
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30 Absent a clear congressional deciThe privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."
29
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U . .S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. . Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
30
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
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sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of
subjective intent.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what the law was at the time the action occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allowed.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct.
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official'
acts.
ere an o
that
con uc ~olate
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to fiesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such knowing
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 l · S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
31
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978) , we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
33
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
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duties legitimately require action in which clearly established
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken "with independence and without fear
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554
(1967). 34

c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. 36 We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The
ably be characterized as being in good faith.'")
.. We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases.
Id., at 508.
36
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Curran, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (controlling question in implication of
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-Q39 (1981) (same). Nor is the
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens
remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals.
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BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Bt ,terfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-

-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning" Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
' The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see i d., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi'See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statuCoalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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tory causes of action.under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
10
The first of these statutes, 5 U.S. C. §7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees .. . to .. . furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
11
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald , ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion,
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits." 438 U. 8., at 507-508 (citations omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Id., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.

III

1

Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of t~ offices as
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the
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President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the
President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506.
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees."
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." !d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
2
' Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. ld., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
u. s. 306 (1973).
13
See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").

"THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent

------ ---- --- - --
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 17

I

years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration without reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis.
"See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
6
' In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515-517.
17
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all 'of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
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c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits
against the President himself.
8
' Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
19
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards
properly applicable to their claims.
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
20
Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
21
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,

supra.
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IV

Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.

A
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at /
506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required
the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At
the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the
society as a whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses
of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that
fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle,
177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949
(1950).
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac22

See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324--327.
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at '
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we relied on

the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23
Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith"
standard established by our decisions.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
Characteristically the
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum23
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378.
24
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. /d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).

/
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... " !d., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 25
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 27

,

,

Clf'-1lSStOI'l

I

"" In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette , 434 U.S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979).
26
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
27
E . g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
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In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of
able people from public service. There are special costs to
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is
available only to officials performing discretionary functions.
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "ministerial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which there often is no clear end to the relevant
evidence. · Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive
of effective government. 29
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
28
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974):
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."
29
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits

·~-
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz,
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland,
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30 Absent a clear congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
30
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
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subjective mental factors.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
law/1 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sumsummary judgment, the judge appromary judgment.
priately may determine what the law was at the time an action occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this
thresholdip1munity question is resolved, extensive discovery
generally should not be allow~
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct.
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's
acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights,
he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. 33
But where an official's duties legitimately require action in
which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public

ron

I

I

"This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
83
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")
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interest may be better served by action taken "with independence and without fear of consequences." Pierson v. Ray,
386

u. s. 547, 554 (1967).

34

c

In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The
34
We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases.
Id., at 508.
36
Petitioners also have m:ged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Curran, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (controlling question in implication of
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638--639 (1981) (same). Nor is the
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens
remedy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

~--··--,;;.

fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I

In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alle~ ~ d to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President. a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning" Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secre 1ry Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public; announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
~ See App. 284.
(Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation-with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity.~ Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159--160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
u The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
'App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statuCoalition and , while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
• App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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tory causes of action under 5 U. 8. C. § 7211 and 18 U. 8. C.
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. 8. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
'"The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra.
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
In
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economo~t, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. 8., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U. 8. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. 8. 564
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion,
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits." 438 U. 8., at 507-508 (citations omitted).
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgemld, ante, at--.

III
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the
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President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the
President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506.
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees."
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.

B
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12

Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. Id., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
u. s. 306 (1973).
'"See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").
"THE CHIEF JusTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In re<;ent
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 17
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration without reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis.
15
See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union ,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
16
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g. , Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515-517.
17
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
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c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits
against the President himself.
18
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege. in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
19
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 61fH>17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in

c
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards
properly applicable to their claims.
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
20
Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
21
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.
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IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A

As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at
506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required
the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At
the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the
society as a whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses
of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that
fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle,
177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949
(1950).
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable acSee generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324-327.
22
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we relied on
the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23
Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith"
standard established by our decisio~s.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum23
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378.
24
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " ld., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 25
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has prove~ incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 27
25

In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979).
26
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
27
E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CAS 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
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In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of
able people from public service. There are special costs to
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is
available only to officials performing discretionary functions.
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "ministerial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which there often is no clear end to the relevant
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive
of effective government. 29
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
28
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974):
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."
29
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz,
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, /
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
law, 3' should avoid excessive disruption of government and
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
30
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
31
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to

r

fYJ/
()

•

sl'tJ;I

80--945-0PINION
18

HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable
law, but whether that law was "clearly established" at the
time an action occurred. 32 If the law at that time was not
clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, however, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can rove that he
neither knew nor should have kno o the relevant ega
standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the
defense would turn primarily on objective factors.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity in "objective"
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public
interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the
objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made
to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court. "
33
Cf. Procunier v. N avarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
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duties legitimately require action in which clearly established
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken "with independence and without fear
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554
(1967). 34

c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")
34
We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases.
Id. , at 508.
"" Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Curran, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (controlling question in implication of
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638--639 (1981) (same). Nor is the
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique rela-
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

tionship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens
remedy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

6th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-945

BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the
Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe1
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." I d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused.
See id., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment) , at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way. " App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald cites communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December
1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at
a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal,
Haldeman solicited Butterfield's recommendations. In a
subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of
"loyalty," Butterfield counselled against offering Fitzgerald
another job in the Administration at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statutory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum, quoted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 3, was not sent to the Defense Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26.
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
10
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
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remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however,
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the
present posture of this case. See note 36, infra.
11
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.

80-94~0PINION

6

HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative.functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. Id., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." Id., at 506. Without discounting the
adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
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(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion,
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 15.

III
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the
President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the
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President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506.
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees."
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Id., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
12

Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412

u. s. 306 (1973).
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " /d., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. /d., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itselfl3-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
13
See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").

14
THE CHIEF JuSTICE, post, at 9, argues that senior Presidential aides
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration with-
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justificat1on would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 12&-133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 17

c

out reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis.
15
See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
16
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515--517.
17
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits
against the President himself.
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Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
19
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a ,derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
18
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course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards
properly applicable to their claims.
IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
20

Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, a t - .
21
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430--431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.
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without resort to trial.

13

We agree.

A
The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a (
balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 506; see
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.
388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial
of absolute immunity to most public officers. At the same
time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims
frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a
cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a
whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses of litigation,
the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of
public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being
sued will "damp~n the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d
579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950).
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we relied on
the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23
See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324-327.
!!.'!The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
22
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Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor presupposed in the bal:;mce of competing interests struck by our
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith"
standard established by our decisions.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... " !d., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 25
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378.
24
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
25
In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in

8{}-945---0PINION
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

15

The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.2:1
In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing
values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of
able people from public service. There are special costs to
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is
available only to officials performing discretionary functions.
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "miniswhich a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979).
26
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. E. g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962).
27
E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).
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terial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which there often is no clear end to the relevant
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive
of effective government. 29
28
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974):
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. "
29
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F . 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz,
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland,
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable
law, but whether that law was "clearly established" at the
time an action occurred. 32 If the law at that time was not
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
30
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504.
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently available to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of
this scope.
31
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of particular statutes or the Constitution.
32
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
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clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct.
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard,
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense
would turn primarily on objective factors.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity in "objective"
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public
interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the
objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he sh9uld be made
to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's
duties legitimately require action in which clearly established
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken "with independence and without fear
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554
(1967). 34
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, at 565 (footnote omitted) ("Because
they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act with
such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be
characterized as being in good faith .' ")
34
We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec33
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c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
35
In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases.
!d., at 508.
36
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (controlling question in implication of
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-639 (1981) (same). Nor is the
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens
remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals.
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v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P.
BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their acts in
office.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
the history of communication between Harlow and Air Force
Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claim consists in a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his into private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the period from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see ibid., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute
whether Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was
confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The
President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. See ibid., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H. R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned
that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some
"shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to
public view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he regarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
6
The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memordandum
Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally .. . .
Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Demo-
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evidence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure
Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful
discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and
Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the
President had promised at a press conference to inquire into
Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing
the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration at that
time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
discovery has failed to turn up any evidence that he caused
any inju y to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statutory actions under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. 10
cratic Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative who , fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment, supra, at 26.
10
Neither of these s
es expressly confers a private right to sue for
he first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides
relief in damage0
generally that "The right of employees ... to . . . furnish information to
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The court found that there were genuine issues of disputed
fact remaining for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for
Cert. 1a-3a.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. T~~ Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion8.. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a.
Never having determined the immunity available to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the United States,
we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - , - - (1981).~
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not
be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
s1
n .
, n e, we gran e ce 1 n
1s case so e y to adress the "collateral" question whether petitioners enjoyed an immunity
from this suit that would be defeated if they were forced to stand trial,
even if they subsequently were to prevail in the litigation. In this posture
we do not consider the correctness of the District Court's "implication"
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.
11
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kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit, we have extended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v.
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-512, executive officers
engaged in adjudicative functions, ibid., at 513-517, and the
President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. Id., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decisiot·n Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualifie mmunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt o balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." Id., at 506. Without discounting the
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an absolute immunity from private lawsuitrconsequences found
sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), to warrant extension to such

I
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officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we
emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not
proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief . . . , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations
omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.

III
A

Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket extension of absolute immunity to presidential aides. In decida.~
ing this claim we do not write on aR-em~~.l\
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
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tion the JX"Wer or the importance of the Secretary's office.
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials," id., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every presidential subordinate lodged in the White House. Members of the Cabinet
are direct subordinates of the President, frequently with
greater responsibilities, both to the President and to the N ation, than White House staff. The considerations that supported our decision in Butz apply with equal force to this
case. It is no disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
12
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos.... " !d., at 61(H)17.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause
derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's
aide that would have been privileged if performed by the
Senator himself. Id., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute ( r ~ (
_ the duties of his office, they argue thatl 'derivative" absolute - "--....:
immunity is"essentialj~~all the policies supporting
absolute immunity for the President himself. Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re--qurrethls protection. But absolute imm.Jlulty has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-

u. s. 306 (1973).
See U. S. Canst. , Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .
13

. . .").

Co)') ... ,~' •.....,
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tive in nature," and not when taking other act' even "in their
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625/ 0ur cases involving
judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line. The
.undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity
to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled
with the "functional" approach that has characterized the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 16

c

"

Petitioners also assert an entitlement to~mmunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesiSee, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
- - U . S . - - , - - (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U.S., at
362.
15
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F . 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
515-517.
16
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absolute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other officials-including presidential aides-generally do not invoke the special
separation-of-powers considerations implicated by suits against the President himself. See ante
t
14

J
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tating performance of functions so vital to the national interest. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket extension of absolute immunity to all presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a presidential aide might
meet this test. But the general requisites are familiar in our
cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to reCf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
18
Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 6HHi17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to presidential immunity would be strongest in
such "central" presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
17

I
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quire a total shield from liability. 19 He then must
demonstrate that he was in fact discharging the protected
function when he performed the act for which liability is
asserted. 20
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.
IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
19
Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass considerations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
"" "heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante
2<)The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Jlconomou, supra,
438 U. S., at 50S-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431
(1976). This inquiry has a familiar analogue in the common law: Was the
action within the outer perimeter of the official's protected function?
See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896) (immunity extends to all
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959) (fact "that the action taken here was
within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render
the privilege applicable"). Cases involving immunity under the Speech
and Debate Clause have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts
and activities qualified for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Gravel
v. United States, supra: Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973).
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As we recogniz~d tod~y in N_ixon v. ~itzg~rald, ante, at 7"~~,6_,_
A

- - , the resolutiOn of 1mmumty questwns mherently re- ~ ...!1====quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any availH ~
able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action
-~
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica~ ~ .nLtion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
~- ~
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni~
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and-perhaps most
important of all-the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of public o ce. A 'I!be ia court examiaati6n of Ll:Ia•21
aets aad-meHt-al tweee~tseS-Df bigh e:f:fieials of the Exeeutive ,.-- _ ~
~raaea ie potentially destructive ofJgovernment. In the case
of high officials of the Executive Branch, separation-of-powers concerns require that such an examination not be
undertaken lightly. 22
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac21
See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281.
22
As distinguished commentators have observed, the "separation of powers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law." Frankfurter
and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempt
Cases in "Inferior" Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924). Even where the separation-of-powers
doctrine imposes no absolute legal barrier to judicial actions intruding on
the functioning of. the Executive Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Administrator of GSA, 433 U. S.425, 443 (1977);
United States v. Nixon , 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974).
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires a clarification of the standards of pleading and proof to be applied in cases involving
immunity claims by high officials of the federal government.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 24 Applying this standard in suits
against public officials, courts have hesitated to grant summary judgment even in cases in which plaintiffs have offered
little or no evidence controverting a defendant's affidavits. 25
23
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their~ before a jury. See Lake Country Estates , Inc . v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U. S. 367, 377 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of
political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed ...
and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for
summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508.
24
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a
court ordinarily must look at the record in the light most favorable to the
party opposing tl~e motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that
party. E. g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
25
Under a standard of qualified immunity, an official will not be liable for

8(}-.945-0PINION
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

15

Because an officials' subjective "good faith" is a question of
fact, some courts have regarded this issue as inherently requiring resolution by a jury/6 and sometimes have found a
plaintiff's unsupported averment sufficient to force a trial. 27
In short, the balance contemplated by Butz has not proved
damages unless he "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or
he "took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.... " Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S.
308, 322 (1975). Cases involving immunity claims under this standard frequently present two distinct kinds of factual issues. The first kind is concerned with whether the alleged conduct actually occurred at all. For discussions of the requisites for establishing a "jury question" on this issue,
see, e. g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 U. S., at 764-765 (POWELL,
J., dissenting); Barker v. Nonnan, 651 F. 2d 1107, 1122-1124 (CA5 1981).
The second kind of issue is whether the conduct-assuming that it did
occur-is entitled to the protections of good faith immunity. See, e. g.,
Barker v. Nonnan, supra, 651 F. 2d, at 1125-1127. In cases raising these
questions, which are concerned with subjective perceptions and motives, it
has proved especially difficult to avoid the costs-in time, money, and anxiety-of trial before a jury. As Judge Gesell explained in his concurring
opinion in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 606 F. 2d, at 1214:
"It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue
of fact on some element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of
constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A
sentence from a casual document or a difference in recollection with regard
to a particular policy conversation held long ago would usually, under the
normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient. In short, if these
standards are those to be followed in these cases, trial judges will almost
automatically have to send such cases to full trials on the merits."
For cases in which qualified immunity was granted only after trial or evidentiary hearings, see Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F. 2d 720 (CA7 1975);
Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979).
26
E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne
v. Sugannan, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977).
27
See Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1092-1093 n. 5 (S.D.
N.Y. 1979), appeal dismissed in part and stayed in part, 624 F. 2d 3, 4
(CA2 1980) (mere· pleading of malice sufficient to prevent dismissal on immunity ground); Schuck, supra, at 324-325.
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workable in practice wi~oQt arification by this Court of the
applicable evidentiary standa: ds. 28
B

In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980), this Court held
in the context of a suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that a claim
of "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded by the defendant. 29 But we did not reach the
question of the burden of proof on this issue. See ibid., at
642 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Petitioners urge that the
burden of showing lack of good faith should be placed on the
plaintiff. Further, where a defendant-by affidavits or otherwise-effectively controverts a plaintiff's factual averments, petitioners argue that the plaintiff should be required
to make some substantial evidentiary showing in order to
survive a motion for summary judgment. We are generally
in accord with these views.
In order to provide an effective barrier to trial of claims
lacking in substance, we believe that a high federal official's
claimed entitlement to qualified immunity must be given substantial weight, not only at trial but on a motion for summary
judgment.:ro Consistently with this view, we hold that a defendant's assertion of this defense shifts the burden to the
:?B Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U. S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (translation of constitutional
principles into "workable constitutional rule[s]" sometimes may require adjustment of burdens of pleading and proof).
29
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. See 446 U. S., at 640.
00
Cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 606 F. 2d, at 1215 (Gesell, J.,
concurring):
"In order to give the immunity doctrine some genuine force and effect, it
appears to me that a plaintiff should be required to make a stronger showing than the Court's opinion requires on the immunity question before
being permitted to proceed to trial. I would hold that the plaintiff must

8{}.-945--0PINION
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD

17

plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
official did not act either in objective or subjective good faith.
Moreover, to effectuate our admonition that insubstantial
claims should be rejected without resort to trial, we think a
plaintiff must show some capacity to meet this burden-as
well as to establish all other elements of his affirmative
case-in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.
Thus, at the summary judgment stage in a case involving immunity claims by high federal officials, we think it appropriate to require a showing of evidence by the plaintiff-with allowance for the uncertainty of developments at trial-from
which a rational factfinder reasonably could conclude that the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard was satisfied.
In allocating the burden of proof to the plaintiff after an immunity defense is raised, we protect the public interest in the
effective administration of government-an interest that indisputably is threatened when insubstantial claims against officials result in protracted and vexatious litigation. Requiring proof of substantiality will not deter or frustrate
meritorious claims. The requirements for pleading, as for
proof at trial, remain the same. If the defendant advances
the defense of good faith immunity, the plaintiff will retain
access to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden.
And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for
summary judgment, but only make a showing of substantiality adequate to justify the cost-both public and private-of
subjecting a high federal official to trial.
establish after the completion of discovery and before the trial commences,
not merely the existence of a genuine dispute as to some material issue of
fact but also, by the preponderance of the evidence or through clear and
convincing evidence, that the official failed to act with subjective or objective good faith."
See also Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations:
An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L.R. 526, 563 (1977) ("the better rule
would be to require the plaintiff to establish subjective bad faith or malice
and the defendant to establish the reasonableness of his action").
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c
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 31 The
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

31
Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal
sufficiency of respondent's ''implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not wish to intimate that either the statutory, cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U. S. - , - ( M a y 26, 1981)
(controlling question is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create
a damages remedy), or the Bivens question, cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d
573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its
civil service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation
in inferring a Bivens remedy''), is insubstantial. ~
--:-~t.---:r.i;...:ct;:;:to:.;::n:.:o~t:-;e:..c::.a..:..;s e.;,..
~f to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order doctrine• \ fee lthink it appropriate to leave these issues for
fuller consideration by tile istrict Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals.
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SUPREME COURT 0 THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-945

BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official
acts.
I
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as
senior White House aides to former President Richard M.
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in detail.
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for congressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claim consists in a recorded conversation in which the President later·
voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning'' Fitzgerald. 3
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that exhaustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his inriod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the various changes of official assignment.
2
The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May,
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans'
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relationship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Seamans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subsequent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in December 1969. See App. 186.
3
See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Harlow had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App.
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitzgerald matter, see ibid., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute
whether Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was
confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The
President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. See ibid., at 220.
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that ·
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force,
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 6
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R.
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-

)

4
See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980).
5
In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the deposition testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that heregarded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the efficiency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case.
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing.
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment.
'The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immediately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
7
App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration
at that time. 8
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969---more than a
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. He argues generally that
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statuCoalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid.
8
App. 99-100, 18{}-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense
Department.
9
See Memorandum in Support of Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment, supra, at 26. The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the
initial civil action filed by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the
first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978.
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tory actions under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. 10
The court found that there were genuine issues of disputed
fact remaining for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for
Cert. 1a-3a.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides
and advisers of the President of the United States, we
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).U
II
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our
decisions consistently have held that government officials are
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages.
As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two
kinds. To offiCials whose special functions or constitutional

Merthe~

e-xpressly-confers<i")n"ivate-right-to~ue-.fm

'"
f these statutes
reliefin damagss. The firs 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides
generally that "The right o employees ... to . . . furnish information to
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, -may not
be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony.
oote - --;-inj'IYJt:
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we
need not consider those challenges in this opinion.

Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages.
Pe titioners argue that the District Court e rred in finding that
a private cause of action could be inferred under either statute,
and that "special factors" present in the context of the federal
employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's
Bivens action under the First Amendment. The legal sufficiency of
respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, a question
that we view as properly presented for our decision in the present
posture of this case.
See note 3~ infra.
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status requires complete protection from suit, we have extended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see,
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions,
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged
that high officials require greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the approach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizens, 438 U. 8., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an absolute immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional
violations--consequences found sufficient in Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S.
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute
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immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages
suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations
omitted).

Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." !d., at 506. This we reaffirmed
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--.
III
A
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket extension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v.
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not question the power or the importance of the Secretary's office.
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Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office.
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials,"
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions ·against
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials," id., at 504.
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than
White House staff. The considerations that supported our
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.
B

In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States,
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that
"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to per2

Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Representatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412
U . S. 306 (1973).
'

-
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form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos . . . . " ld., at 616-617.
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator
himself. I d., at 621-622.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the President must delegate a large measure of authority to execute
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the President
himself.
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately,
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presidential subordinates some of whose essential roles are acknowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has extended
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel,
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their
13
See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices .

. . .").
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official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involving judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line.
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel
itself. 16

c
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national inter"See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at
362.
15
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court reserved the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979).
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasiprosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
51fHJ17.
16
Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of absoto the same
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offiextent as
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke Hte-special-'l ....-- - - - - -separation-of-powers considerations iH<pli~7 sm s agamst t e resident himself. See ante, at - - .
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est. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be
justified by reference to the public interest in the special
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof.
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the official asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demon,; Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added).
8
' Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion.
We fairly may assume
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel,
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra,
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immunity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security,
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own.
•• Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
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strate that he was in fact discharging the protected function
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 20
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that either has shown that "public policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the
standards properly applicable to their claims.
IV
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial. We agree.
A
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
- - , the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, a t - .
20
The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States,
supra.

'•
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for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi~ ~
,
Q
cial energy from pressing public issues, and.....,.--pexhaps--Rio~
'---"' '-.i~nt=ar-aH-the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of public office. ~------------In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S.,
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz,
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a
"See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281,
324--327.
22
The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe R egional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed . . . and as readily believed." 341 U. S. , at 378. It is
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508.

Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
ante, at
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factor presupposed in the balance of competing interes~s 9 - " - - - - - - - _ . J
t I) struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the ~
~ti'le~ standard
established by our
decisions.
B
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers
to "permissible intentions." Ibid.
Characteristically the
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known th~t the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. . " Id., at 321-322 (emphasis added). 24
•
23
Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d . , at 642 (REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring).
24
In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline,"
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See,
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring
resolution by a jury. 26
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of
the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideology, and emotion. This environment in part explains why
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary
· judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979).
25
The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the
·
vorable to the art o osi the motion, drawing all inferlumbia Broadcastences most favorable to that party. E. g., Po e
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962) .
. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329
1978 Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2
,
33 (CA21977) cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary
,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure).

The two-pronged standard as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat
redundant in many if not in most cases.--rf the defendant neither
knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the defendant
could no~ ha~e acte~ with a ma~icious intent to cause a deprivation
of const1tut1onal r1ghts of wh1ch he knew noth~ng. The subjective
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant
acted without knowing this his conduct violated the Constitution, but
intending to inflict "other [actionable] injury."

.
<
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not only can distract officials from the performance of their
duties. 27 At least in the case of such high officials as the
President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking
should not be undertaken lightly. 28
As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v.
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981):
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic]
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a trial] .... The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." i:;~------28 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United
States v. Nixon:
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution."
418 U. S., at 705-706, 708. Many of the policy considerations implicated
by Presidential communications would apply with nearly equal force to
communications among Presidential aides and other high Executive officials. The separation-of-powers concerns are different in the two cases,
27

./

-

1'-'s t:...-+
l4 tfo. C l-, -t" q# II
''R,of ft" A
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist.
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "settled, indisputable" legal rights of which they reasonably
should have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S.,
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30
being less weighty where the President personally is not involved. As
commentators have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a
'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes no absolute barrier to judicial functions intruding on
the functioning of the Executive Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services Administration, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977);
United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S., at 711-712 (1974).
29
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes,
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by different officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based."
30
This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-

80-945-0PINION
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Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable
law, 31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. Charged with decisionmaking under pressures of time and limits of information, not every official
fairly could be held responsible for areas of the law remote
from his experience or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect
every such official to be familiar with the most recent judicial
developments. On summary judgment, the j~dge appropri~ maJ::;e what the law was ~t the time the ~ction
occurred
·
-may be able to decide what a particular
high official reasonably could be expected to have known
about it. 32
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless
conduct. The public interest in deterrence
of constitutional
..-'
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of
an official's acts. l\ Where an official knows that his conduct
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which
established rights are not implicated-even if the action potentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless
ticular statutes or the Constitution.
31
As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."
32
Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted)
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.' ")

(Footnote 33 appears on the following page)

- /8o.._ -

Footnote 33:

A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official
frequently may be able to obtain compensation by means other than
a private suit for damages against the individual wrongdoer in a
federal court.

In this case, for example, Fitzgerald invoked

civil service remedies that resulted in a judgment entitling him
to reinstatement and backpay.

See Decision of Civil Service

Commission Chief Appeals Examiner: Decision on the Appeal of A.
Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973).

Where relief is available

from the Government, as under the Civil Service Act, no immunity
defense generally will be recognized.
Tort Claims Act, 28

u.s.c.

§§

Even under the Federal

1346(b) and 2671-2680, which

provides certain exemptions from Government liability, including
one for "discretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States,
346

u.s.

15 (1953), this Court has held that "the very purpose of

[Congress] was to waive the Government's traditional allencompassing immunity" and that there is "no justification for
this Court to read exempti ons into the Act beyond those provided
by Congress," Rayonier v. United States, 352
(1957).

u.s.

315, 319, 320
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c
In addition to the question of good faith, cases involving
of qualified immunity frequently involve disputes over
whether the official's allegedly wrongful actions ever occurred at all.
Where a defendant-by affidavits or otherwise--effectively controverts a plaintiff's factual averments,
petitioners argue that the plaintiff should be required to
make some substantial showing in order to survive a motion
for summa _ judg-Q!ent by a high federal official.
o~s'-tently with our view that a clrum of 1mmuru y shouldyo vide
an eff~tive barrier to trial of claims lacking in substance, we
agree. a t the summary judgment stage in a£se involving
immunity claims by high federal officials~ think it appropriate to require a snowing_ of evide~ by the plaintiff-with
allowance for the uncertainty-o-fctevelopments at trial-from
which a rational factfindeti=easo~ly C,QEld conclude that the
"preponderance of tbe evidence" standara w~satisfied. 35
Requiring this proof of substantiality will not deter or frustrate meritorious claims. The requirements for pleading, as
Jor'Proof at trial, remain unchanged. Further, the plamt.!!!._
claim~

~We

emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available.
~For discussions of the requisites for establishing a "jury question" on
this issue, see, e. g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 U. S., at 764--765
(POWELL, J., dissenting); Barker v. Norman, 651 F. 2d 1107, 1122-1124

(CA5 98D-- - - - - - - - - - - : : : : : : : : : : : = o - - - - --,
Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independen!.J?:m unity School Dist., 393
U. S:"-'50~26 (1969) (Harlan, J., di~nting) (translation of constitutional
principles into "workable constitutional rule[s]" sometimes may require adjustment of rules ~roof ancrpJeading); Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 616
F. 2d, at 1215 (Gesell, J., co~ng)-(summary judgment standards
should be a ·usted to "give the immunity d~ne-some enuine force and
35

In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is
unnecessary to protect the public interest in "encouraging

s u.s.

the vigorous exercise of official authority", 43f

at

506, because we believed 'that qualified immunity would
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith
mistakes.

We assumed that such immunity would prove

"workable".

There are indications, however, that some

District Courts have not understood our admoni tion in
Jt. J -t

Butz

4

tha~ \ suits

cvt..tr¥fl"--t/ 1

I

•

\

against high public officials should not

,. <

Aproceed to trial t i; the absence of a showing of

substantialit~ l we

reiterate this admonition.

A

/

..

See /H anrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446

I

u.s.,

at 763-766

(Powell, J., dissenting in part); . Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup.
_;_!

-I"£Lo -

-~

plaintiff retains, of course, access to reasonable
discovery to aid in carrying his burden.

And he need not

prove the merits of his case on a motion for summary
judgment

J

0

V~'-.

But there should be a showing of sufficient . ,

substantiality to justify the costs - both public and
private - of subjecting officials to protracted trials
when it is evident at the summary judgment stage that the
claims are insubstantial.

Ct. Rev., at 324-327; ' cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, supra,
606 F.2d, at 1214-1215 {Gesell. J., concurring)

{quoted at

note 27 supra)=) -.,;

-

-.-

- ----------

-~-- ·-~-·

-

-·--

---:---·- -
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retains access to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his
burden. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a
motion for summary judgment, but only make a showing of
substantiality adequate to justify the cost-both public and
private-of subjecting a high federal official to trial.
D
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the respondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropri\ .., r-J \
ate, !;2,wever, to remand the case to the District Court, for its
\:_:)-reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion.~ The
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed
and also is better situated to make any such further findings
as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

\

..
;

,.., n

L----"J~etitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal

~

sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C.
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amendment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451
U. 8.630, 638--6 91¥.}81-) (1981) (controlling question in implication of statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create
a damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F . 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a
special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of
the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of
Appeals .

February 8, 1982

5

No. 80-945, Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity
available

to

the

senior

aides

and

advisers

of

10

the

President of the United States in a suit for damages based
on their acts in office.
I

In

this

suit

for

civil

damages

petitioners

Bryce

15

~~t~la~
Harlow

and

participat~

Alexander
in

a

Butterfield
conspiracy

..-\

stand
to

aee-us-e.d
violate

of
the

constitutional and statutory rights of the respondent A.
~

Ernest

Fitzgerald.

Respondent

a-lleges

that

oeti tioners

2.

alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in No. 791738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the facts need not be repeated
in detail.
Respondent alleges that Harlow entered the conspiracy
in

his

role

responsible
reveals

as

for

that

Air

the

presidential

congressional
Force

aide

relations. 1

Secretary

Robert

25

principally
The

Seamans

record
called

Harlow in May, 1969, to inquire about likely congressional
reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause
Fitzgerald's dismissa1. 2 Harlow responded that "this was a
very sensitive item on the Hill and that it would be [his]
recommendation
such

a

change

that
at

[the Air
that

Force]

time." 3

not proceed to make
But

the

Air

Force

1 Harlow held this position from the beginning of
the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through
November 4, 1969.
On that date he was designated as
Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet
status. He served ih that capacity until December 9, 1970,
when he -'teturned to private life.
Harlow later resumed
the duties of Counsellor for the period from July 1, 1973
through April 14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that
Harlow continued in a consiracy against!\ throughout the
various changes of official assignment.
2According to Seamans' testimony, "we [the Air
Force Department] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on
the action itself.
We just asked him what the impact

30

3.

~g,
apparently

not

-6i-d

tais

"i:ilid"e-Fst-aRd

Seamans

spoke

"* esponse

to

a-s

Harlow

an

>-

35

about

O'U-

Fitzgerald's
occasions

possible

during

the

remova1
spring

at

1
of

least
1969.

two
The

subsequent
record

also

establishes that the Secretary called Harlow on November

5,

1969,

shortly

after

the

Defense

Department

announced Fitzgerald's impending dismissal. 4
one occasion,

I~

petitioner

alleges,

had

40

On at least

Harlow discussed

the

Fitzgerald matter directly with the President. 5

)

Harlow's

role--both

in

these

and

possibly

other

I

discussions during

this period--remains

dispute.

cites

Harlow

the

testimony

substantially in
of

Air

45

Force

Secretary Seamans, who has sworn that he "never received
any

instruction"

regarding Fitzgerald's dismissal. 6

Yet

;)J! n his complain ~-the factual allegations of which we must
accept

as

true

for

purposes of our decision) -Fitzgerald

4 see JA, at 186a.
5 The evidence of this discussion consists entirely
in a taped conversation, some three years later, in which
Richard Nixon recollected that Harlow "was all for

50

4.

alleges that Harlow acted in concert with other
to cause Fitzgerald's unlawful dismissal.
this

allegation Fitzgerald

conversation

in

which

officialz~

In support of

relies heavily on a

the

President

later

recorded
voiced

a

tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning"

55

Fi1;zgerald. 7
~ .... t

Petitioner

Butterfield

allegedly

the

entered

conspiracy in his White House roles as Deputy Assistant to
the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. Haldeman. 8
In

May

1969

Butterfield

concededly

circulated

a

White

60

House memorandum in which he claimed to have learned that
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing

practices"

by

leaking

congressional committee. 9 Butterfield
information

had

been

referred

to

documents

to

a

reported

that this

the -< f~deral

Bureau of

7 see
JA,
at
284a.
Petitioners
emphasized
the
tentativeness of the President's query. To the President's
question White House press secretary Ronald
Ziegler
replied, "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way."
Id. Nixon did not respond to Ziegler's remark.
8 The
record
establishes that Butterfield worked
from an off ice immediately adjacent to the oval off ice.

65

5.

Investigation.
as

evidence

efforts

that

to

~1 though

Fitzgerald
by May

secure

characterizes
1969

Butterfield

Fitzgerald's

Butterfield's

role

this

in

memorandum

had

retaliatory
the

commenced
dismissal.

Fitzgerald

dismissal

also is much in controversy, for purposes of our decision
we

r+-'\)1-

again

must

i

,/\9-<--..f r

-v) ,_..

record

also

Haldeman

assume

,,

,~-,.,.

;t

shows

this

allegation

.~ ~

to

be

'

~~ ·~

true·_) Tl1.a

< .f

that White House chief of

solicited

"\

70

Butterfield's

staff H.R.

recommendations

in

December 1970, shortly after the President had promised at
a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal.
Emphasizing

the

importance

of

"loyalty,"

75

Butterfield

counselled against offering Fitzgerald another job within
the Aministration. 1 0
Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial

I
ctvil complaint filed by respondent in the District Court
in January 1974. 11

f

Harlow was first cited in the Second

10 see JA, at 99a-100a, 180a.
not sent to the Defense Department.

This

memorandum was

11 see Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DDC
\ 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (CADC

80

6.

Amended

complaint

codefendant
summary

of

Richard

judgment on

Together

1978.

July

Nixon,

petitioners

February

12,

with

both

1980.

their

moved

for

In denying

the

motion the District Court upheld the legal sufficiency of
Fitzgerald's Bivens claim under

the First Amendment and

his "inferred" statutory actions under 5

18 U.S.C. § 1505.
were

invoked

the

of

immune

former

collateral

the

of

§

7211 and

President

ci vi 1 damages.

Nixon,

doctrine

and

petitioners
appealed

90

the

Jf'

so1.~e

District

from suit for

order

~.,;

denial of

u.s.c.

The court also ruled that petitioner's

not absolutely

Independently

85

immunity to the Court of Appeals for

Columbia Circuit.

The Court

of

Appeals

entered an order of dismissal.
Never
available

having
to

determined

the

senior

the

aides

scope
and

of

the

advisers

immunity
of

the

President of the United States, we granted certiorari. ___

u.s.

{1981). 12

12 As in Nixon, ante, our jurisdiction has been
challenged on the basis that the District Court's order

95

..,

7.
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As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante,

I

100

our decisions consistently have recognized that government

I

officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits
for damages.
require

As recognized at common law, public officers

this

interference

protection
with

their

to

shield

duties

them
and

from

undue

alleviate

to

105

potentially incapacitating fears of liability.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), this Court

s
stablished

the principle that the immunity available to

state executive officials generally should vary with the
complexity and sensitivity of their duties.
247.

In Scheuer

frequently

must

we noted
make

416

u.s.,

at

,

110

that high executive officials

decisions

in

an

"atmosphere

of

confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events." Id., at
247.

The

range of

required decisions may be

infinite," yet promptness essential.
the

risk

COJ;l.Sti tute

that

"action

deferred

"virtually

Vacillation entails
will

virtual abdication of office."

be

futile

Id.,

at

or
246.

115

8.

"In short," we concluded, "since the options which a chief
executive and his principal subordinates must consider are
far broader and more subtle than those made by officials

120

with less responsibility, the range of discretion must be
comparably

broad . "

Ibid.

perception

that

high

protection

than

those

Nonetheless,

officials

will

with

complex

less

despite

require

our

greater

discretionary

responsibilities, we held in Scheuer that a governor and
his

chief

subordinates

could

receive

the

125

requisite

protection from a limited or good-faith immunity.

Ibid.,

at 247-248.
In Butz
applied

v.

Economou,

438

u.s.

478,

(1978),

we

the "governing principles" of Scheuer to federal

officials.

the

need

for

official

immunity

suits alleging constitutional violations.
established
We

functions

130

For them as for state executive personnel, we

acknowledged

norm.

503

that good faith
continued
of

some

to

even

from

But we clearly

immunity would represent the

acknowledge

officials

might

that

the

require

special
absolute

135

9.

that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from
personal liability must

bear

the burden of showing that

public policy requires an exemption of that scope."
supra, 438

u.s.,

at 506.

140

Butz,

This too we reaffirmed in Nixon.
III

In attempting to carry the burden established by our
cases, petitioners undertake to derive an entitlement to

145

absolute immunity from the absolute immunity possessed by
the President.
the

functions

special

They also advance a related argument that
of White House

sensitivity,

immunity under

which

aides are
entitles

invested with a

them

to

absolute

the Butz reservation of absolute immunity

150

for "those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated
that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the
public business."

438 U.S., at 507.
A

Petitioners'

claim

to

"derivative"

immunity

rests

heavily on the decision of this Court in Gravel v. United
States,

408

u.s.

606

(1972).

In Gravel we held that the

155

10.

In

so

holding

we

looked

to

the

"central

role"

of

the

160

Speech and Debate Clause, which we identified as being "to
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary."
U.S.,

at 617.

Appeals

408

Both the District Court and the Court of

had concluded

that

"it was

literally

impossible

165

... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative
tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that
"the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the
Members'

performance

that

latter's alter egos •••• "
endorsed

that view.

they

must

be

Id., at 616.

treated

as

the

we substantially

170

Having done so, we held the Speech

and Debate Clause applicable to the "legislative acts" of
a Senate aide that would have been privileged if performed
by the Senator himself.
In

arguing

that

Id., at 621-622.
the

analysis

of

Gravel mandates

a

similarly "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President

of

the

United

States,

petitioners

correctly

assert that the President must delegate a large measure of

175

necessary

in

order

to

promote

all

of

the

policies

supporting absolute immunity for the President himself.
tao
in
President's
from

Nixon

absolute
unique

Fitzgerald,

v.

immunity derives
to

his

in

we

As

supra,

the

principal

part

station.

No

other official has responsibilities nearly so broad.

No

other

factors

f a r.

official approaches

constitutional scheme.

constitutional

the President's status

185

in the

Suits against presidential aides

therefore do not invoke the special separation-of-powers

190

considerations implicated by suits against the President
himself.

Moreover,

blanket

prohibition

subordinates

is

petitioners
of

necessary

have

shown

against

suits
to

not

the

perform

a

range

of

tasks

President's

from

the

extension

of

absolute

"derivative"

effective

Presidential
sensitive

discretionary to the routine and ministerial.
of some are essentially political.

a

presidential

performance of his constitutional functions.
aides

that

and

The duties

The undifferentiated
immunity

therefore

195

12.

we emphasized that the protection of the Speech and Debate
Clause

does

not

perimter

of

only

acts

to

proposing

a

extend

to

all

acts

within

the

Applicable

legislator's official duties.
performed

and debating

in Congress's
legislation,

outer

"central

role"

the Clause does

of

205

not

"privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct beyond that
essential

to

foreclose

executive

" 408

speech and debate

u.s.,

control of

legislative

at 620 (emphasis added).

By construing the Speech and Debate Clause in these

210

"functional" terms, Gravel employs an analytical approach
closely analogous

to

that of Scheuer and Butz.

Clearly

Gravel in no way denies the principle that the scope of an
official's

immunity

generally

should

depend

on

the

sensitivity and the complexity of his official functions.

215

B

Petitioners
based

on

the

Their

argument

also

"special
again

assert

an entitlement

functions"
claims

more

of White
than

our

to

immunity

House

aides.

cases

will

support. / For aides entrusted with discretionary authority

220

13.

the public business."
at

507.

warrant a

But

"special

functions"

rationale

blanket extension of absolute

presidential
offices.

a

Butz v. Economou, supra, 438

aides

This

in

the

conclusion

does

not

immunity to all

performance

follows

u.s.,

of

all

inescapably

225

their

from

our

decision in Butz, in which we held that a Cabinet officer
generally
alleging
justified
mere

fact

could

not

claim

constitutional
by
of

the

special

high

absolute

immunity

violations.
functions

executive

from

Immunity
of

offices,
It

station.

suits

must

be

not

the

would

be

230

anomalous at best to hold that White House aides generally
enjoy absolute immunity, which they actually might forfeit
if

appointed

to

assume

greater

and

more

sensitive

235

responsibilities as a member of the Cabinet.
IV
The approaches of Butz and Gravel both indicate that
the

scope

of

an

aide's

immunity

should

vary

with

the

functions of the office assigned him by the President of
the United States.

Our cases indicate that two inquiries

240

14.

entitlement

to

absolute

immunity must

be

roo fed

in
~

_,1-..t?'r. ,.

functions of offices, not based solely on discrete acts.

245

This is necessary to achieve some minimum of certainty and
predictability--both

for

citizens

believing

that

their

rights have been violated and for officials anxious that
their conduct may be called in question. 13
stage,

however,

particular

it

does

acts,

in

aide

in

presidential

become

order
fact

was

necessary

to

At the second
to

determine
discharging

examine

whether
a

250

a

protected

function when he performed the act on which liability is
predicated. 14
the common law:

'

The inquiry here has a familiar analogue in
was the action within the outer perimeter

13 As Professor Schuck has written, "To minimize
uncertainty, rules should be simple, predictable, and so
easily applied that the immunity questions can be resolved
at a very early stage of the trial."
Schuck, Suing Our
Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public
Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 325. This
aim would be defeated entirely if every presidential aide-regardless of his duties of office--could invoke a claim
that
a
particular
act
was
somehow
related
to
a
presidential function of great sensitivity.
By the same
token, the deterrent purpose of damage actions would be
undermined
if
all
White
House
officials
believed
themselves possessed of a colorable claim to absolute
immunity.
1 4 The need for such an inquiry
in this Court's decision in Butz v.

255

15.

of the official's protected function? 15
Applying

these standards to

petitioners

Harlow

neither

has

shown

office]

an exemption of

438

u.s.,

post,

at

506.

Harlow's

congressional

and
that

the claims advanced by

Butterfield,

we

conclude

"public policy requires
[absolute]

Although
position

an

[for his

Butz, supra,

260

important discretionary

as

relations

scope."

that

the

did

senior

not

aide

for

regular

entail

(?

responsibilities in any such especially sensitive areas as
adjudication,
Petitioner

Butterfield

is

or

sued

on

national
the

1

security.

basis of

actions

allegedly taken during his tenure as Deputy Assistant to
the

President and Deputy Chief of Staff.

senior level assignments,

Despite being

these posts also do not appear

I

to have included functions requiring absolute immunity as l
a matter of compelling public policy.

v

15 cf.

Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 (1896)
(immunity extends to all matters "committed by law to [an

265

16.

As

we

recognized

resolution of
balance

today

in

immunity questions

between

the

evils

Nixon,

supra,

inherently

inevitable"

in

the

requires

any

"a

avaliable

alternative.

In situations of abuse of office, an action

for

may

damages

vindication
438

of

u.s.,

required

at

offer

the

only

constitutional
506.

It

is

guarantees.
this

the denial of absolute
At

officers.

the

same

realistic

time,

avenue
Butz,

recognition

for

supra,

that

has

immunity to most public
history

has

275

taught

280

that

claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty--at a cost not only to innocent officials, but to
the society as a whole.

/
of

These social costs

litigation-,--~e_jdiversion

include ,...t.b.e

of official energy

285

;.c.-."".r.."WA

pressing

public

issues,

aft(!

the deterrence of able

citizens from the acceptance of public office.

,.
In

Butz,

supra,

we

emphasized

the

protections

available

to public officials under a rule of qualified

immunity.

Experience indicates that these protections may

work less effectively

in practice than our decision had

290

17.

evils as we do, we must continue to rely on the principles
stated in Butz, supra, 438 U.S., at 507-508:
295
/

,.. .. Insubstantial
lawsuits
[should]
be quickly
terminated by federal courts alert
to the
possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the
complaint states a compensable claim for relief
... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that
damages
suits
concerning
constitutional
violations need not proceed to trial, but can be
terminated on a properly supported motion for
summary
judgment
based
on
the
defense
of
immunity.
See 416 u.s., at 250.
In responding
to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in
the manger; and firm application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure
that
federal officials are not harassed by frivolous
lawsuits."
438
U.S.,
at 507-508
(footnote
mitted}.

300

305

310

315

VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case remanded
for

further

ordered.

action

consistent

with

this

opinion.

So
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No. 80-945, Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity
available

to

the

senior

aides

and

advisers

of

10

the

President of the United States in a suit for damages based
on their acts in office.
I

In
Harlow

this
and

suit

for

Alexander

civil

damages

Butterfield

are

petitioners
alleged

Bryce

to

have

participated in a conspiracy to violate the constitutional
and

statutory

Fitzgerald.

rights

of

the

respondent

A.

Ernest

Respondent avers that petitioners entered the

15

2.

conspiracy

is

Fitzgerald,

the

same

ante,

the

as

that

facts

involved

need

not

in

be

Nixon

v.

repeated

in

detail.
Respondent alleges that Harlow entered the conspiracy
in

his

role

responsible

as
for

the

presidential

aide

principally

relations. 1

congressional

25

the

At

conclusion of discovery the supporting evidence remained
inferential.
activity

As

respondent

communication

Harlow

of

relies

between

Robert Seamans.
cailed

evidence

Harlow's

heavily

Harlow

and

on
Air

conspiratorial
the

history

Force

of

30

Secretary

The record reveals that Secretary Seamans
in

May,

1969,

to

inquire

about

likely

congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that
would

cause

Fitzgerald's

dismissal. 2

Through

an

aide

1 Harlow held this position from the beginning of
the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through
November 4, 1969.
On that date he was designated as
Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet
status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970,
when he ....-t:e turned to private life.
Harlow later resumed
the duties of Counsellor for the period from July 1, 1973
through April 14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that
Harlow continued in a consiracy against throughout the
various changes of official assignment.
~
2.,. ____ ..:1!--

35

~ \
~

3.

Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive item on
the Hill and

that

it would be

[his]

recommendation that

[the Air Force] not proceed to make such a change at that
time. n3

But

the Air

Harlow on at
spring

shortly

two

1969.

of

Secretary

least

record

called

the

Harlow

public

impending dismissal. 4

Seamans spoke to

subsequent occasions during

The

Seamans

after

Force persisted.

also
on

establishes
November

announcement

of

5,

the
that

1969,

Fitzgerald's

The other evidence most supportive

of Fitzgerald's claim consists in a recorded conversation
in

which

recollection

the

President
that

40

Harlow

later
was

voiced
"all

a

tentative

for

canning"

45

Fitzgerald. 5
In his motion for summary judgment Harlow argued that
exhaustive discover 1
his

involvement

had adduced no direct evidence of

in any conspiratorial activity.

In his

brief in this Court Harlow cites the depostion testimony

3 Id. , at 15 2a.

50

4.

of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who averred that he "never
any

received
dismissa1. 6
Nixon's

instruction"

Disputing

recorded

tentativeness
President's

probative

remark,

of

the

query

[Fitzgerald] ,

the

he?",

of

Richard

emphasizes

statement.

Harlow
White

Fitzgerald's

value

Harlow

President'

whether

wasn't

regarding

was

"all

House

To

for

Press

55

the
the

canning

Secretary

Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative reply: "No, I think

60

Bryce may have been the other way."7
According
complaint,

to

the

petitioner

averment's
Butterfield

H.R.

the

Employed as Deputy

to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to

Haldeman, 8

memorandum

entered

also

conspiracy not later than May of 1969.
Assistant

respondent's

of

in

Butterfield

that

month

in

circulated
which

he

a

White

claimed

to

House
have

learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on

6 JA, at 159a-160a.
7 see JA, at 284a.
Ziegler's remark.

The President did not respond to

65

5.

some "shoddy purchasing practices" by leaking documents to
a congressional committee. 9 Butterfield reported that this
information had
Investigation.
as

evidence

secure

been

referred

Fitzgerald

that

the

Federal Bureau of

characterizes

Butterfield

Fitzgerald's

to

had

retaliatory

this memorandum

commenced
dismissal.

efforts

to

Fitzgerald

also relies heavily on communications between Butterfield
and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970.
President had

into

promised at a

Fitzgerald's

chief~~ff

memorandum

emphasizing

the

importance

inquire
Haldeman

-

solicited Butterfield's recommendations.

75

After the

press conference to

dismissal,

70

In a subsequent
of

"loyalty,"

80

Butterfield counselled against offering Fitzgerald another
job within the Aministration.l 0
For his part, Butterfield denies that he took part in
any
until
than

decision
Haldeman
a

month

involving

Fitzgerald's

sought his advice
after

Fitzgerald's

employment

in December
termination

status

1969--more
had

been

85

6.

scheduled

and

announced

publicly

by

the

Air

Force.

According to Butterfield, eight years of litigation 11 have
established

a

basis

for

memorandum

concerning

the

conclusion

Fitzgerald's

that

his

alleged

May

"whistle-

90

blowing" cannot be connected with the Air Force decision
to

terminate

Fitzgerald's

employment.

Butterfield

also

argues generally that discovery has failed to adduce any
evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald.
Together

with

petitioners

Harlow

their
and

codefendant

Butterfield

judgment on February 12, 1980.
District

Court

Fitzgerald's

upheld

the

Bivens claim under

Richard

moved

for

Nixon,

95

summary

In denying the motion the
legal

sufficiency

of

the First Amendment and

(\
his "inferred" statutory actions under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 and

r,
18 u.s.c. § 1505.

v

The court found that there were genuine

I
issues of disputed fact remaining for resolution at trial.

11 see Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DDC
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (CADC
1977). Together with eight officials of the Department of
Defense, Butterfield was accused in Fitzgerald's initial
complaint of conspiring to cause Fitzgerald's retaliatory

100

7.

It

also

ruled

5

that

petitioner

tv

did

not

possess

absolute

immunity from this suit for civil damages.
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners
invoked

the

collateral

denial of their
for

the

order

doctrine

and

appealed

105

the

immunity defense to the Court of Appeals

District

.

of

Columbia

Circuit.

The

Court

of

~J:d_

Appeals~~4er~

dismissal.

Never

having

determined the immunity available to the senior aides and

110

advisers of the President of the United States, we granted
certiorari.

--

{1981) . 12

u.s.
II

As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante,
our decisions

~onsistently

have recognized that government

officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits
for damages.
require

this

As recognized at common law, public officers
protection

to

shield

them

from

undue

12 As in Nixon, ante, our jurisdiction has been
challenged on the basis that the District Court's order
denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an
appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals'
dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this
11!-11

.Lt...-

,..... ____ .._

-~

~----,-

--!L..'L..!-

.L.t....-.
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8.

interference

with

their

duties

and

to

alleviate
120

potentially incapacitating fears of liability.
Our

decisions

two . kinds.

For

have

recognized

some officials

immunity defenses of

whose

special

status or

functions have been thought to require complete protection
from

suit,

immunity."

we

have

recognized

the

defense

of

"absolute

The absolute immunity of prosecutors, in their

125

prosecutorial function, and of judges, in the performance
of

judicial functions,

Butz v. Economou,
that

executive

enjoy absolute

and

that

supra,

U.S.,

is well settled.

u.s.

478

(1978).

this

See, e.g.,

We have not held

__,s-

administrative

immunity.

explicitly
438

438

now

officials

never

may

On the contrary, we have held

factor

at 511-512,

is not determinative,
and

in

fact

130

Butz,

have extended

'

absolute

immunity to prosecutors,

to executive officials

engaged in adjudicative functions,

ibid. , at 513-517, and

to

States,

~
~

the

President

Fitzgerald,
c ases

ante.

of

the

United

see

For executive officials,

make plain that qualified

immunity

Nixon

v.

however, our

represents

the

135

9.

considered
Governor

the

scope

a

State

of

of

the

and

immunity

his

chief

available

to

the

subordinates.

In

140

Scheuer we noted that high executive officials frequently
must

make

decisions

ambiguity,
"[S]ince

and
the

in

swiftly

options

an

"atmosphere

moving

which

a

events."
chief

of

confusion,

Id.,

at

executive

247.

and

his

145

principal subordinates must consider are far broader and
more

subtle

than

responsibility,"
must
our

be

we

comparably

perception

protection

than

made

reasoned,
broad."

by
"the

v.

range

of

with

less

discretion

Nonetheless,

Ibid.

those

with

despite

complex

discretionary

the requisite protection from

Economou,

438

.a-y-

Ibid., at 247-248.

u.s.

478,

503

(1978),

we

applied the "governing principles" of Scheuer to federal
officials.
would

be

Concluding
anomalous

in

150

~ ~uJ.-t ;;..., ~ _.f,.c~c~
in Scheuer that a governor and
1\

hei~

receive

less

good-faith immunity.
In Butz

officials

that high officials will require greater

responsibilities, we
his aides could

those

that a
light

blanket grant of
of

the

qualified

immunity
immunity

155

10.

by

basic

constitutional

determined

guarantees,"

id.,

at

that public policy generally would

508,

we

be served

best by affording to federal executive officers a defense
of

qualified

standard

reflected

principles.
damages
U.S.,

immunity.

at

an

Cognizant

remedy

to

In

attempt

but

required

and

public

related

the

also

officials who are
the

as
to

not only of

protect

504-505,

Butz

in

balance
the

rights
of

"the

this

competing

importance of
of

citizens,

need

to exercise
interest

Scheuer

in

to

165

a

438

protect

their discretion
encouraging

the

170

vigorous exercise of official authority," id., at 506, we
expressed our
terms.

choice of qualified

Without

discounting

immunity
the

in balancing

adverse

pol icy

consequnces of private lawsuits, we relied on procedural
guarantees

that

frivolous

suits

could

be

terminated

175

quickly:
"Insubstantial
lawsuits
can
be
quickly
terminated by federal courts alert to the
possibilities of artful pleading.
Unless the
complaint states a compensable claim for relief
.•• , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that
damages
suits
concerning
constitutional

180

11.

at 507-508.
,

Nevertheless,

despite

our

decision

that

qualified

immunity should be the norm, Butz continued to acknowledge

195

that the special functions of some officials might require
absolute immunity, and in fact extended such immunity to
administrative

adjudicative functions.
however,

with

officials

that

prosecutorial

Id., at 513-517.

"federal

officials

who

and

We emphasized,
seek

absolute

200

exemption from personal liability must bear the burden of
showing that public policy requires an exempt1un o f
s cope."

I d ., at 506.

tha t

This we reaffirmed today in Nixon

v. Fitzgerald, ante.
205

III
In

attempting

to

justify

an

extension

to

them of

absolute immunity, petitioners, as presidential aides and
advisors,
scope

from

undertake
the

President himself.

to

derive

absolute

an

~unity

immunity

possessed

of

this

by

the

They also advance a related argument

210

12.

A

Petitioners'

claim

to

"derivative"

immunity

rests

215

heavily on the decision of this Court in Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606

(1972) • 13

In Gravel we held that the

congressional privelege under the Speech and Debate Clause
extended to certain acts per formed by a Senatorial a ide.
In

so

holding

we

looked

to

the

"central

role"

of

the

220

Speech and Debate Clause, which we identified as being "to
prevent

intimidation of legislators by the Executive and

accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary."

u.s.,

at 617.

Appeals

408

Both the District court and the Court of

had concluded

that

"it was

literally impossible

225

... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative
tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that
"the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the
Members'

performance

that

latter's alter egos .••• "

they

must

!d., at 616.

be

treated

as

the

We substantially

13 Petitioners also rely on other cases in which this
Court
has
held
that
Congressional
employees
are

230

13.

Having done so, we held the Speech

endorsed that view.

and Debate Clause applicable to the "legislative acts" of
a Senate aide that would have been privileged if performed
by the Senator himself.
In

arguing

that

Id., at 621-622.

the

analysis

of Gravel mandates

a

235

similarly ""derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the
President

of

the

United

States,

petitioners

correctly

assert that the President must delegate a large measure of
authority merely to execute the duties of his office.
this

they

reason,

necessary

in

argue,

order

to

immunity

"derivative"

promote

all

of

the

For
is

240

policies

supporting absolute immunity for the President himself.
Petitioners'

argument

Ultimately, however,

is

not

without

it sweeps too far.

force.

As we explained

----.__/

today

in

absolute

Nixon

v.

Fitzgerald,

immunity derives

ante,

scheme.

the

President's

President's

in principal part from factors

unique to his constitutional station.
approaches

the

status

in

No other official
the

constitutional

No other official has responsibilities nearly so

245

14.

immunity for all his official acts.

No further inquiry is

needed
/

presidential function

to determine the particular
an

act

was

In

taken.

with

contrast

the

claiming congressional immunity in Gravel and
similar

cases,

petitioners

here

fail

to

establish

255

that

public policy requires an extension to them of an immunity
equal

to

that

of

their

Suits

principal.

against

presidential aides do not invoke the special separation-

tJ/::; tt~r? of-powers

considerations implicated by suits against the

President himself.
that a

Moreover,

petitioners have not shown

blanket prohibition of suits against presidential

subordinates

is

necessary

to

the

President's

performance of his constitutional functions.
aides

260

perform a

range

of

tasks

discretionary to the routine and
of some are
extension

of

ees ~ ;i,a~~¥

absolute

from

the

effective

Presidential
sensitive and

265

ministerial. ~~uties

political.
"derivative"

~

The undifferentiated
immunity

therefore

could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach of

Scheuer

a~~J

indeed with Gravel itself.

270

15.

e.within

the

outer

perimter

of

a

legislator's

official

~

duties.

Applicable only to acts performed in Congress's

"central role" of proposing and debating legislation, the
Clause

does

conduct

not

"privilege

beyond

that

illegal

or

unconstitutional

foreclose

essentiaYt l to

executive

control of legislative speech and debate •..• " 408
{emphasis added) . 14

at 620

u.s.,

By construing the Speech and

Debate Clause in these "functional" terms, Gravel employs
an

analytical

Scheuer

and

approach

closely

analogous

Bu~ Gravel

principle

that

the

generally

should

scope

depend

275

of
on

that

of

in no way denies

the

an
the

to

official's
sensitivity

280

immunity
and

the

complexity of his official functions.

285

B

Petitioners also assert an
based on
Their

the

argument

support.

"special
again

entitlement

functions"
claims

more

of White
than

our

to

immunity

House aides.
cases

will

For aides entrusted with discretionary authority

290

in such sensitive areas as national security or

~

"\

~

immunity might'\ be justified to protect
their
the

unhesitating
national

performance of

interest.

But

functions

a

so vital

"special

to

functions"

rationale does not warrant a blanket extension of absolute

295

immunity to all presidential aides in the performance of

~
all

their

oHice-s.

This

conclusion

follows

inescapably

·I\

from our decision in Butz, in which we held that a Cabinet
officer--a high officer of the executive branch directly
accountable
absolute

to

the

President--generally could

immunity

violations.

Butz

from

suits

plainly

alleging

affirms

that

not

claim

300

constitutional
an

executive

official's claim to absolute immunity must be justified by
reference to the public interest in the special functions
of

his

office,

not

the

mere

fact

of

high

executive

station.
IV
The approaches of Butz and Gravel both indicate that
the

nature

and

scope of

an

aide's

immunity must depend

305

17.

some

aides

egos,"

cf.

exercise

are

assigned

Gravel,

of

to

supra,

functions

act

as

presidential

"alter

408 U.S.,

at 616-617,

in

for

which

absolute

immunity

the
is

"essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz,
supra,

438

U.S.,

at

507.

It

is clear

from our

315

cases,

however, that the burden to establish this claim rests on
the official asserting a right to absolute immunity.
order

to

carry

this

burden,

a

presidential

aide

In

first

would need to show that the responsibilities of his office

320

did in fact embrace functions so sensitive as to require a
total

shield

requires

from liability.

no~neral

Our dec is ion of this case

enumeration of protected functions.

Our cases make plain, however, that the relevant inquiries
would

encompass

considerations

of

public

policy

and of

325

either the common law or, more likely, our constitutional
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante.
Having established that his duties of office included
functions warranting the protection of absolute immunity,
the presidential aide then would need to establish that he

330

18.

inquiry here has a
Was

the

action

familiar
within

analogue

the

outer

in the common law:
perimeter

of

the

official's protected function?l6
Applying

these

standards

to

335
the claims advanced

by

petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on
the record before us that either has shown that
policy requires

[for any of the functions of his office]

an exemption of [absolute] scope."
at 506.

"public

Butz, supra, 438 u.s.,

340

Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions

for which absolute immunity would be warranted, could we
now conclude

that

the

acts

charged

in

this

lawsuit--if

taken at all--would lie within the protected area.

we do

not, however, foreclose the possibility that petitioners,
on remand, could satisfy the standards properly applicable

15 The need for such an inquiry is at least implicit
in this Court's decision in Butz v. Economou, supra, 438
u.S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.S. 409,
430-431 (1976). Cases 1nvolv1ng immun1ty under the Speech
and Debate Clause have inquired explicitly into whether a
particular
acts
and
activities
qualified
for
the
protection of the Clause.
See, e.g., Gravel v. United
States, supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 u.s. 306 (1973)
16 see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 (1896)
(immunity extends to all rna tter s "commit ted by law to [an
lol
.. .:e.:""' ... - - ___ ,_ __ , .. \ n--- .... .._._.L.L.---

,.._,,.:,f=~,.,.;~,

~n'l"'_~-.-

~L:_I\

345

19 •

.

to their

functions

require

absolute

immunity,

petitioners

assert

350

that public policy at least mandates an application of the
qualified

immunity standard that would permit the defeat

~

we agree.

of'\,frivr cws claims without resort to trial.
A

As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante,
the resolution of

immunity questions

355

inherently requires

"a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avaliable
alternative.

In situations of abuse of office, an action

for

may

damages

vindication
438

u.s.,

required
officers.

of
at

offer

only

constitutional
506.

It

the denial of
At

the

the

is

guarantees.
this

absolute

same

realistic

time,

avenue
Butz,

recognition

for

supra,

that

360

has

immunity to most public
however,

it

cannot

be

disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty--at a cost not only to the

365

20.

These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,

--

tu~~ ~f ~!.-:;:/ ,~--

and~the

deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of
370

public office.
In Butz, supra, 438
supra, 416

u.s.,

at 507-508, as in Scheuer,
~

u.s.,

at 245-248, we uRdertO&k-a A i:Rqniry
-1

4:R~

the protections available to public officials under a rule

a....
of qualified immunity.

In striking " ..the balance J

we

relied

on

immunity would

permit

"[i]nsubstantial

quickly terminated."

the

Butz,

see Hanrahan v. Hampton,

assumption

supra,

446

u.s.

754,

in

part

and

importance

of

this

consideration

Q¥Q-r-&~ t

a ted •

lawsuits

[to]

dissenting

(Powell, J.,

in

part) •

The
380

.. ~ •.,~ & c'l-:-/
This

Court has

noted

the

risk .ftazarcled

by

""

political officials who must defend their motives before a
jury.

See Lake Country Estates,

Planning

Agency,

440

U.S.

391,

375

be

765

~~

~

that qualified

438 U.S., at 507-508;

concurring

~~.

~

Inc.

v.

Tahoe Regional

405

(1979);

Tenney

v.

21.

Brandhove,
have

341 U.S.

admonished

proceed

to

367,

that

trial,

but

377-378

(1951) • 18

insubstantial
can

be

suits

terminated

supported motion for summary judgment."

u.s.,

We therefore
should
on

a

385

"not

properly

Butz, supra, 438

at 507-508.
Petitioners

present

persuasive

arguments

that

the

390

implementation of this admonition--a factor presupposed in
the

balance

of

competing

cases--requires

a

interests

clarification

struck

of

the

by our

prior

standards

of

pleading and proof to be applied to the immunity claims of
high

officials.

Under

the

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

395

Procedure disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be
decided on motions for summary judgment. 19
standard

in

suits against

Applying this

public officials,

courts have

hesitated to dismiss by summary judgment even claims for
which

plaintiffs

have

adduced

little

or

no

factual

18 As the Court observed in Tenne1, "In times of
passion, dishonest and vindictive mot1ves are readily
attributed
and as readily believed."
341 u.s., at
378.
.___,_ -

400

~

22.

f-,.. ~ ,... ~¥ t!.·4~ ~

,t..~--.,t-- .£..&.;.s~ Lc.- ~-~-~4£. .

1

~~~~~;u,
A~ ... -'W . .~ ~ ~~

support ~
is

itself

asoning that an officials's "good faith"

a

of

fact'

tfie r

r

federal courts

y judgment on this issue, sometimes
finding

nsupported averment sufficient to

405

force a
If

~,

contemplated

~~

~9

'Having

~1::

~
v:--~ . ~

20 As

opinion
1212:

;;c·

~-~-~·I

~t

a

'

~~~

~

lf"''"i-...

~~~

"""

~ ~
~

·

1

•.

~

~

.~/

,~- ~

~p·_- r
v •. ~

tv'w· \
·..

~ ~)11;

IV

reasoned

against

them,

our

cases

from

the

avoid
the

cannot

be

trial

"balance
attained

empirical premise

even
of

on

evils"

in

fact.

'

in

Judge

Gesell

Halper in

v.

2

that vacuous

J!f,

..J~·
"!
,1

by

cannot

charges could be dismissed without trial, we cannot ignore

II

~

officials

claims

frivolous

~·

d

high

in
his
concurring
explained
Kissinger, supra, 606 F.2d, at

"It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff Is
counsel to create a material issue of fact on
some element of the immunity defense where
subtle quest ions of constitutional law and a
dec isionmaker 's mental processes are involved.
A sentence
from
a
casual
document
or
a
difference in recollection with regard to a
particular policy conversation held long ago
would usually, under the normal summary judgment
standards, be sufficient.
In short, if these
standards are those to be followed in these
cases' trial judges will almost automatically
have to send such cases to full trials on the
merits."

For cases in which qualified immunity was granted only
after trial, see Knell v. Bewnsinger, 522 F. 2d 7 20 (CA 7
1975); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F.Supp. 324
(D.Vt. 1979).

410

23.

the

counsel

of

jurists, 22

distinguished

and

academic

commentators 23 that high public officials not only can
but frequently are, harassed by frivolous lawsuits.
B

In Gomez
held

that

v. Toldeo, 446 U.S. 635

a

affirmative

claim
defense,

defendant. 24
burden

of

(Rehnquist,

of

"good

which

But we did
proof
J.,

on

this

faith"

must

not

be

reach

issue.

concurring).

(1980), this Court
immunity
pleaded

is
by

an
the

the question of

the

See

at

642

that

the

ibid.,

Petitioners

urge

415

420

burden of showing lack of good faith should be placed on
the plaintiff.
or

Further, where a defendant--by affidavits

otherwise--effectively

factual

averments,

controverts

petitioners

argue

plaintiff's

a

that

the

plaintiff

~~kL
should

be

required

to make

some

~1

evidentiary

showing in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.

W~ ~

22

-~~

~

see

Halperin

v.

Kissinger,

supra,

606

F.2d,

at

1214-1215 (Gesell, J., concurring).
23 see, e.g., Schuck, supra.

~

J..\.....-

- - .. - - . 1 . .!---

.! -

.._,_ __

425

24.

views.

We are

In order to provide an effective barrier to trial of
·~

kivej,g.ys

clai~ieve

entitlement

to

qualified

that an oflicial's claimed
immunity

must

be

accorded

substantial weight, not only at trial but on a motion for
summary judgment. 25

Consistently with 'this view, we hold

25 There
is
implicit
support
for
this view
in
decisions in which this Court has contemplated that an
official's perception of events generally would provide
the basis for judging his actions. As the Court stated in
Scheur v. Rhodes, supra, 416 u.s., at 247-278 (emphasis
added}:
"These considerations suggest that, in varying
scope, a qualified immunity is available to
officers of the executive branch of government,
the variation being dependent upon the scope of
the responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought
to be based. "
Emphasizing the necessity for judicial deferenc·e to the
official's invocation of an immunity defense, the court in
Scheuer quoted from Justice Holmes's opinion in Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 u.s. 78, 85 (1909}:
"No doubt there are cases where the expert on
the spot may be called upon to justify his
conduct later in court, notwithstanding the fact
that he had sole command at the time and acted
to the best of his knowledge.
That is the
position of the captain of a ship. But even in
that case great weight is to be given to his
determination and the matter is to be judged on
the facts as they appeared then and not merely
in the light of the event." (emphasis added}.
As has been observed of Mr.
Learned
Hand,
Mr.
Justice
(

Justice
Holmes

Harlan and Judge
was
neither
an

:t~;~r:r~~nc~~~!~:op~!:e!-~~~!~~~c~:~~-~~:

visi~~, -~r .~~~

430

25.

t!

that a defendant's assertion of this defense shifts the

~y

burden to the plaintiff to

a preponderance of the

I\

evidence that the official did not act either in objective

43 ~

Ck...,tl

or subjective good faith.
our admonitions that

.,

~F~fie~, ~ R ~Ede~ to effectuate

~

~f~

~ ~:ivoleous claims
~
~

without resort to trial, we

should be

~

-u

.e ~~
~

~l4~ th~intiff~
""'

~ pt..__., ~,.AJ&-v- ~
J order to survive a motion for

summary

judgment. 26

440

carry his burden at trial, a plaintiff

~~wett.ld Rees

summary
high

to prove all elements of his affirmative case
~

/.1.~

judgment

government

1

in a case

officials,

involving

immunity claims by

we

it

think

26 cf. Halperin v. Kissinger,
1215 {Gesell, J., concurring}:

supra,

appropriate

606

F.2d,

"In order to give the immunity doctrine some
genuine force and effect, it appears to me that
a
plaintiff should be required to make a
stronger
showing
than
the
court's
op1n1on
requires on the immunity question before being
permitted to proceed to trial.
I would hold
that the plaintiff must establish after the
completion of discovery and before the trial
commences, not merely the existence of a genuine
dispute as to some material issue of fact, but
also, by the preponderance of the evidence or

to

at

445

------

showing
uncertainty

of

the

allowance

dev~lopments

of

---------zo:-

at

trial--from

which

a

~
m~ ~~

rational juror reasonably

to conclude that
1'\

the preponderance standard was satisfied.

c

45 1

w~~~~
ca ~

There

procedural

and

doJ,l.b.t:

evidentiary

implementation of

the

law of

affirmed

today in Nixon v.

immunity

remains,

making."
the

Moreover,

methods

of

as

it

~ower

eY£ -

rules

official

been,

"

to

fashion

necessary

Fitzgerald,

"has

courts

.g£

to

immunity.
ante,

the
As

we

the law of

largely of

judicial

45~

traditionally have determined

pleading,

proof,

and

procedure

appropriately applied to claims of different kinds.
Neither

do we view today's decision as a departure

'

from the principles of our prior cases.

On the contrary,

we act in implementation of one of the central tenets on
which previous decisions have rested: "Qualified immunity"
should

afford

realistic

protection,

not

only

against

adverse judgments, but against the expense, annoyance, and

460

lfpjss 02/16/82

Rider A, p. 27 (Harlow)
( a~l~ k p
~~

z..u

~)

'/

HAR27 SALLY-POW
In allocating the burden of proof to the
plaintiff when immunity is put in issue, we protect the
public interest in the effective administration of
government -- an interest that indisputably is threatened
when insubstantial claims against officials result in
protracted and vexatious litigation.

Requiring proof of

substantiality will in so way deter or frustrate
meritorious claims.
the same.

The requirements for pleading remain

If the defendant advances the defense of good

faith immunity, the plaintiff will retain access to
reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden.

t:LL-~l ~~~
~

i\.

And

need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for

summary judgment,

~t

-'\

must make a showing of

2.

substantiality adequate to justify the cost -- both public
and private
trial.

of subjecting a government official to

27.

,._ rules

for the pre-trial dismissal

~~
suits, we a-Hr principally to protect the public

""
in the effective administration of government--an 'nterest
that

indisputably

is

threatened

by

vexatiou

470

lawsuits.

~~~~;(
0

In order to
commence

a

tortious
defense

behavior
of good

burden of
some

lawsuit
of

of

summary judgmen

plaintiff

only

a

th · s

plead

the

By entering

faith,

proof on

showing

a

official then may shift
issue,
in

and

order

is not appropriate.

further
to

a

the

may require

demonstr·a te

that

But the plaintiff,

in undertak' g to meet his burdens, will retain access to
And he need not prove his case on a
motion

for

summary

judgment,

but merely make

a

showing

'
\

l

sufficient to warrant the costs--both public and private--

of subjecting the defendant to trial.

~--~~~------------------~

480

28.

survive

for

summary

judgment ...

1:1nder~

&~
'
we think it appropriate to remand
-'\

for consideration of this issue by the District

490

~~~~~~~~--
&-~ ~~aeQ

Eamilia~ity

LA..~

so far developed andA i~ ~Qee&&«Fy, eoaid

~~k
further

findings

on the record before us
VI
..--;---"1

J he judgment
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case remanded
for further action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

500

rhf

March 5, 1982
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OBJECTIVE INTENT
IV
Even
functions

if

they

require

cannot

establish

absolute

immunity,

that

their

official

petitioners

10

assert

that public policy at least mandates an application of the
qualified
of

immunity standard that would permit the defeat

insubstantial

claims

without

resort

to

trial.

We

agree.

15
A

As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante,
at __ ,

the

resolution of

immunity questions

inherently

2.

for

vindication

Economou,

supra,

Unknown Fed.
("For

of

438

u.s.,

at

Narcotics Agents,

people

nothing.").

constitutional

in

Bivens'

guarantees.

506;

see

403 U.S.

shoes,

v.

v.

Six

Bivens
388,

it

Butz

is

410

(1971)

damages

25

It is this recognition that has required the

denial of absolute immunity to most public officers.
the

or

same time,

however,

At

it cannot be disputed seriously

that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as
the guilty--at a cost not only to the defendant officials,
but

to

the

society

include

the

expenses

as
of

whole. 1

a

These

litigation,

the

social

30

costs

diversion

of

official energy from pressing public issues, and--perhaps
most

important

of

all--the

deterrence

of

able citizens
35

from the acceptance of public office.
In

identifying

attainable
supra,
U.s.,

qualified

accommodation

438 U.S.,

of

at 507-508,

immunity

competing
as

as

values,

in Scheuer,

the

best

in

Butz,

supra,

416

at 245-248, we relied on the assumption that this

3.

standard

would

permit

quickly terminated."

"[i]nsubstantial
Butz,

see Hanrahan v. Hampton,
concurring

in

petitioners
dismissal
factor

part

and

446

4 38 U.S. ,
754,

dissenting

insubstantial

presupposed

u.s.

persuasive

advance
of

supra,

lawsuits

765
in

be

40

at 507-508;
(Powell, J.,

part) • 2

Yet

that

the

arguments

lawsuits

[to]

without

trial--a

45

in the balance of competing interests

struck by our prior cases--requires an adjustment of the
substantive and evidentiary standards established by our
decisions.
50

B

Qualified or "good faith"
defense

that

must

be

Gomez v. Toledo, 446

pleaded

u.s.

635

immunity is an affirmative
by

a

defendant

(1980) • 3

official.

Decisions of this

2 The importance of this consideration hardly needs
emphasis.
This Court has noted the risk imposed upon
political officials who must defend their actions and
motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 (1979);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the
Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion,
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed •••
and as readily believed."
341 U.S., at 378.
It is for
this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that

4.

Court have established that the "good faith" defense has
both

an

"objective"

and

a

"subjective"

aspect.

The

55

objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and
respect
Wood

for

v.

"basic,

unquestioned constitutional rights."

Strickland,

u.s.

420

subjective component refers
Id.

Characteristically

elements

by

identifying

to

the
the

308,

320

(1975).

"permissible
Court

has

to

the

objective

and

intentions."

defined

circumstances

qualified immunity would not be available.

The

in

these

60

which

Referring both

subjective elements,

we

have

held

that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took

within his

65

sphere of official responsibility would

violate the Constitutional rights of the

[plaintiff], or

if he took the action with malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury

II

Ibid., at 321-322 (emphasis added) • 4

defense

in actions under

the Constution and laws of the

70

5.

~

~ t.Re---o~tiu.Q iU=ld subjective element# of the good
A

faith

de fens ~

particularly unamenable to summary judgment.
the

Federal

Rules

proved

has

the

of

Civil

Procedure

Rule 56 of

provides

that

disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided
on motions for

summary judgment. 5

75

Because an official's

subjective "good faith" has been considered a question of
fact,

some courts apparently have regarded this issue as

inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 6
For

this

reason

the

"subjective"

component

of

the

321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an act ion
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the
Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified
1mmunity standard. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S.
555,
562-563,
566
(1978), quoted in Baker v.
McCollan, 443 u.s. 1 37, 139 (1979).

~{e-1-- ~

R~leo

of tl:le Federal
ef Civil P£QSeEhue
states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court
ordinarily must look at the record in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
inferences most favorable to that party. E.g., Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 u.s. 464, 473
(1962).
6 E.q ••

Landrum v.

Moats.

576

F.2d

1320.

1329

(CAS

80

\

6.

qualified
proved

immunity

frequently

defense

incompatible

with

our

admonition

in

Butz

has
that

insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.
Viewed

in the context of Butz 's attempted balancing

~~~

of competing values, eftormous costs attend the litigation
of

the

subjective

good

*

Executive Branch.

.~

faith

of

high

The duties of higa

officials of

85

the

~
officers

~Guti'ft!

--1

often require decisions on controversial issues of gravest

t1
"' 1·- I
)f~ ' importance, in an environment in which views inevitably
are

affected

environment

by

evidence

ideology,

and

emotion.

in part explains why questions of

rarely can be
background

loyalty,

d~e~~~r;'e7~t
'\

in which
that

may

This

90

intent so

also frames a

there often is no clear end to the
be

probative

of

subjective

intent.

Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may
entail broad-ranging

~ officials. ~t:l:~rdens

of this kind not

only can distract officials from the performance of their

95

7.

decisionmaking should not be undertaken lightly. 7
As we
are

affirmed

situations

in Nixon v.
in

justifications exist.

which
In

Fitzgerald, · ante,

there

compelling

sufficiently

the case of private suits for

damages, however, we conclude today that bare allegations
of

malice

federal

should

officials

not
to

suffice
the

costs

either
of

to

subject

trial or

to

high

1 icense

7 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services Administral::L<)n, 433 U.S.
425, 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United States
v. Nixon:
"A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do
so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except
privately.
These are considerations
justifying
a
presumptive
privilege
for
Presidential communications.
The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
udner the Constitution."
418
u.s., at 705-706, 708.
Many
of
the
policy
considerations implicated by Presidential communications
would apply with nearly equal force to communications
among
Presidential
aides
and
other
high
Executive
officials. The separation-of-powers concerns are different
in the two cases, being less weighty where the President
personally is not involved. As digtiR9YieaeQ commentators
have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a
'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law."
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in
Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior" Federal Courts--A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014
(1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-
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broad-reaching discovery. t:hat eerr.gaee- s01:2fl6 gov er nmen L. 71
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Consistently with the balance,.., a-t ..wb.icb
we

therefore

u-1 high

hold

that

1

aimed in Butz,

WQ

executive

officials

~·
110

are

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

~ ~lu»~

violate A ~ed

conduct does not

le9~l

rights of which

UJ~ vS"~Ue-e•A.~4--I-.Jzt!),
they

reasonably

should

have

a

known.!\ Absent

clear

congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that
public

policy will not
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support the cost of conditioning

their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 8
Reliance

on

the

official's conduct,
law, 9
permit

?

objective

as measured

reasonableness
by reference

of

an

to settled

~

avoid excessive disruption of government and

w.i-:H.
/\

the

resolution

summary judgment.
lies
be

of~

insubstantial

claims

on

The identification of established legal

within

the

competence

a

factual

question

of
what

rna

an

official

8 This case involves no claim that Congress has
expressed its intent to impose "no fault" tort liability
on high federal officials for violations of particular
statutes or the Constitution.
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sonably

could

decisionmaking

be

expected

under

know. 10

to

pressures

of

time
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Charged
and

limits

of

information, not every official could be held responsible
for the most recent judicial developments.

But the judge

appropriately may determine what the law was at the time
an

action

necessary

L

occurred,
the

reserving

question

what

a

for

the

particular

jury

only

if

high

official

130

reasonably could be expected to know.
By

defining__;{

the

limits

on

a

high

official's

/
qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide
no

license

deterrence

to

lawless

of

conduct.

The

constitutional

public

interest

violations

and

in
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in

compensation of victims remains protected by a test that
focuses

on

the

official's acts.

objective

legal

reasonableness

of

an

Where an official knows that his conduct

will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to
hesitate.

10 cf.

Where his duties legitimately require action in

Procunier

v.

Navarette.

suora.

434

U.S .•

at
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10.

which established rights are not implicated--even if the
action potentially is harmful to someone that the official
dislikes--the

public

interest

frequently

may

be

served

better by fearless and unhesitating action. 11
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c
In

addition

to

the

question

of

good

faith,

cases

involving claims of qualified immunity frequently involve
disputes over
actions

ever

affidavits

whether

the

official's

occurred

at

a11. 12

or

allegedly wrongful

Where

otherwise--effectively

a

defendant--by

controverts
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a

plaintiff's factual averments, petitioners argue that the
plaintiff

should

be

required

to

make

some

substantial

showing in order to survive a motion for summary judgment
by a high
that

a

federal official.

claim

of

immunity

Consistently with our view
should

provide

an

effective

-4~~~~-~-o
11we emphasize that w~old only that a high federal
official is shielded again
liability for civil damages
arising from actions within t e scope of his duties and in
"objective" good faith.
We .i-ftt!imabs >11\iiiWiiJ.R9 •li;a,Qy-t the
conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might
be available.
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11.

barrier to trial of claims lacking in substance, we agree.
At the summary judgment stage in a case involving immunity
claims by high federal officials, we think it appropriate
to

require

a

showing of evidence by the plaintiff--with

allowance for

the uncertainty of developments at trial--
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from which a rational factfinder reasonably could conclude
that

the

"preponderance

of

the

evidence"

standard

was

satisfied.
Requiring this proof of substantiality will not deter
or

frustrate

pleading,
Further,

as
the

meritorious
for

proof

plaintiff

claims.
at

The

trial,

retains

requirements
remain

access

discovery to aid in carrying his burden.
prove

the

judgment,

merits
but

of

only

his

case

make

a

on

a

showing

to

for

unchanged.
reasonable

And he need not

motion
of

for

summary

substantiality

adequate to justify the cost--both public and private--of
subjecting a high federal official to trial.
D
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12.

appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District
Court, for

its reconsideration of this issue in light of

this opinion. 13
record

so

far

The trial court is more familiar with the
developed

and also

is better

situated

180

to

make any such further findings as may be necessary.

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and
the case remanded for further action consistent with this

185

opinion.
So ordered.

w~ 4 /JA...D-f ~~~ ~
~~~~1.-.- ~~ ~

13 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the
remand, to ule on the legal sufficiency of respondent's
"implied" c uses of action under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 and 18
U.S.C. §
505 and his Bivens claim under the First
Amendment.
we do not ~Q. to i:ntima.t:e that ei:ther tne
!Ita~~
f f.
Texas
Industries,
Inc.
v.
Radcliff
Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 638-639 (1981) (1981) (controlling
question is whether Congress affirmatively intended to
create a damages remedy), or the Bivens question, cf. Bush
v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576 (CAS 1981), affirming on
remand 598 F. 2d 9 58 (CAS 1979) (holding that the "unique
relationship between the Federal Government and its civil
service
employees
is
a
soecial consideration which

lfp/ss 03/12/82

Rider A, p. 19 (Harlow)

HARL19 SALLY-POW
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary
to protect the public interest in "encouraging the
vigorous exercise of official authority", 435 U.S. at 506,
because we believed that qualified immunity would
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith
mistakes.
"workable".

We assumed that such immunity would prove
There are indications, however, that some

District Courts have not understood our admonistion in
Butz that suits against high public officials should not
proceed to trial in the absence of a showing of
substantiality.

We reiterate this admonition.

A

plaintiff retains, of course, access to reasonable
discovery to aid in carrying his burden.

And he need not

2.

prove the merits of his case on a motion for summary
judgment.

But there should be a showing of sufficient

substantiality to justify the costs - both public and
private - of subjecting officials to protracted trials
when it is evident at the summary judgment stage that the
claims are insubstantial.

Note to Dick:

I would like to try on Justice Stevens

something along the foregoing lines.

I agree with you

that without Subpart C, the full force of our Part IV is
somewhat diluted.
I repeat that I would like to include in a
footnote much of what Gesell said at 608 F.2d at 1214,
that I quoted on page 17 of the 6th draft of my memorandum
(Version I) last spring.

